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Abstract
This thesis presents a comprehensive picture of the Italian political system 
under mixed electoral rules, between 1996 and 2001. It addresses how a 
mixed member majoritarian electoral system affects the incentive structure of 
parties, voters and legislators, which in turn affect political and social 
outcomes. The thesis consequently investigates three related phenomena 
which were not necessarily considered by the drafters of the reform; namely 
pre-electoral bargaining, split-ticket voting, and the link between dual 
candidacy and legislative behaviour. First, the thesis addresses pre-electoral 
coalition bargaining, investigating the role that parties’ policy positions play 
as a ‘threat’ resource. Second, the thesis investigates the impact of 
candidates’ policy positions, among other variables, on the tendency of voters 
to split their ticket. Finally, the thesis addresses how indicators of electoral 
path, such as the opportunity of MPs to run simultaneously in both 
proportional and majoritarian tiers, affect legislative behaviour. The research 
develops new theoretical insights, analyses new empirical data, and applies 
innovative methodological tools. Not only does the thesis shed light on the 
logic underlying these three intriguing phenomena, but also contributes to our 
understanding of mixed electoral systems. Specifically, by investigating the 
incentive structures of parties, voters and legislators under mixed rules, the 
thesis represents an important contribution to contamination theory. The 
results support the argument that mixed electoral systems are not merely the 
sum of their proportional and majoritarian elements, but instead constitute a 
new and distinct hybrid system.
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- PARTI-
CHAPTER 1 - INSTUTUTIONS, CHOICE AND
BEHAVIOUR: A COMPREHENSIVE MODEL OF 
MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM.
A popular view in the political science literature sees institutions as the 
means through which individual preferences and actions are aggregated into 
collective outcomes. This entails that institutional change translates into 
policy change (Riker, 1980; Ostrom, 1986). It is not surprising, therefore, that 
a lot of the scholarly social science’s attention is directed to study the nature 
of the different outcomes resulting from the emergence of new political 
institutions such as electoral systems. Different forms of electoral institutions 
translate into different forms of its players’ incentive structures, which in turn 
contribute to the change in the final policy outcome. Mixed electoral systems 
(MES) are among the latest innovations in the field of comparative electoral 
institutions, which paved the way to new research opportunities.
This thesis is a research piece about two utterly intriguing and at the 
same time fascinating units of analysis: ‘Italy’ and ‘mixed electoral rules’. 
Not only Italy has been a very fascinating topic of debate, and off-limits for 
many analytical scholars, but the introduction of mixed electoral rules 
between 1994 and 2005 renders it even more fascinating and intriguing.'
1 The mixed electoral system was officially introduced in 1993 through the so much wanted 
electoral reform. The 1994 and the 2001 elections were the first and the last elections to be 
carried out under those rules.
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Since their inception, these systems generated a lot of interest among 
political scientists. The combination of the proportional and majoritarian 
elements spawned a whole new area of research, and studies addressing 
mixed electoral systems grew so much to the extent that they are described as 
a “cottage industry” (Ferrara et al., 2005: 3). These studies, in fact, not only 
assess the ‘normative’ aspects of mixed systems, in terms of their merits and 
qualities (take for example the title of Shugart and Wattenberg’s 2001 book: 
“Mixed Electoral Systems: The Best o f Both Worlds?”), but they also assess 
their ‘positive’ aspects in light of the new mechanisms created by the union of 
the two rules (take for example the work on ‘contamination’ and its effects 
initiated by Herron and Nishikawa, 2001). More precisely, research is 
conducted on most aspects of mixed electoral systems; their origins (Shugart 
and Wattenberg, 2001; Navarra and Sobbrio, 2001), and their consequences in 
terms of parties (Nishikawa and Herron, 2004; Ferrara and Herron, 2005), 
voters (Bawn, 1999; Benoit et al., 2006; Karp et al., 2002) and legislators 
(Herron, 2002; Thames, 2001; Haspel et al., 1998).
Concerning the case study, Italy, for decades the proportional logic 
represented a “genetic trait of the Republican political system” (Bartolini and 
D’Alimonte, 1995: 7) which modelled and influenced its actors’ values and 
behaviour. With the adoption of a mixed electoral system Italy abandoned its 
old proportional tradition and introduced a system characterised by a dual 
ballot; a proportional as well as a majoritarian one. The first mixed elections,
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in 1994, represent a discontinuation with the past. This set of new rules 
affects the incentives of the main political actors, namely parties, voters and 
legislators, which consequently brings about changes to their behaviour. This 
reform makes the study of the new analytical elements, introduced by the dual 
ballot, necessary. These new elements, that did not characterise the old 
proportional system and upon which this thesis is articulated, include pre- 
electoral coalition formation, split-ticket voting and dual candidacy. By 
studying these aspects of the Italian political scenario under mixed rules, the 
scope of this thesis is to directly address how mixed electoral systems affect 
the incentive structure of parties, voters and legislators, which consequently 
affect their behaviour. Through this research I enhance the fairly developed 
body of theory in the field of mixed electoral systems with new theoretical 
insights and then I confront my theoretical arguments with empirical evidence 
using different types of data, as well as different and innovative 
methodological tools.
In doing so, this research constitutes a unique piece of work especially 
because it seeks to present a comprehensive picture of Italy under mixed rules 
relying on the most important stages of that era (1996-2001). The framework 
of this work is mainly justified by the seminal work of Austen-Smith and 
Banks (1988, 2005), who suggest that a multiparty representative system is 
identified by a social choice mechanism intended to aggregate individual 
preferences into social choices in four consecutive stages:
5
1. The pre-electoral stage: whereby parties position themselves in a 
policy space, chose a leader and declare their manifesto.
2. The electoral game: whereby voters choose whether to vote and for 
whom.
3. Coalition formation: characterised by a bargaining game over the 
division of a political cake.
4. The legislative stage: whereby policy is implemented as the social 
choice outcome.
A comprehensive model of a multiparty representative system must 
include these four consecutive stages (Schofield and Sened, 2006). By 
appropriately adapting these stages to the study of the Italian system under 
mixed rules, where for example both the coalition formation and the pre- 
electoral stages fuse into one single element, this research constitutes a 
thorough account of Italian political players’ new incentives under a mixed 
member majoritarian system.2
As the subsequent chapters demonstrate, research on mixed electoral 
systems has proliferated abundantly. Nevertheless, theoretical and empirical 
gaps still exist regarding the mechanisms through which mixed rules affect 
both choice and behaviour of the concerned actors. This is where this thesis 
intervenes. My objective is to focus on a clearly defined set of questions
2 As I explain in Chapter (2) the Italian mixed electoral system is known as a ‘mixed member 
majoritarian’ (MMM) system with partial compensation. This is different from mixed 
member proportional (MMP) systems whereby there exists a compensatory vote link between 
the two tiers (Shugart and Wattenberg, 2001).
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relating to how mixed electoral rules constrain and thus affect the choice and 
behaviour of involved actors. Consequently, this research plan is “intensive, 
rather than extensive” (Mudambi et al., 2001a: 7) and it contributes to the
theoretical and empirical debate on the political consequences of mixed
electoral laws.
While in this works I answer a different set of questions, I do 
nonetheless complement the ‘positive’ work of Mudambi et al. (2001 a,b) that 
covered both the 1994 and the 1996 elections. In fact, while their studies 
focus on both normative (constitutional political economy) and positive
(public choice) aspects of voting rules in Italy, in my research plan I only
focus on the latter. In other words, I focus “on choices subject to rules that 
define any community’s political institutions and on the manner in which 
such institutions impact on collective decision making” (Rowley, 2004: 3). 
This implies that I forgo the objective of evaluating mixed electoral systems 
and I limit my purpose to analysing the implications of these rules for 
political behaviour.
The goal of this thesis is ambitious; to formulate hypotheses that seek to 
find and describe causal relationships. Consequently, I discuss my empirical 
findings with caution and candour recognizing that like every other 
methodology and dataset the ones I adopt in this work have their own 
limitations. In the respective empirical chapters 4, 5 and 6 I use a variety of 
quantitative methods to test my hypotheses. In each chapter I try to identify
7
the best and most appropriate empirical technique that is adequate for the data 
available as well as for the questions I pose.
Summing up, this research aims at making both theoretical and 
empirical contributions to the mixed electoral systems literature, in general, 
and to Italian studies, in particular. On the one hand, the thesis makes an 
important theoretical contribution to the topic of pre-electoral bargaining. As I 
demonstrate in Chapter (3.1), the dividing line between coalitions formed ‘to 
establish a government’ and those formed ‘to divide a pie’ is blurred and 
under-investigated. Consequently, the resource-based account I develop to 
explain pre-electoral coalition bargaining fills the theoretical gap that prevails 
in this field. On the other hand, while the theory of split-ticket voting and that 
of legislative behaviour under mixed rules is rather developed, academics 
reach somewhat inconclusive results as how voting and legislative behaviour 
is constrained under these forms of rules. Consequently, this thesis chews 
over, expands and replicates some existing theoretical insights and tests them 
in the Italian mixed context. The use of advanced econometric tools such as 
Bayesian simulations as opposed to the use of survey data to study the split- 
ticket phenomenon, and the breaking down of variables into smaller units like 
I do for the legislative behaviour section, together generate more precise and 
reliable empirical results that help explaining how institutions constrain
8
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choice. Since comparative political theorists in general and Italianists in 
particular have been unable to determine the merits of mixed electoral rules 
without ambiguity, the issue must ultimately be decided empirically. The 
objective of this study is, therefore, to provide such an important empirical 
contribution.
1.1 Research questions of the thesis.
As stressed in the above introduction, the direct scope of this thesis is to 
address how mixed member majoritarian (MMM) electoral systems, like the 
Italian system between 1994-2006, affect the incentive structure of parties, 
voters and legislators, which in turn affect and alter political outcomes. While 
the main focus is to analyse how the interaction of plurality and 
proportionality constrain and thus affect political behaviour, the findings have 
wider implications. The major by-product of answering this general question 
is to determine the extent to which the behaviour of the above actors is 
different under mixed rules than it is under pure majoritarian or proportional 
rules. In other words, to assess the extent to which the interaction of the two 
tiers produces a new system with some old features but also with new and 
unique ones. This implies that this research touches upon the issue of 
‘contamination’ between the two tiers. To be more precise; it addresses the 
extent to which mixed systems can be defined as hybrid new systems as
3 While technically King’s (1997) approach is actually based on importance sampling from 
constrained maximum likelihood and not a fully Bayesian method, I refer to it as ‘Bayesian’ 
for simplicity.
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opposed to the mere sum of proportional and plurality systems (Ferrara et al, 
2005; Herron and Nishikawa, 2001).
With the above premises in place, it becomes obvious that this study 
fits the wider academic research that spans across areas. The study of 
electoral institutions - qualitative, quantitative, formal, or comparative - is 
among the most developed in political science. While this research seeks to 
contribute to the already existing literature about mixed electoral systems, it 
follows a clear-cut rationale. It is clear by now that the general research goal 
of this thesis is to evaluate how mixed electoral rules constrain and thus affect 
the choice and behaviour of political actors. This, however, is achieved by 
addressing three new distinct phenomena engendered by the reform. Through 
the study of pre-electoral coalition bargaining, split-ticket voting and dual 
candidacy this thesis evaluates the new set of incentives faced by parties, 
voters and legislators under mixed electoral rules to give an analytical 
explanation and assessment of the consequences of such rules. Consequently, 
this thesis tackles the change of incentives in three scenarios and as such it 
engenders three different research questions:
“Ql: How does the strategic environment created by mixed electoral rules 
affect pre-electoral coordination? More specifically, what affects bargaining 
potentials in pre-electoral alliances? ”
Pre-electoral intra-coalition bargaining and the distribution of electoral 
districts among allies is the first interesting phenomenon that we can observe 
in Italy after the introduction of mixed rules. In pre-reform Italy with pure
10
proportionality the decision to run in each district was a matter of internal 
politics. With the transition to a different system characterised by an abundant 
majoritarian element (75%), the decision to run in each electoral district 
becomes a tricky one. As explained in detail in future chapters, the new 
incentive structure created by the new rules of the game imposes on parties 
within each coalition the need to gather around a negotiation table to 
coordinate entry decisions. In order to maximise the chances of winning as 
many single member districts (SMDs) as possible, allied parties face the need 
to distribute the electoral cake composed of 475 districts among themselves. 
The question of ‘who stands where’ (i.e. who gets what), therefore, becomes a 
very salient issue and the essence of pre-electoral coalition bargaining under 
the new rules.
In the relevant theoretical chapter of this thesis I highlight the absence 
of a proper theoretical account for pre-electoral intra coalition bargaining. I 
fill this gap by proposing a resource-based theoretical model, which I later 
test empirically. I then move to the second question of the thesis:
“Q2: How does the strategic environment created by mixed electoral rules 
affect voters ’ behaviour and in particular split-ticket voting? ”
Voters’ electoral behaviour is another interesting phenomenon related to 
the incentives created by the new mixed rules. Voters under these new rules 
face two voting choices rather than one; they are all endowed with a 
proportional and a majoritarian ballot. One the one hand, in the proportional
11
tier parties obtain a share of seats that is proportional to their electoral size.4 
Consequently, voters can express a sincere preference and vote for their first 
choice without running the risk of harming it. On the other hand, in the 
majoritarian arena their choice is restricted by what is on offer by the 
coalition. Following Benoit et al. (2006) these voters are identified as 
“frustrated voters”. In such situations frustrated voters might opt to vote for 
another party’s candidate within the same coalition, vote for a party belonging 
to another coalition or even vote for an independent party not belonging to 
any coalition. In multiparty systems the choice to abandon the preferred 
party’s coalition to another party belonging to another alliance in the plurality 
tier can have serious consequences on the victory chances of alliances. 
Consequently, it is necessary to analyse the motives and the conditions under 
which frustrated voters are driven to jeopardise or at least affect the victory 
chances of the coalition to which their preferred party belongs.
This analysis complements the existing literature in two major ways. 
First, by simultaneously testing some of the most important theories of split- 
ticket voting on the 2001 Italian general ‘Lower House’ elections this work 
seeks to identify the validity of existing explanations. Second, the research 
employs some of the most recent methodological advancements, not yet 
widely used, known as Bayesian simulations. This latter method is adopted in 
order to (attempt to) overcome the widely known ecological inference
4 This is simplified account of the two tiers. In the next chapter I explain the nature o f the 
system in more details.
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problem, which arises when using common election data, through the 
simulation of more precise dependent variables. Finally, I move to the last 
question:
“Q3: How does the strategic environment created by mixed electoral rules 
constrain the behaviour o f office seeking legislators? More specifically, how 
does the opportunity created by the reform to run in both proportional and 
majoritarian tiers affect legislative behaviour o f elected MPs? ”
The interaction of proportional and majoritarian tiers is finally analysed 
within the context of legislative politics. Whether the incentives faced by 
proportional and majoritarian candidates differ in influencing their legislative 
behaviour is of great importance. While there are various studies concerning 
legislative behaviour under pure proportional and pure majoritarian systems, 
more research is needed in the context of mixed systems.
Apart from shedding some light on the nature of legislative behaviour in 
the Italian Parliament, this area of research is interesting from a more general 
‘mixed-electoral system’ perspective. The conclusions I draw from the 
legislative behaviour investigations help us understand more about the nature 
of the new incentives faced by MPs touching upon the new ‘hot topic’ within 
mixed electoral systems, that of contamination effects (Herron and 
Nishikawa, 2001). The ‘contamination effects’ theory suggests that mixed 
electoral systems do not simultaneously exhibit the same characteristics of 
both majoritarian and proportional systems. This is because the interaction of 
those two tiers creates a new hybrid system with its own identity and features.
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Therefore, by studying the legislative behaviour of those MPs who run in 
either a proportional district only (similar to pre-reform), or in a majoritarian 
district only and comparing it to the behaviour of those who run in two tiers 
simultaneously (only possible during the mix rules era), I can shed some light 
on the issue of whether this new system portrays new and unique traits from a 
legislative behaviour standpoint.
By drawing important elements from the political economy literature I 
investigate the role that district-specific characteristics (such as seat safety) 
and candidate-specific characteristics (such as an MP’s electoral mandate) 
play in explaining legislative behaviour using NOMINATE scores as my data 
(Landi and Pelizzo, 2006a).5
This analysis contributes to the limited existing literature of Italian 
legislative politics in two major ways. First, I analyse legislative behaviour in 
Italy using a different set of data so far unused for this parliament; that is 
NOMINATE scores instead of simple roll call data (RC).6 This data comes 
from the analysis of 242 bills voted by 642 MPs during the XIII Italian 
legislature. Second, I study legislative behaviour at three different levels. At 
the first level I compare two categories of MPs; those who run in either
5 Even though recent work of Landi and Pelizzo (2006b) estimates Optimal Classification 
(OC) scores for the same legislature, I use NOMINATE scores as they represent the 
‘industry’ standard for scaling roll call (RC) votes.
6 One clear advantage of NOMINATE vis-a-vis raw RC is that we can obtain the 
directionality o f individual’s policy positions. For example, while RC can indicate weather a 
legislator is closer or further away than the party mean (median) compared to another 
legislator, NOMINATE can go further by indicating weather that same legislator is closer or 
further and in which direction (to the right or the left) compared to the party mean (median). 
For a more detailed explanation of the shortcomings of simple RC see Poole and Rosenthal 
(1997), p. 5-7.
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districts (only SMD or only PR) and those who run in both. At a second 
deeper level I compare three categories of MPs; those who run in PR districts, 
those who run in SMD ones, and those who run in both. Finally, at the 
deepest level of analysis I further disentangle the category of MPs who run in 
both districts into four mutually exclusive categories that combine their 
political mandate with their electoral path. While this is an uncommon 
procedure in most legislative studies, as they usually separate mandate and 
path, this classification sheds the light on new interesting results about what 
affects legislative behaviour under mixed rules.
1.2 Overview of the thesis.
In the next Chapter I address the general theoretical views and the
existing empirical work permeating the literature on mixed electoral systems 
in general as well as the main literature that addresses the Italian system under 
mixed rules. This information is necessary in order to identify the body of 
literature to which this thesis contributes to and reveals the gaps that need to 
be filled.
In Chapter (3) I move to the discussion of the more detailed theories 
related to the three research questions. This part also exhibits a dual purpose. 
First, it gathers the theoretical explanations that the literature provides 
addressing the three political phenomena under investigation. Second, it 
complements the existing material with my own theoretical reflections, and 
extensions.
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In the subsequent three chapters (4, 5, and 6) I adopt a quite similar 
structure; the difference rests in the topic each one addresses. First, I present 
and explain the data employed in each chapter. Then, I expand on the research 
design, present detailed hypotheses and justify the methodology employed. 
This is followed by reporting the results and a discussion of the estimations. 
Each empirical chapter relies on a different set of dependent variables, 
explanatory variables and methodology. While the explanatory variables 
sometimes overlap, for consistency reasons and in order to facilitate the 
reader to follow the logic of each chapter, I address the data, the methodology 
and the results of each single topic together in individual chapters.
Finally, in Chapter (7) I sum up the main findings and address the 
implications of the empirical chapters.
7 This order is not followed in Chapter (5), whereby I discuss the methodology first. This is 
necessary as the data I use are derived through Bayesian simulations which need to be fully 
introduced.
CHAPTER 2 - ITALY AND MIXED ELECTORAL 
RULES: NEW OPPORTUNITIES AND NEW
CHOICES.
This chapter is divided into two sections; the first one focuses on mixed 
electoral systems and the other focuses on the Italian political system under 
mixed rules. The scope of addressing the literature that addresses these two 
topics consists in highlighting the important contribution of this thesis in 
filling the existing theoretical and empirical gaps that transpire from the 
literature.
The first section uncovers the main body of knowledge concerning 
mixed systems. I start from the simple definition and description and then I 
move to a more detailed account of their working mechanisms in terms of 
how these systems differ from pure ones. In particular, I address the 
distinctiveness of these systems vis-a-vis pure ones in their ability to affect 
the incentive structure of the political system’s players; namely parties, voters 
and legislators. This touches upon the topic of mixed systems as being a new 
hybrid form with their own characteristics and not as the mere product of 
uniting plurality and proportionality. This latter feature brings about the need 
to distinguish between ‘interaction’ and ‘contamination’; two concepts that 
are often confused in the literature.
The second section addresses the body of literature that investigates the 
Italian political system under mixed rules between 1994 and 2005. This is
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essential in order to highlight the main contribution of the literature but 
especially to highlight the several remaining pending question marks. This 
section is particularly important as it highlights the existing ‘gaps’ especially 
in reference to the theoretical debates advanced by studies on mixed electoral 
systems.
On the one hand, these two sections encompass the body of literature to 
which this thesis contributes both theoretically and empirically. On the other 
hand, they demonstrate how both my theoretical arguments and my empirical 
findings are generalizable beyond the Italian case and which can travel 
beyond Italy’s borders.
Generalizing about electoral politics is not a trivial matter. Every 
country is unique. Even those countries that share a similar electoral system 
challenge those who govern it with a distinctive mixture of historical 
precedents, democratic principles, social conventions and popular demands. 
This would lead us to expect that clarifying accounts of one country’s 
electoral politics will seem bizarre when applied elsewhere. If a theoretical 
framework can explain important aspects of pre-electoral bargaining, voting 
and legislative behaviour in the Italian ‘unique’ context, can I use it to better 
explain electoral politics in other countries with similar electoral systems? 
Throughout this thesis, I answer “Yes.” Using a single case study to analyse 
the feature of mixed electoral systems is not an uncommon procedure. Most 
of the literature on mixed systems focuses on a single country or on a small
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group of countries (Ferrara et al., 2005: 11). The framework adopted 
throughout this thesis stems from the premise that electoral rules constrain the 
choice and the behaviour of political actors. Therefore, by controlling for 
country specific variables, as I do in this thesis, this work can be extended to 
understand the ‘rules-constrains-behaviour’ relationships under mixed rules in 
other countries outside of Italy.
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2.1. Mixed Electoral Systems.
“...electoral engineering is a highly inexact science and one liable to rebound upon
those who try to practice it'.
Bogdanor (1983: 16)
2.1.1. Focus on Mixed Electoral Systems (I): A New Species of 
Electoral Institutions.
Recently, mixed systems of representation witnessed a “surprising
growth in the popularity” (Cox and Schoppa, 2002: 1027); they became de 
jour (Thames, 2005). These systems are in fact used to govern a great deal of 
the world’s population, and they are found in countries of all sizes and on all 
continents (Massicotte and Blais, 1999: 345). Back in 2001 Herron and 
Nishikawa affirm that during the last decade in more than twenty national 
parliaments, and in several other sub national units, a form of mixed systems 
was employed to elect representatives (63). It is estimated that hundreds of 
millions of voters took part in an elections characterised by this form of 
institutional framework (Ferrara and Herron, 2005: 16). While very few 
countries are abandoning this institution (like Italy and the Ukraine), the 
positive trend is constantly increasing, especially in former Soviet Union 
countries which previously adopted or are still adopting this form of 
representation (Kostadinova, 2002: 24).
The data provided by Golder (2004), which covers 199 countries from 
all continents over the period between 1946 and 2000, shows that there is a 
clear and increasing trend in the adoption of mixed systems of representation
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(Figure 2.1) and that Eastern and Western Europe witnessed a boom during 
the nineties (Figure 2.2).
Figure (2.1): Electoral Systems Across 199 Countries Between 1946 and 2000.
Figure (2.2): Mixed Electoral Systems Distribution Between 1946 and 2000.
■  1940s ■ 1950s □  1960s □  1970s ■ 1980s ■  1990s
Source: Golder (2004).
Consequently given the rising number of mixed electoral systems 
around the world, it is important that the implications o f these systems are 
analysed for the working of democracy, especially because they are high on 
the engineering agenda of many other new and old democracies.
Going back to basics, an electoral system is simply the mathematical 
formula through which votes are translated into seats. The choice of which 
mathematical formula to employ, consequently, affects every component of 
the representative system. While scholars have extensively evaluated the 
consequences o f the extended and diverse families o f pure proportional and 
plurality electoral systems (Cox, 1990; Cox and Shugart, 1996; Downs, 1957; 
Rae, 1967; Tsebelis, 1986 just to name a few); a less extensive but yet 
increasing amount of work exists to address the consequences of this new 
form of institutions. Scholars, in fact, agree on the necessity to expand the
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research agenda on mixed electoral systems (Kostadinova, 2002; Massicotte 
and Blais, 1999).
According to Nishikawa and Herron (2004) the existing literature on 
mixed electoral systems can be disentangled into three main groups. One 
group is concerned with the normative aspects of the study of mixed systems 
and is mainly concerned with their description and classification. The other 
two address more positive aspects of the study of mixed systems and are 
divided into a case study group and a cross-national research group.
The first group of research addresses the nature of this form of 
institutions in terms of definition and taxonomy, as well as its origin and 
development. While various opinions exist concerning what constitutes a 
mixed electoral system, some common ideas prevail. The first one is that all 
mixed systems combine the two principles of representations, whether it has a 
two ballots structure (Shugart and Wattenberg, 2001) or it uses only one tier 
(Golder, 2005). Reynolds and Reilly (1997) define mixed electoral systems as 
those which “use both PR lists and plurality majority (‘winner takes all’) 
districts” (19). Massicotte and Blais (1999) define mixed rules as “the 
combination o f different electoral formulas (plurality or PR; majority or PR)
o
fo r an election to a single body” (345). For Shugart and Wattenberg (2001) 
electoral systems are a “subset of the broader category of multiple-tier 
electoral systems [...] with the specific proviso that one tier must entail
8 Emphasis in original.
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allocation of seats nominally whereas the other must entail allocation of seats 
by lists'’ (10).9 As Ferrara et al. (2005) highlight, while the list of systems 
classified as mixed varies across definitions, one fundamental element 
prevails across them (17). That is the allocation of seats by more than one 
formula. This defines the fundamental criterion for Ferrara et al.’s definition 
of mixed systems. According to them a mixed electoral system is one where 
'‘'‘more than one formula is employed to distribute legislative seats” (17).10 In 
line with other definitions and taxonomies, by “more than one formula” they 
mean a proportional formula reflected through the adoption of party lists and 
semi-proportional or a majoritarian formula where votes are cast nominally 
for individual candidates. This definition excludes electoral systems that use 
variations of one formula for the same district (such as Remainders-Hare and 
D’Hont or SMD plurality and majority run off) from being defined as 
mixed.11
The second common view scholars agree on is the fact that various 
forms of mixed systems actually exist and that they can be classified 
according to some distinct taxonomies. Scholars distinguish between mixed 
member systems on the basis of the independence or the dependence of the 
two tiers (Shugart and Wattenberg, 2001; Massicotte and Blais, 1999; and 
Golder, 2005). For example, Shugart and Wattenberg (2001) distinguish
9 Emphasis in original.
10 Emphasis in original.
11 Remainders-Hare and D’Hont are two formulae used to distribute PR seats, while SMD 
plurality and majority run off are two formulae used to distribute majoritarian seats.
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between mixed member majoritarian electoral systems (MMM) and mixed 
member proportional electoral systems (MMP) whereby the former is 
characterised by two parallel tiers while in the second there exists a
19compensatory link between the two (13). Finally, this group also tackles 
aspects ranging from the origins of these systems and their evolution (Bawn, 
1993; Benoit and Schiemann, 2001; Diaz-Cayeros and Magaloni, 2001; 
Dunleavy and Margetts, 2001; Gambetta and Warner, 2004; Nagel, 2004; 
Remington and Smith, 1995; and Wada 2004).
The other two groups concerned with mixed electoral systems are those 
that focus on the research of the specific features of these institutions through 
empirical theory testing. As mentioned in the introduction, the proliferation 
and expansion of research on mixed systems was mushroom-like. In 
particular, this analytical group investigates, in a mixture of case study and 
cross national contexts, the nature of party systems and electoral coordination 
under these rules (Barker and McLay, 2000; Bartolini et al., 2004; Benoit 
2001; Birch, 2000; Denemark, 2003, Ferrara 2004a, 2004b, 2006; Herron, 
2002; Herron and Nikishawa, 2001; Nishikawa and Herron, 2004; Katz, 1996; 
Kostadinova 2002, 2006; Moser and Sheiner, 2005; Reed, 2001), as well as 
voting behaviour (Bawn, 1999; Bawn and Thies, 2003; Benoit et al. 2006; 
Benoit et al., 2005; Burden and Kimball, 1998; Fisher, 1973; Gschwend et al.,
12 The Italian mixed electoral system is a Mixed Member Majoritarian system with partial 
compensation, whereby list votes are reduced from successful majoritarian candidates who 
are linked to those lists. For a detailed discussion on MMM and MMP as well as for the 
distinction of votes and seats linkages, see Shugart and Wattenberg, 2001: 13-18.
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2003; Karp et al., 2002; Klingemann and Wessel, 2001; Moser and Scheiner, 
2005; Reed, 1999; Roberts, 1988; Schoen, 1999) and legislative behaviour 
(Haspel et al. 1998; Herron, 2002; Judge and Ilonskzki, 1995; Remington and 
Smith, 1995; Smith and Remington, 2001; Thames, 2001).
Perhaps the common feature among these four groups of research on 
mixed electoral systems consists in the two fundamental questions, often 
confused, that they pose, directly or indirectly, concerning the nature of mixed 
systems. On the one hand, this body of research addresses the question of 
“whether mixed systems represent a new hybrid of electoral institutions and 
what are the new consequences of such new and ‘different’ systems”. On the 
other hand, it addresses the question of “the nature and the extent of 
contamination between the two electoral formulae” (Bawn and Thies, 2003; 
Cox and Schoppa, 2002; and Ferrara et al., 2005; Herron and Nishikawa, 
2001).
Most of the analytical work on mixed electoral systems addresses how 
the combination of majority and proportionality affects strategic behaviour of 
parties and voters. This is known as the “controlled comparison approach” 
whereby the two different logics can be studied in isolation. However, this 
method, by definition, minimizes the implications of such a combination 
(Bawn and Thies, 2003; Cox and Schoppa 2002).
One the contrary, some scholars argue that the two tiers are not 
independent of each other by reversing the causal relationship of Duverger
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(1985). In other words, instead of focusing on the impact that electoral rules 
exert on the number of parties (Duverger, 1985: 72) these studies investigate 
how the multiparty competition, which characterises PR competition, spills 
over to the SMD contest (Cox and Schoppa, 2002; Ferrara, 2004; Herron, 
2002; Herron and Nikishawa, 2001). These studies suggest that these systems 
violate the above mentioned independence assumption and as such they 
should not be used as laboratories for ‘controlled experiments’. This thesis fits 
this branch of the literature whereby the interaction between the majoritarian 
and the proportional components of mixed electoral systems is considered to 
“give rise to incentive structures that differ from those we would observe if 
the two tiers operated independently” (Ferrara et al., 2005: 4). Following this 
rationale, the interaction between the mechanical components of majority and 
proportionality is likely to produce outcomes that diverge from those 
observed under separate pure rules. Consequently, mixed systems do not 
constitute a controlled laboratory setting whereby independent effects of 
majority and proportionality can be isolated and compared.
With these premises in mind, this thesis will go beyond its main scope, 
which is the analysis of how the new incentive structure created by mixed 
rules affects the behaviour of the electoral system’s players. In fact, while 
pursuing this goal the results of the empirical analysis will by default 
simultaneously shed some light on the issue of ‘interaction’ and
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‘contamination’. However, a few words should be first spent regarding the 
difference between the two.
The contamination literature, lead by the work of Herron and Nishikawa 
(2001) and that of Ferrara et al. (2005), mainly suggests that mixed electoral 
systems constitute a new species of electoral rules. According to them, 
contamination can be observed at both the micro and at the more aggregate 
level. At the micro-level, contamination is “when the behaviour o f a voter, a 
party, a candidate or a legislator, in one tier o f the election is demonstrably 
affected by the institutional rules employed in the other tier". At the aggregate 
level, contamination is observed “when a particular outcome produced in one 
tier [...] is affected by the institutional features o f the other*' (Ferrara et al., 
2005: 8-9).13 However, this definition fails to distinguish between interaction 
and contamination. In fact, while different these two concepts are seldom 
used interchangeably. Ferrara et al. in fact posit that “the two components of 
mixed rules do not operate independently, but are characterised by profound 
interaction that alters the decision-making processes and ultimately the 
choices of relevant political actors” (2005: 139).14 Nevertheless, interaction 
does not automatically translate into contamination. The mere fact that the 
two distinct tiers interact and give birth to a new mixed system with new 
characteristics does not necessarily mean that the features of one tier (its 
outcome) affect the features of the other tier (its outcomes). To be more
13 Emphasis in original.
14 Emphasis in original.
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precise, interaction implies the following. The union of the two tiers generates 
a third system which is not equal to the mere sum of the two. The difference 
in this third system lies in the fact that the new incentive structure diverges 
from the incentive structure under the two distinct rules. In other words, 
contamination is an automatic indicator of interaction. However, interaction 
does not automatically signal contamination. To give an example, in the 
Italian political scenario under mixed rules the creation of ‘pre-electoral 
alliances’ is an evidence of interaction. The co-existence of proportionality 
and majority per se imposes the need on parties to come together under pre- 
electoral alliances in order to win as many SMDs as possible. There is no 
contamination in this scenario, but simply interaction. However, in the case of 
Ferrara’s (2004) study about entry decision of Italian parties in SMDs, where 
he demonstrates that the number of parties running in the majoritarian tier 
affects the performance of parties in the PR tier; we can talk about both 
interaction and contamination. Consequently, my understanding of 
contamination is more limited than that of Ferrara et al. (2005). 
Consequently, I consider that when two tiers “give rise to incentive structures 
that differ from those we would observe if the two tiers operated 
independently” (2005: 4) as ‘interaction’ without contamination.
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2.1.2. Political Actors’ Incentives Under Pure Systems vs. Political 
Actors’ Incentives Under Mixed Systems.
In order to pursue the scope of this thesis, to investigate the new
incentive structures that prevail under mixed rules, it is useful to look first at 
the political players’ incentives under pure systems. Consequently, this 
section illustrates the incentives of political actors under distinct proportional 
and majoritarian systems.
More precisely, this brief section describes (1) How electoral systems 
affect party competition and their electoral strategies, (2) How electoral 
systems affect voting behaviour and (3) How electoral systems affect 
legislators’ propensity to vote against their party.
2.1.2. a. Parties Electoral Strategies: Proportionality vs. majority.
Parties’ electoral strategy is a very broad theme. In fact, it could entail 
parties’ electoral campaigns, their revealed policy platforms, candidate 
selection, entry decisions and the choice of partners for coalition formation, 
just to name a few. What I am concerned with in this section, however, is only 
the aspect of parties’ electoral strategies related to coalition formation. The 
scope is to distinguish between the incentives that parties face concerning 
coming together in both ‘pre’ and ‘post’ electoral alliances. In other words, 
how do mixed electoral systems differ from pure PR and majoritarian systems 
in terms of the constraints they generate on coalition formation strategies? 
With few exceptions, in parliamentary democracies single parties are usually 
unable to command a majority of support in the legislature. Consequently,
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when they desire to be involved in the executive power they are typically 
forced to enter a form or another of coalitions. Pre-electoral coalitions are 
understood as a collection of parties that come together before elections and 
choose to co-ordinate their electoral strategies rather than running for office 
alone (Golder, 2006a: 194). In those rare studies about pre-electoral coalitions 
Golder (2006a, b) reports that it is a common and implicit claim in the 
coalition literature that pre-electoral coalitions are a simple function of 
electoral rules (Shepsle and Boncheck, 1997; Laver and Schofield, 1998). 
More specifically, “Systems not based on PR lists tend to force parties to 
coalesce before elections in order to exploit electoral economies of scale. The 
more disproportional the electoral system, the greater the incentives for pre- 
electoral alliances” (Strom et al., 1994: 316). However, through a thorough 
empirical analysis Golder reaches different conclusions and suggests that pre- 
electoral coalitions can also form in highly proportional electoral systems. 
According to her it is not the electoral rule that matters but instead the 
expected utility from forming the coalition before elections as opposed to the 
expected utility from running independently (2006: 197).
In both pre and post electoral alliances a party will make some 
concessions in terms of policy and office to its coalition partners. However, in 
pre-electoral alliances concessions may be more costly than those made 
afterwards. This is because after elections any concessions that must be made 
to other parties in terms of ministerial posts or coalition policies can be
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presented to party members as a consequence of the votes cast by the 
electorate. However, concessions that occur before an election can only be 
blamed on the party leadership (Ibid: 197). Consequently, the reason for 
which parties do not wait until after elections has to do with winning 
probabilities. Because pre-electoral coalitions can affect the probability that a 
party enters government, party leaders will form them if they believe that it 
“will increase their probability of entering government to such an extent that 
the expected utility from doing this is larger than the expected utility from 
running independently” (ibid: 197).
While there is no specific research undertaken, yet, concerning pre- 
electoral coalition under mixed rules; both the above views contribute to the 
explanation of the formation of this type of alliances. On the one hand, by 
definition mixed rules employ some elements of majority rules that are 
considered to provide incentives for pre-electoral alliances. On the other hand, 
the presence of a PR threshold might negatively affect a party’s probability of 
winning if running independently. This in itself creates incentives to create 
this form of alliances.
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2.2.b. Voting Behaviour (Split-ticket behaviour): Proportionality vs. majority.
Divided government and split-ticket voting are usually studied together. 
This phenomenon is usually studied in those electoral systems which adopt a 
majoritarian or plurality formula in whole or in part (like it is the case for 
mixed systems). In fact, incentives to split the ticket in proportional systems 
are weaker as a voter can simply vote for her preferred candidate without 
risking wasting her vote.15
The American and the British electoral systems are two examples of 
majoritarian systems investigated by scholars of split-ticket behaviour. (Bom, 
1994; Burden and Kimball 2002; Fiorina, 1996; Grofman et al., 2000 for the 
USA and Johnston and Pattie, 1991; Railings, 2003 for Britain). As for mixed 
systems, split-ticket research is available for several countries such as 
Germany (Bawn, 1999; Gschwend et al., 2003; Schoen, 1999; Italy (Benoit et 
al., 2006; Venturino, 2002), New Zealand (Johnston and Pattie, 1999, 2002, 
2003; Karp et al., 2002), Japan (Kohno, 1997; Reed, 1999) and Russia 
(McAllister and White, 2000).
15 That is if  the party, of course, reaches the pre-determined PR threshold.
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2.L2.C. Legislative Behaviour: Proportionality vs. majority.
There is little question that electoral rules do have persistent and 
significant effects on legislative behaviour. Electoral systems have different 
impacts in terms of how they can influence personal vote. This in fact could 
be affected by access to ballots, access to financial resources and by career 
advancement considerations (Collie, 1985; Loewenberg and Patterson, 1975; 
Weaver and Rockman 1993). In other words, different institutions provide 
legislators with different opportunities and different incentives to skew away 
from party lines. 16 More specifically, in the legislative behaviour literature 
there are three institutional elements which are highly investigated; namely 
electoral rules, candidate selection procedure and district magnitude (Carey 
and Shugart, 1995; Hix 2001; 1995; Mitchell, 2000; Pennings and Hazan, 
2001; Samuels, 1999). Electoral rules are arranged on a continuum on the 
basis of the extent to which voters can exert preference. Electoral systems are 
consequently ordered from closed-list proportional representation (PR) 
systems (with the most party-centred setting and little or no incentive to seek 
personal vote), to single-member-simple-plurality and single-member-
16 I refer to the act of MPs to skew away from party lines with the term ‘legislative 
individualism’. In the legislative behaviour literature the tendency o f an MP to vote with or 
against party lines is usually addressed under the labels of ‘cohesion’ or ‘discipline’. There 
exist a clear distinction, and a long debate, between what both discipline and cohesion are 
(see Owens, 2003). Party cohesion is described as a “bottom up phenomenon” while party 
discipline is viewed as a “top down” one (Giannetti and Laver, 2008: 2). Discipline is 
reflected in MPs responding to the party’s rewards and punishment system while cohesion is 
the product of coordinated behaviour stemming from individuals’ incentives. The end- 
product of the presence of either of the two is, however, the same. In fact, in both cases we 
observe that MPs are compact and vote with party lines. However, in this thesis such 
distinction is not relevant as the dependent variable is an MPs tendency to vote with or 
against party line; in other words her degree of ‘legislative individualism’.
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alternative vote or double-ballot systems (with limited effectiveness to of 
personal voting), to folly open-list PR systems and single-transferable-vote 
(with the most candidate-centred setting, which makes personal voting the 
most effective). As far as candidate selection is concerned, in those systems in 
which there is weak central party leaders’ control over access to and orderings 
on ballots; there are significant incentives for candidates to cultivate personal 
identification and support that might consequently tend to stray away from 
party lines. On the contrary, in systems where parties have a strong control 
over nominations, legislators seeking re-elections have great incentives to 
support their parties. Finally, the role of district magnitude is also considered 
a central one. In fact, the size of a district influences the ability of a party 
leadership to threaten the punishment of a candidate by moving her, for 
example, down its lists. Candidates in small districts are more vulnerable to 
pressures from their party leaders than candidates in large districts because in 
the latter popular incumbents have greater chances to stand as independent 
candidates.
When it comes to mixed system, however, the picture is blurred and the 
literature provides inconclusive answers concerning the incentive structure of 
legislators. As I demonstrate in Chapter 3.3 there is no agreement on the 
matter as existing studies reach quite diverging conclusions.
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2.2. Italy.
2.2.1 Focus on Italy: The New Institutional Dimension 1994-2001. 
While several studies address the reasons behind electoral reform in
general, there is a common agreement concerning the motivations behind the
Italian electoral reform. In Shugart and Wattenberg’s (2001) language, the
reform was designed to fix pathologies arising from ‘extreme’ institutional
I n
features. To be more specific, Italy (like Israel) exhibited a severe form of 
hyper representation or what Sartori labelled as “polarized pluralism” (1976). 
In fact, the long dominance of the Christian Democracy (Democrazia 
Cristiana) prevented any form of power alternation and favoured the spread 
of political corruption. It is not a surprise, therefore, that the decrease in the 
number of parties not only was the most anticipated and awaited consequence 
of the reform but also the one most studied by scholars of Italian politics. 
Interest in this topic was amplified by the fact that the first elections held 
under the new mixed rules (in 1994) witnessed a proliferation rather than a 
decrease in the number of parties (Morlino, 1996). While research conducted 
in this area provides some satisfactory answers to one of the most solicited 
questions posed by the new rules, so many other questions remain 
unanswered. Even if the emergence of phenomena such as pre-electoral party 
competition or split-ticket voting are phenomena not originally nor
17 See Pappalardo (1994), and Katz (2001:102-106) for an in-depth discussion about the 
motivations behind the Italian electoral reform as well as the original aspired goals o f Italian 
electoral reformers.
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intentionally contemplated by the reform advocates, they are, nonetheless, 
important outcomes of the new rules of the game which need to be addressed. 
This brings me to the explanation of the choice of the Italian lower house as a 
case study, and in particular the 1996 and 2001 elections, which is justifiable 
on several grounds. To begin with, the nature of the new system is ideal for 
the study of mixed systems. The coexistence of the plurality and proportional 
tiers provide an excellent environment for the study of the new incentives 
faced by the system’s actors under the new rules of the game. Second, the 
Italian lower house is a fertile ground of research from an empirical point of 
view. Compared to other parliamentary systems, little empirical research was 
conducted on Italy to assess the political consequences of the new rules. 
Finally, the 1996 and 2001 elections represent the second and third elections 
held under the mixed rules. The cultural legacy of the players’ attachment to 
proportionality elections translates into a limited experience by the political 
actors of the new electoral rules (Di Virgilio, 1998). Discarding the first 
elections is thus dictated by the assumption that parties, voters, and legislators 
need some time to adapt to the new norms. As Bartolini and D’Alimonte put 
it; “the Italian electorate was taken by surprise at its majoritarian debut” 
(1998: 159). Intuitively, it is reasonable to assume that the reform represented 
a learning curve for every actor of the political scene.
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While it is not the purpose of this chapter to go over the whole political 
scenes of the 90s, I will touch upon the most important changes that were 
brought about by the 1993 electoral reform.
In 1993, motivated by a need to restructure its electoral system 
permeated by a fragmented number of parties coupled with other factors such 
as the overwhelming corruption scandals; Italy abandoned its old proportional 
system for a mixed member majoritarian one (MMM) with partial 
compensation. It was after a referendum (in 1993) and several negotiations 
later that the new electoral law became a reality. The electoral system 
introduced by the 1993 electoral reform transformed the Italian system from 
one of pure proportionality to a mixed one. The new rules introduced the 
majoritarian element and, in particular, both chambers were elected through 
‘mixed member majoritarian with partial compensation’ systems (Shugart and 
Wattenberg, 2001), whereby three quarters of the seats are filled in single 
member districts (SMD). The remaining seats are filled by proportionality 
(PR), with a 4% national threshold, and with the ‘vote totals’ used for 
proportional allocations adjusted on the basis of the outcome of the plurality 
elections. This latter complex mechanism, also knows as “/o scorporo” or 
“unbundling”, was designed to sustain smaller parties overwhelmed by the 
probable domination of SMDs by larger parties (Donovan, 1995: 60). For the 
Chamber of Deputies each elector has two ballots, one for one candidate in
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his SMD and another for a party list but without ‘preference voting’.18 Table 
(2.1) below reports the distribution of PR and SMD seats across the 20 Italian 
regions.
Table (1.1): Distribution of Seats Between Plurality (75%) and Proportional 
Districts (25%)
Constituency Total Seats Number of PL 
Seats
Number of PR 
Seats
Piemonte 1 25 19 6
Piemonte 2 23 17 6
Valle d’Aosta 1 1 0
Lombardia 1 41 31 10
Lombardia 2 42 32 10
Lombardia 3 15 11 4
Trentino 10 8 2
Veneto 1 29 22 7
Veneto 2 20 15 5
Friuli 13 10 3
Liguria 19 14 5
Emilia Romagna 43 32 11
Toscana 39 29 10
Umbria 9 7 2
Marche 16 12 4
Lazio 1 42 32 10
Lazio 2 15 11 4
Abruzzi 14 11 3
Molise 4 3 1
Campania 1 33 25 8
Campania 2 29 22 7
Puglia 45 34 11
Basilicata 7 5 2
Calabria 23 17 16
Sicilia 1 27 20 7
Sicilia 2 28 21 7
Sardegna 18 14 4
Total 630 475 155
18 For more analytical accounts on the reform see Donovan (1995), Katz (1996) and Shugart 
and Wattenberg (2001).
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It is needless to say that the reform prompted several innovations in the 
political system as a whole. Nowadays, even after 14 years, the 1993 reform 
represents the institutional change with the biggest impact. The novelty of the 
majoritarian element and the subsequent emergence of bi-polarism are two 
important phenomena that represent a huge transformation and a change form 
the First Republic.19
Moving the attention to the major alliances; the three Italian national 
elections held under mixed rules (1994, 1996 and 2001) are largely 
characterised by the formation of connected coalitions. As table (2.2) below 
shows, while the choice of partners varied across elections ideological 
compatibility was generally the norm.20
19 The expression ‘First Republic* marks the period between 1948 and 1994. In other words, 
the first elections held under the mixed electoral rules represent the beginning of the ‘Second 
Republic’.
20 Like the following section highlights, the 1994 elections, for example, represent an 
exception for this rule. In terms of connectedness we find that the centre-right coalition in the 
north “Casa delle Liberia” is exclusive o f the centre-right party Alleanza Nazionale, which 
formed a separate coalition in the south with Forza Italia called “Partito del Buon Govemo 
The lack of ideological compatibility and connectedness is also reflected in the enrolment of 
the centrist Pannella list (currently Radicali Italiani) in a coalition with the extreme right 
Lega Nord.
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Table (2.3): Coalitions Throughout the 1994,1996 and 2001 Italian Elections.
1994 1996 2001
Progressisiti: Ulivo: Ulivo:
PDS, PSI, RC, VERDI, 
Movimento per la 
Democrazia- La Rete, AD,
PDS, Verdi, PPI, RI. Ds, Margherita (PPi, 
Udeur, RI, 
Democratici),
® s Partito Socialista, Girasole (Verdi and
i I Rinscita Socialista and CS Sdi), Svp, and Pdci.
• 1
Polo delle Liberia (North Cdl per le Liberia: Casa delle Liberia
ofltaly): Fi, An, Ccd, and (Cdl): Fi, An, Ln,
Fi and Ln, Ccd, and Udc 
Lista Pannella- 
Riformatori.
Cdu. Biancofore (Ccd, 
Cdu), Nuovo Psi, and 
Pri
s
- M
oy
- wJ3'6JD
'E
i»
s .
Polo del Buon Governo 
(South ofltaly):
Fi and Wis\-An as well as 
Lista Pannella- 
Riformatori, Ccd, Udc, 
Cdl Liberal-Democratico.
s
U
Patio per L *Italia: R C 2' Lista Pannella-
PPI, Patto Segni, Pri, Ln Bonino
Unione Lista Dini- Italia dei Valori
GA Liberaldemocratica Rinnovamento RCeo Italiano. DE
O
th
er
C
oa
lit
i Lista Pannella- 
Sgarbi (centre- 
right)
Msft
Source: Adapted from Venturino (2004:21) as well as from official election data.
21 RC and Ulivo agreed through the ‘non belligerence pact’ known as ''Patti di desistenza’ or 
‘Par/// di non belligeranza’ to place, in some agreed upon districts, a RC candidate under the 
label of Progressisti with no direct competition from Ulivo.
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As highlighted by Reed (2001), throughout the three elections bipolarity 
developed and materialized under the form of two major blocks; the centre- 
right and the centre-left. In 1994, the centre-left is under the name 
“ProgressistF gathering most of the left wing spectrum. In the middle we find 
a minor congregation called “Patto per L ’Italia” which lasted only for those 
elections and gathered four centrist parties. In these elections the centre-right 
is broken down into two major blocks. In the north Forza Italia {Fi) is allied 
with the Northern League (LN) and some other smaller components under the 
label of Pole of Liberties {Polo delle Libert a). In the south Fi is allied with the 
Northern Alliance (Ari) and with some other smaller components under the 
label of Pole of the Good Government {Polo del Buon Govemo). This 
division proved semi-successful for the centre-right as it contributed to 
attracting votes across Italy and contributed to facilitating its victory. 
However, while a majority was obtained in the lower house, the centre-right 
failed to gain majority of the Senate. For this and other reasons, such as the 
dissidence of the extreme right party Lega Nord, the government fell and new 
elections took place in 1996. In these second elections both blocks loose their 
‘extreme’ components. The centre-left now called Olive Tree {Ulivo) runs 
without the Communist Refoundation Party {Re), and the centre-right, called 
the Pole for Liberties (Polo per Liberia), runs without Ln. In fact, an 
important feature of these second mixed rules elections was the deal that the 
extreme left party Rc stroke with the centre-left coalition Ulivo called “Patio
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di non belligeranza” or “Patto di desistenza”. According to this agreement 
Rc agreed not to compete in some majoritarian districts of the lower house 
while at the same time giving its voters indications to support the Ulivo 
candidates in those particular districts. Consequently, the winning coalition 
did not match the governing coalition. Rc, in fact, was part of the former but 
not of the latter. This time the centre-left gains victory and governs until the 
2001 elections through the Prodi I, D ’Alema I, D ’Alema n , and Amato II 
governments. Finally, in the 2001 elections we observe a consolidation of the 
two blocks; the Ulivo maintains its overall 1996 composition with the 
addition of the Democratic Union for Europe (Udeur), a centrist political 
party led by the ex-Christian Democrat Clemente Mastella, while the centre- 
right, now the Casa Delle Liberta, rejoins with Ln. In these last mixed 
elections the centre-right obtains a striking majority in both houses and 
governs Italy for five years under Berlusconi’s (I and II) Governments.
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2.2.2 The Italian Second Republic: What We Know and What We 
Don’t Know.
As every other new political change, the one that took place in Italy as a 
consequence of the electoral reform of 1993 attracted a lot of scholarly 
attention. The academic research on Italy under the mixed electoral system 
can be grouped under two main headings. The first one is the collection of 
work produced in the first years of the reform, what I call the ‘first generation 
studies’. The main scope of this generation of work was exploratory aiming at 
theory formulation and data collection. Take for example the book series 
initiated by the Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politico and which was published 
by II Mulino.22 The scope of such series was to collect as much data as 
possible and to document the important structural changes that took place in 
Italy as a consequence of the electoral reform. Between 1995 and 2002 three 
major volumes edited by the two same authors; D’Alimonte and Bartolini, 
were published to “comprehend the evolution of the political system in Italy” 
(Bartolini and D’Alimonte, 2002). These were Maggioritario ma non troppo 
(Majoritarian but not too much) in 1995, Maggioritario per caso 
(Majoritarian by chance) in 1997, and Maggioritario Finalmentel 
(Majoritarian at last?) in 2002. These three editions covered almost every 
aspect of the new electoral system from parties, to voters, legislators, cartels,
22 The Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politico is the most renowned Italian journal for political 
science.
23 As mentioned above, the first mixed rules election engender a divided parliament; two 
different majorities won in the lower house and in the Senate. From this is derived the title of 
the first edition: “Majoritarian but not too much”.
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symbols, alliances and political participation. Notwithstanding the valuable 
contribution of these volumes, especially in their endeavour to create a 
database of Italian elections, they provide an insufficient contribution towards 
satiating the empirical and analytical research gap that reigns within Italian 
studies. In fact, little empirical work is undertaken throughout these volumes. 
Articles are of a ‘catch-all nature’ gathering under the same title topics 
ranging from the creation of electoral coalitions to party fragmentation, split- 
ticket behaviour and the role of the media. With the exception of the 2002 
volume each other one is tailored around one specific election. Consequently, 
their scope is mainly to describe the overall context of the specific election by 
simultaneously covering several of its aspects. While this in itself is essential 
in order to explain the circumstances that lead a particular alliance to win the 
elections under consideration, it constitutes a weakness of such literature as it 
runs short from building a general body of theory and empirics.
The second group of research is more data-focused and while it involves 
some degree of theory formulation it is of a predominant empirical nature. In 
fact, while the first generation of research on Italy under mixed rules answers 
many of the questions posed by the reform, very little of this work is 
corroborated by empirical findings. This second group of research combines 
theory formulation and theory testing, with a focus on the latter, to address 
several aspects of the electoral reform. Studies include analyses of voting 
behaviour (Benoit et al., 2006; Mudambi and Navarra, 2004), parties and
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party systems (Ferrara, 2004a; Ferrara and Herron, 2005; Reed 2001), and 
legislative behaviour (Ferrara, 2004b; Giannetti and Laver, 2008).
Given the breadth of these themes, no single chapter could do justice to 
their detailed overview. I will, therefore, attempt to present a synthesis of the 
most relevant body of literature on the Italian electoral system under mixed 
rules belonging to both generation studies. Consequently, the next section 
outlines contemporary debates and the fundamental questions that 
characterised the political scenario after Italy’s electoral transition.
The very same issues that prompted the Italian reform were the first on 
the expectation-agenda of political scientists during the first years of the 
reform. Consequently, they wanted to investigate themes such as ‘whether a 
closer control of candidates by voters occurs and whether a more significant 
voters’ role in selecting their representatives occurs’, ‘whether party 
fragmentation decreases’, ‘whether government alternation takes place and if 
it leads to cabinet stability’ and ‘whether parties adapt to the new logic of 
competition’. Among these topics, the interlinked issues of ‘party 
fragmentation and the decrease in the number of parties’ and consequently 
‘the issue of bipolarity’ are perhaps the most important of all (Bartolini et al., 
2002, 2004).
Studying the impact of electoral rules on the number of parties goes 
back to the seminal work of Duverger (1951, 1954) and Downs (1954). In 
Italy the general expectations were of a simplification of the party scenario
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and an increase in govemability through the creation of two competing 
blocks. Consequently, this would have favoured the so hoped-for 
phenomenon of governments’ alternation (Chiaramonte and D’Alimonte, 
2004: 105). It seems, however, that party fragmentation under the new rules 
was higher, overall, than it was pre-reform if compared with levels in 1987.24 
By comparing the number of parties pre-reform to their number post reform it 
is obvious that the mixed rules did not bring about a reduction in the number 
of parties. Bartolini et al. (2004) suggest that while the distributive criteria are 
rather complex, the outcome of this distributive process is a partition of 
plurality seats “more or less equivalent to the size of their electoral 
contribution to the success of the coalition” (12).
Table (3.4): Number of Party Actors in the Italian Chamber: 1987-2001 
Elections.
Elections
Units of 
Accounts 1987 1992 1994 1996 2001
Lists with
more than 
0.5% of the 14 16 14 11 14
PR vote in
the Chamber
20 24 20
of which:
5 PR lists 
19 parties in 
the plurality 
arena
Number of 
parties/lists 
obtaining 
seats in the 
Chamber
14 16
of which: 
7 PR lists 
19 parties 
in the 
plurality 
arena
of which: 
8 PR lists 
24 parties 
in the 
plurality 
arena
Source: Bartolini et al. (2004:11).
24 The proportional elections o f 1987 can be considered an adequate reference point as 
opposed to the more recent elections of 1992. In fact, while the latter also took place in a pure 
proportional system the destructuring of the party system was already under way.
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Several interpretations are brought forward. Small parties are considered 
to retain ‘coalitional blackmailing power’ because the plurality competition is 
embedded within a fundamentally proportional environment (Bartolini et a l, 
2004). In other words, the power of small parties derives from those arenas 
where strength is measured in PR terms. This is the case, for example, in most 
other elections like elections of city councils’ Majors and those of the 
European Parliament. This, however, explains why small parties survive in 
the regional and local arenas but it does not necessarily explain the 
blackmailing power exercised at the national level. There is a missing link in 
terms of explaining how this power at the local and regional level is translated 
into the national arena. Another more convincing explanation attributes 
smaller parties an “electoral blackmail power” in the national arena (13). In 
other words, the bigger is the coalition the higher its probabilities of success 
in the single member districts (Bartolini and D’Alimonte, 2002). Small 
parties’ blackmailing power consists in the threat that they will defect and 
present their own candidates at the election, accruing a potentially irreparable 
damage to the coalition’s chance of winning (Bartolini et al., 2004: 13). This 
is what Bartolini et al. (2004) define as “the freezing o f party fragmentation” 
(13). These scholars, however, admit that the serious fallacy with their 
interpretation relies on the actual credibility of the threat. The credibility of 
this threat is anchored to the assumption that when the small party will 
present its own candidate it will gain sufficient support to be regarded as a
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threat. This assumption, however, clashes with the other assumption whereby 
instrumental voters will rationally abandon parties which have low probability 
of winning in order not to waste their vote. As a way out, and to explain the 
blackmailing power of small parties, Bartolini et al. (2004) hypothesise that 
the threat of leaving persists because there exists “a quota of identifiers” who 
are so loyal that will support the party label no matter what, or whom do not 
follow classical logics of political rationality based on maximisation (13).
In a similar vein, and by analysing the changes that Italy undertook after 
the reform from a different perspective, Reed (2001) reaches interesting 
conclusions concerning the ‘number of parties’ issue. His results suggest that 
“Duverger's law is not only working in Italy but it is working rapidly and 
powerfully” (313) manifesting itself through the two-candidate competition at 
the district level. Nevertheless, scholars go as far as saying that in the context 
of the 1990s party scene any other form of electoral reform would have hardly 
succeeded in containing party fragmentation (Chiaramonte and D’Alimonte 
2004: 116). Such a reform would have interfered with the complex 
institutional architecture dominated by a purely proportional logic (like it is 
the case for the public financing of parties).
This brings me to the issue of party system change and of whether 
parties adapted to the new logic of competition. On the one hand, soon after 
the reform the Italian system was described as a party system in transition 
(D’Alimonte and Bartolini 1997b: 121). The break with the past was evident
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in the sense that the old anti-system parties-disappeared, and competition 
turned among alliances (coalitions) not parties. The system became more 
competitive, which is clear in the increase in number of marginal seats 
(whereby the difference between the winner and the second placed candidate 
is less than 8% of the votes) (D’Alimonte and Bartolini, 1997b: 132; Bartolini 
and D’Alimonte, 1995:328). On the other hand, although coalitions did not 
technically replace parties, the new rules of the game transformed electoral 
competition into “a context based on coalitions rather than parties” (Bartolini 
et al., 2004: 2; Bartolini and D’Alimonte, 1998:164; D’Alimonte and 
Bartolini, 1997b: 131; Di Virgilio 1998: 5).
Since 1994 the Italian party system developed according to a bipolar 
pattern. Throughout the three elections the formation of pre-electoral 
coalitions favoured the progressive concentration of votes and seats with the 
two main coalitions. This in turn played a major role in the increasing decline 
of third actors, which contributed to the creation of parliamentary majorities 
in favour of one of the major coalitions (Bartolini et al., 2004: 3). The 
formation of pre-electoral coalitions has been described as “the most 
important development of Italian politics in recent history” (Bartolini et al., 
2004: 2). Before the 1993 reform Italian coalitions were post-electoral 
governing coalitions. Consequently, in those few instances where post-
25 For example in the left spectrum we find transformations such as the ‘Italian Communist 
Party’ (Pci) which first becomes the ‘Democratic Party o f the Left’ (Pds) and later turns into 
the party o f the ‘Left Democrats’ (DS). On the right we find the ‘Italian Social Movement’ 
(Msi) turning into the ‘National Alliance’ (An).
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electoral coalitions are investigated, they are only analysed in function of their 
causal link with electoral outcomes. For example Bartolini et al. (2004) 
explain how the ‘variable geometry’ nature of the 1994 centre-right coalition 
granted it its victory, how the abandonment of Lega Nord caused its defeat in 
1996 and how the coming together of all centre-right parties under one label 
of the Casa delle Liberia (Cdl) determined its victory in 2001 (Bartolini et al., 
2004: 2).
Among the other issues addressed by scholars of Italian politics we find 
the nationalisation of candidates, or in other words, the weakening of 
territorial links between candidates and voters (Bartolini et al., 2004; 
Chiaramonte and D’Alimonte, 2004; Di Virgilio, 1997 and 2004; Verzichelli, 
2002). This is a direct consequence of the new politics o f alliance. In fact, this 
nationalisation can be explained by the fact that coalitional quotas are 
determined at each election. Furthermore, re-evaluations and a re-assessments 
of districts in terms of winnability change at each election. This causes the 
movement of candidates from a district to another (Chiaramonte and 
D’Alimonte, 2004). Furthermore, while district allocation is the result of intra 
coalition bargaining, the choice of the specific candidate to run in the district 
belongs to the party and this could be subject to internal party dynamics that 
are independent of voters-candidate ties. Alliances are thus more competitive 
(Di Virgilio, 2004: 200; Chiaramonte, 2002: 182-186) and portray a higher 
level of discipline as opposed to pre-reform (Di Virgilio, 2004: 200). Overall,
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across the three elections (1994-2001) less than 100 candidates competed in 
the same election Di Virgilio, 2002: 124-126).
Finally, some research was conducted to study the nature of voters. This 
work mainly demonstrates that in Italy under mixed rules there were two 
distinct electorates (Corbetta and Caciagli, 2002:438). The centre-left 
electorate is described as more educated, more informed and more interested 
in politics. These qualities lead them to trust politics more than the centre- 
right electorate. This latter is found to be less educated, less informed and 
more distant from politics, and consequently more “alienated” (ibid: 439).
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2.3. Conclusions.
The above literature review uncovers many important details about the
working of the Italian system after its 1993 reform. Three important 
phenomena were documented an analysed. The first is the proportionalisation 
of alliances (Di Virgilio, 2004: 196), which lead to the move towards a more 
centralised party decision making (Di Virgilio, 2004: 195; Di Virgilio, 2002: 
126). The second is party system fragmentation and the increasing power of 
small parties within alliances. The last one is the confirmation of bipolar 
competitive dynamics (Chiaramonte and D’Alimonte, 2004: 108; Reeds, 
2001; Bartolini et al., 2004: 3).
By now, the need to address the research questions of this thesis 
becomes obvious. While the above literature is very useful to comprehend the 
post-reform Italian scenario, its lack of empirical testing leaves room to 
conduct more investigations. Only a limited amount of literature, discussed in 
its relevant chapter, addresses Italy under mixed rules from an empirical stand 
point. For example, some scholars investigate party entry decisions (Ferrara, 
2004a; Ferrara and Herron, 2005; D’Alimonte and Bartolini, 2002; 
D’Alimonte and Chiaramonte, 1995), others investigate voting behaviour 
(Benoit et al., 2006; Venturino, 2002), and others analyse legislative 
behaviour (Benoit et al., 2006; Ferrara, 2004b; Giannetti and Laver, 2008; 
Mudambi and Navarra, 2004). This literature is discussed in detail in Chapter 
(3) in order to highlight both its contribution and its limitation. In the
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following Chapter, in fact, I demonstrate why this material is insufficient to 
explain the incentives of political players under mixed rules and how this 
thesis complements the existing material both theoretically and empirically.
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CHAPTER 3 - THEORIES OF ITALIAN POLITICS 
UNDER MIXED ELECTORAL RULES.
The previous chapter demonstrates that, with few exceptions, most 
research carried out on the Italian political system between 1994 and 2001 is 
of a descriptive nature. It is important to recognise the role these studies play 
in increasing our understanding of the Italian political scene during that 
period. However, it is also true that in proportion to the existing literature a 
very limited amount of work is corroborated through appropriate empirical 
testing. Consequently, most of the available research I use as starting point for 
my analyses comes from the work of comparative scholars who do not 
necessarily study Italy in their research. Bawn (1999), Benoit et al. (2006), 
Cox and Schoppa (2002), Ferrara (2004a,b), Giannetti and Laver (2001, 
2008), Haspel et al. (1998), Hix (2001, 2006a,b) and Herron and Nikishawa 
(2001) are just few examples. This is why, aside from theoretically enhancing 
the already existing research, this thesis is essentially an empirical 
contribution to those themes reached by theory but not sufficiently 
corroborated by empirics.
As highlighted in the research question section, this thesis is not about 
one single topic but about three connected themes. Therefore, there is no 
single overarching theory but instead there are three different, but 
nevertheless connected, theoretical frameworks. These theoretical frameworks 
tackle three political outcomes; the pre-electoral partition of majoritarian
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districts trough intra-coalition bargaining, split-ticket voting, and the 
propensity of dual-candidacy MPs to vote against their party. These outcomes 
are linked together by the umbrella of mixed electoral rules and at the same 
time they constitute three unintended consequences of the reform drafters. As 
said before, in the late eighties and early nineties a mixture of factors such as 
pervasive corruption and the high number of parties called for heavy changes 
in Italian politics if things were to be improved. The emergence of pre- 
electoral alliances, allowing for split-ticket voting, and dual candidacy ‘per 
se’ were not intentional goals of reformers, but instead externalities. 
Furthermore, the necessity to tackle the three phenomena together comes 
from the work of Austin-Smith and Banks (1988, 2005) which argues that a 
comprehensive model of a multiparty representative system must cover the 
pre-electoral, the electoral, and post electoral stages.
This chapter is divided into three main sections each of which addresses 
one of the three analytical themes of the thesis. Each section is composed of 
three parts. In the first one I expose the political phenomenon engendered by 
the new rules (pre-electoral coalition, split-ticket voting or dual candidacy). In 
the second section I address the most relevant theoretical and empirical work 
undertaken in the specific area. Finally, I complement it with my own 
theoretical contributions as well as my own expectations.
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3.1. The Intra-Coalition Bargaining Game of Pre-Electoral
Politics.
As it is the case for each of the three phenomena under investigation, the 
point of departure of this analysis is the crucial change in the Italian political 
system brought about by the new mixed rules. As Table (3.1) below shows, 
before the 1993 reform Italy witnessed 50 post-electoral alliances. In the 
game theoretic language such coalitions are characterised by ‘inter-coalition 
Nash bargaining behaviour’ because parties adopt a competitive behaviour 
vis-a-vis other coalitions (Roemer, 2001).
57
Table (3.1): Post-electoral Alliance in Italian Pre-reform Governments
Legislature Prime Minister Parties in coalition
1 De Gasperi VI PSDI+PRI+DC+PLI
I -1948 2 De Gasperi VII PRI+DC+PLI
3 De Gasperi VIII PSDI+PRI+DC
4 De Gasperi IX PRI+DC
5 De Gasperi X PRI+DC
6 De Gasperi XI DC
7 Pella DC
11-1953 8 Fanfani I DC9 Scelba PSDI+DC+PLI
10 Segni I PSDI+DC+PLI
11 Zoli DC
12 Fanfani II PSDI+DC
13 Segni II DC
III-1958 14 Tambroni DC
15 Fanfani III DC
16 Fanfani IV PSDI+PRI+DC
17 Leone I DC
I V - 1963 18 Moro I PSI+PSDI+PRI+DC19 Moro II PSI+PSDI+PRI+DC
20 Moro III PSI+PSDI+PRI+DC
21 Leone II DC
22 Rumor I PSU+PRI+DC
23 Rumor II DC
V -1968 24 Rumor III PSI+PSDI+PRI+DC
25 Colombo I PSI+PSDI+PRI+DC
26 Colombo II PSI+PSDI+ PRI+DC
27 Andreotti I DC
28 Andreotti II PSDI+DC+PLI
VI - 1972 2930
Rumor IV 
Rumor V
PSI+PSDI+PRI+DC
PSI+PSDI+DC
31 Moro IV PRI+DC
32 Moro V DC
VII -1976 3334
Andreotti III 
Andreotti IV
DC
DC
35 Andreotti V PSDI+PRI+DC
36 Cossiga I PSDI+DC+PLI
37 Cossiga II PSI+PRI+DC
VIII -1979 3839
Forlani 
Spadolini I
PSI+PSDI+PRI+DC
PSI+PSDI+PRI+DC+PLI
40 Spadolini II PSI+PSDI+PRI+DC+PLI
41 Fanfani V PSI+PSDI+DC+PLI
42 Craxi I PSI+PSDI+PRI+DC+PLI
IX -1983 43 Craxi II PSI+PSDI+PRI+DC+PLI
44 Fanfani VI DC
45 Goria PSI+PSDI+PRI+DC+PLI
X -1987 4647
De Mita 
Andreotti VI
PSI+PSDI+PRI+DC+PLI
PSI+PSDI+PRI+DC+PLI
48 Andreotti VII PSI+PSDI+DC+PLI
49 Amato I PSI+PSDI+DC+PLI
XI - 1992 50 Ciampi I PSI+PSDI+DC+PLI
Source: Italian Ministry of Intern. DC (Democrazia Cristiana), PLI (Partito Liberale Italiano), 
PRI (Partito Repubblicano Italiano), PSDI (Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano), PSI 
(Partito Socialista Italiano), PSU (Partito Socialista Unificato).
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By introducing the majoritarian element, coupled with the inability of 
parties to control a majority by themselves, the reform impinged on parties 
the need to come together in pre-electoral alliances to secure as many of the 
newly created 475 majoritarian districts as possible. The new rules of the 
game transformed Italian coalitions from post-electoral to pre-electoral ones 
exhibiting, in the game theoretic language, what is knows as ‘intra-coalition 
Nash bargaining behaviour’. In these types of coalitions, parties adopt a 
cooperative behaviour inside their coalitions (Roemer, 2001).
The total number of majoritarian districts can thus be viewed as a pie 
that needs to be divided among allies. Each party wants to obtain as many 
candidatures as possible. Therefore, parties need to sit around a negotiation 
table and decide who stands where. Explaining what affects the division of 
these newly created districts among allies is the crux of this section. In the 
following section I will provide an overview of the distribution of districts 
among parties within both the centre-left and the centre-right alliances. Then, 
I will provide a literature review about the existing explanations regarding 
pre-electoral alliances and parties’ bargaining power determinants. The 
section will illustrate that there is a shortage of knowledge in the subject of 
pre-electoral coalitions. Finally, I will draw my theoretical model which will 
allow me to make testable predictions about what effects ‘who gets what and 
where’ in the distribution of SMDs.
26 According to this approach the electoral equilibrium (Nash equilibrium) is as the 
simultaneous combination of the above Nash bargaining solutions (Roemer, 2001).
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3.1.1 The Italian Coalition Scenario Under Mixed Rules: a new 
6Modus OperandV.
The distribution of the 475 majoritarian districts among allies is in 
essence a ‘divide the pie game’, which was evidently in place from the first 
mixed rules elections of 1994 and throughout the subsequent ones (Di 
Virgilio, 1998). In this section I address the last elections of 2001 where 
voters and legislators familiarised and acquainted themselves with the new 
mixed rules of the game. Furthermore, in these elections the geography of the 
alliances is national. In 1994 territorialisation of the alliances is represented 
through the two coalitions of the centre-right; one in the North (Fi with Ln 
and Radicali under the name Pdl) and one in the South (Fi and Msi-An under 
the name Pdbg). In 1996 the territorialisation can be seen in the presence of 
Ln as a third competitor in the northern districts. In 2001, however, alliances 
are free from geography in the sense that the two main players are the centre- 
left and centre-right coalitions. Outside the two alliances there are only small 
actors more or less homogenously distributed along the territory (such as Rc 
only in the Senate; Lista Di Pietro, Democrazia Europea; Lista Pannella 
Bonino; and Fiamma Tricolore). By having the two main actors facing the 
same bargaining situation (i.e. divide the pie) in the same environment (in 
terms of ‘other’ actors) the 2001 elections, as opposed to the1994 and 1996 
ones, constitute a somewhat ideal case where to test theories of pre-electoral 
bargaining (Di Virgilio, 2002). Furthermore, as tackled in Chapter (2), the
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proportionalisation of the majority lead to the move towards a more 
centralised party decision making (Di Virgilio, 2004: 195; Di Virgilio, 2002: 
126). In particular, and for both alliances, in the 2001 elections bargaining 
was more centralised if compared to 1994 and 1996 (Di Virgilio 2002: 97).
By looking at the simple quantitative distribution of districts among 
allies for each of the two coalitions (Graphs 3.1 and 3.2), the first striking 
evidence is that size and leadership matter. In fact, for both allies the two 
major parties Fi, and Ds are the two parties with the highest number of seats 
with 49.67% and 42.58% of the total seats respectively.
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Figure (3.1): Dividing the Pie (1): Quantitative Distribution of SMDs 
Among Centre-right Allies.______________________________________
Quantitative distribution of SMDs among the CDL coalition
30% 14,35%
10%  M
9.71% 26.27%49.67%
Udc Fi Ln An
Parties
B Seats shares B Vole shares
Source: 2001 official national elections data.
Figure (3.2): Dividing the Pie (I): Quantitative Distribution of SMDs 
Among Centre-left Allies.________________________________________
Quantitative distribution of SMDs among the Ulivo coalition
100%
It is also interesting to observe the allocation of districts according to the 
nature of each one. In fact, districts differ among themselves in terms of their 
winnability. By this I mean the probability that this district is going to be won 
by a party. Throughout the literature and the relevant empirical chapter of this 
thesis ‘safety’ is operationalised as a continuous variable. In fact, it is 
common procedure to look at the difference between the first and second 
candidate to describe winnability. The greater is the difference between the 
first and the second candidate the safer is a district. For obvious reasons, 
parties would want to gain as many ‘safe’ districts as possible.
The two graphs below (3.3 and 3.4) show the allocation of districts 
among the two allies according to the quality of districts. Following Bartolini 
and D’Alimonte (1995, 1996), districts whereby the difference in favour of 
one candidate is higher than 8% are labelled as ‘safe’ and ‘not safe’ 
otherwise.27
27 While another category of classification best known as ‘marginal districts’ could be 
identified, it is here irrelevant. In fact, while marginal districts are better than purely lost 
ones, it is the number of safe district vis-a-vis others that parties attempt to maximise.
Figure (3.3): Dividing the pie (II):Qualitative Distribution of SMDs 
Among Centre-right Allies._______________________________________
Allocation of safe ditricts among the CDL Coalition
Udc Fi Ln An
Parties
H Safe seats shares B Vote shares 
Source: 2001 official national elections data.
Figure (3.4): Dividing the Pie (II): Qualitative Distribution of SMDs 
Among Centre-left Allies.________________________________________
Allocation of safe districts among the Ulivo coalition
However, it is by comparing the number of majoritarian districts 
allocated to each party in the 2001 elections to their size, measured as the vote 
share at previous elections (also known as advantage ratio), that I can spot 
some interesting observations.28 Such a comparison is an important starting 
point as it helps uncover whether parties receive a disproportional number of 
districts compared to their size. As the advantage ratio approaches one it 
indicates that there is almost a perfect proportionality between the exchange 
of SMDs for votes. If the ratio is bigger than one, it indicates that a party 
receives a share of SMDs that is bigger than its votes’ contribution. The 
contrary is true if it is smaller than one.
Beginning with the centre-right, table (3.2) below illustrates how the 
party of the media tycoon Berlusconi, Forza Italia, obtained the majority of 
districts across all the country (north, centre, and south) totalling to 49.67% of 
all SMDs. Nevertheless, if I look at the vote share obtained by this party in 
the 2000 regional elections - which is the index for size- illustrated in table 
(3.3) below, I find that its vote share was of 53.60%. This produces an overall 
advantage ratio of 0.92 (49.67% divided by 53.60%). The interesting thing 
that I can observe is that Udc, the most centrist of the centre-right alliance, is 
the one party with an advantage ratio which is very close to one or bigger than 
one in every of the three geographical areas. This suggests that the percentage
28 As properly explained in the relevant data section; because o f the narrower time lag, the 
‘previous’ elections for this comparison are the 2000 regional elections or the 1999 European 
elections where there where no regional ones, and not the previous 1996 elections. The data 
for the regional elections are aggregated so as to mach the electoral districts of the national 
elections.
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of districts this party received is proportional and sometimes greater than 
what it should have obtained on the mere basis of vote shares. As for Ln, 
scholars suggest that the 44 districts received (30% less than it obtained in 
1994) reflect its weakening (Di Virgilio 2002: 107). However, similar to Udc, 
Ln's overall advantage ratio above 1 makes us reject such claim. The same 
applies for An with an overall advantage ratio of 1.01. These values suggest 
that with the exception of Fi all other smaller parties of the centre-right 
coalition received a number of districts that is greater than their electoral size.
The results of the bargaining process differ significantly on the left. By 
looking at tables (3.4) and (3.5) I observe that the major party of the coalition 
(Ds) obtained the overall majority of the SMDs (43.22% of the total districts) 
with an overall advantage ratio of 0.88. However, it is the most moderate 
party of the coalition (Margherita) that obtained the majority of the northern 
and southern districts (44.69% of the northern district, and 48.35% of the 
southern districts respectively). In the north, in particular, it obtained an 
advantage ratio higher than 5. This indicates that in the north that the party 
was awarded an abundant number of districts if compared to its electoral size. 
The Margherita is the sole coalition member with all its advantage ratios 
bigger than one or at least very close to one in all geographical areas (5.19 in 
the north, 0.94 in the centre, and 0.87 in the south). The Girasole displays an 
overall advantage ratio close to 1 (0.96) signalling that there is a quasi 
equivalence between its size and the allocated number of electoral districts.
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With the exception of the centre area, the most extreme party of the coalition 
(Pdci) was always allocated a smaller number of districts than its electoral 
size. In the centre, in fact, the Pdci was awarded 6 districts making its 
advantage ratio in that area almost one (0.93). Overall, it seems that the 
allocation of districts within the centre-left coalition is between the two 
parties Ds and Margherita and it discriminates against the two smallest 
parties Girasole and Pdci. In fact, only these two smallest parties (Girasole in 
the centre and Pdci in the south) portray an advantage ratio less than 0.50 
(0.44 and 0.27 respectively).
Finally, if I correlate the advantage ratio with size I can get some 
insights on whether there are some elements of bargaining. A positive 
correlation coefficient suggests that big parties are those who receive bonus 
SMDs and vice versa. The correlation coefficient amounts to -0.95 for the 
centre right and -0.92 for the centre left, which suggests that small parties 
receive bonus SMDs while big parties are those which surrender them.
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Table (3.2): District Allocation for the Centre-right, by Area (2001 
Lower House Elections).________________________________________
Political
area
Freq. Freq. Udc Fi Freq. Ln Freq.
An
North 175 14 95 36 30
(3.09%) (20.97%) (7.95%) (06.62%)
Centre 74 11 35 7 21
(2.43%) (7.73%) (01.55%) (04.64%)
South 205 40 96 1 68
(8.83%) (21.19%) (0.002%) (15.01%)
Total 453 65 225 44 119
(14.35%) (49.67%) (09.71%) (26.27%)
Source: Official electoral data. The brackets reflect the number o f districts allocated as the 
overall percentage o f districts.
Table (3.3): 2000 Regional Elections Results for the Cdl by Region.*
Political
area Votes Udc Votes Fi Votes Ln Votes An
North 3.18% 24.79% 8.90% 7.78%(0.97) (0.84) (0.89) (0.85)
Centre 2.46% 11.17% 0.43% 9.05%(0.99) (0.69) (3.60) (0.51)
South 5.55% 17.63% 0.002% 9.0%(1.59) (1.20) (1.00) (1.66)
Total 11.20% 53.60% 9.34% 25.84%(1.28) (0.92) (1.03) (1.01)
Source: Official electoral data. *The first figure reflects the votes obtained by each party in 
each geographical region as a percentage of the total votes. Numbers in brackets represent the 
‘advantage ratio’; the % of districts obtained divided by % votes.** For example this 0.85 
reflects 20.97% (FTs district share in the north) divided by 24.79 (FVs vote share in the 
north).
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Table (3.4): District Allocation for the Centre-left, by Area (2001 Lower 
House Elections).________________________________________________
Political
area
Freq. Freq.
Pdci
Freq. Ds Freq.
Girasole
Freq.
Margherita
5 71 23 80North 179 (1.07%) (15.26%) (4.94%) (17.20%)
6 50 5 19
Centre 80 (1.29%) (10.75%) (1.07%) (4.08%)
3 80 28 103South 213 (0.64%) (17.20%) (6.02%) (22.15%)
14 201 56 201
Total 465 (3.01%) (43.22%) (12.04%) (43.22%)
Source: Official electoral data. The first brackets reflect the number of districts allocated the 
overall percentage of districts.
Table (3.5): 2000 Regional Elections Results for the Ulivo by Region.*
Political
area
Pdci Ds Girasole Margherita
North 1.82% 9.66% 3.22% 3.31%
(0.58) (1.57) (1.53) (5.19)
Centre 1.38% 19.14% 2.38% 4.30%
(0.93) (0.56) (0.44) (0.94)
South 2.35% 20.10% 6.89% 25.37%
(0.27) (0.85) (0.87) (0.87)
Total 5.56% 48.91% 12.49% 32.99%
(0.54) (0.88) (0.96) (1.31)
Source: Official electoral data. * The first figure represents the percentage o f votes in the 
geographical region. The numbers in brackets represent the ‘advantage ratio’; the %district 
divided by %votes o f previous 2000 regional elections. At the aggregate level only the 
Margherita has a ratio bigger than one, which reflects that it obtained more seats than its 
actual size.
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The descriptive statistics portrayed in Tables (3.2) through (3.5) 
demonstrate that the two centrist parties of both alliances, Margherita for the 
centre-left and Udc for the centre righ, as well as two other components of the 
centre-right namely Ln and An, have an overall advantage ratio bigger than 
one. This is an indicator that these parties have a considerable power at least 
over the quantitative allocation of districts. While only of a descriptive nature, 
the data reported above suggests that it is inaccurate to generalise about the 
large power of small parties. In fact, while the Pdci and the Girasole are two 
small parties, the preliminary statistics suggest that, unlike Udc, they are not 
that powerful after all.
The values of the descriptive advantage ratios above suggest that some 
forms of bargaining do take place. Bargaining, in fact, explains how some 
parties obtain a share of seats bigger than their electoral size. Consequently, if  
bargaining confirms itself as one basic element of the new multifaceted Italian 
system, what affects it? In other words; ‘what determines who stands where’ 
is the inevitable question that arises.
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3.1.2 On Pre-electoral Intra-Coalition Bargaining.
Throughout the academic research related to multiparty systems, where 
no single party controls a majority, an interest arises concerning coalitions' 
agreements and the process of government formation. Despite the extensive 
scholarly work devoted to the study of coalitions arising after elections 
(Austen-Smith and Banks, 1988; Laver and Shepsle, 1990a,b; Riker, 1962), 
little attention is devoted to the study of pre-electoral alliances. In fact, 
stripped down to their basics, coalition bargaining theories are predominantly 
‘coalition building or coalition formation’ and ‘coalition termination’ 
theories. This existing research aims at predicting the types of coalitions that 
will emerge given the nature of parties (such as their size and their location) 
and the nature of expected gains.29 Take for example the seminal work of 
Riker (1962) “The Theory of Political Coalitions”, which is considered the 
cornerstone of coalition studies. This work uses bargaining theory to address 
legislative coalition formation. In fact, concepts that engender from this work 
such as ‘minimum winning coalitions’, and the subsequent ‘minimum 
connected winning coalitions’ (Axelrod, 1970), rely on the knowledge of each 
party’s location and its post-electoral size.
A great deal of the literature also dedicates its attention to post electoral 
alliances’ life, such as policymaking, conflict management, and coalition
29 Take for example those theories that address the division o f cabinet portfolios among allies; 
in essence they are coalition formation theories (Laver and Shepsle, 1990a,b; Schofield and 
Laver, 1980). These studies in fact explain coalition formation on the basis of future gains in 
terms of ministerial, or other, positions.
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termination. Lupia and Strom (1995), for example, look at coalition 
bargaining in the context of coalition termination and parliamentary 
dissolution. Similarly, Mershon’s (1996) extensive survey of Italian coalitions 
between 1946 and 1992 assessing the schools of research prevalent in the 
literature is in itself a study of ‘coalition formation’ and ‘coalition 
termination’.
Only recently scholars rediscovered pre-electoral alliances and a limited 
amount of work, mainly Golder’s (2005, 2006a,b) emerged addressing pre- 
electoral coalition formation, which actually prevailed in 19 European 
countries between 1946 and 2002 (Golder, 2005: 646). It is needless to say 
that the study of these coalitions is important for several reasons, but 
especially because of the impact this forms of institutions exert on election 
outcomes and the types of policies that are eventually implemented.
While the above approaches to the study of pre-electoral and post- 
electoral coalitions’ formation are very different, they are similar in their 
failure to discriminate between coalitions formed ‘to establish a government’ 
and those formed ‘to divide a pie’. As Laver and Shepsle (1990a) pinpoint, 
while these coalitions are intertwined, it is necessary and useful to distinguish 
between the two (489).
As previously said, the 1994 reform impinged on parties the need to 
come together in pre-electoral alliances to secure the newly formed 475
30 See Golder (2006a,b) for a more detailed account of the importance o f pre-electoral 
coalitions.
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majoritarian districts. In the pursuit of an explanation for parties’ bargaining 
success in obtaining an («) number of those districts, it becomes apparent that 
I am interested in the ‘divide the pie’ scenario only.
Perhaps the most useful tools of analysis needed for this purpose comes 
from the coalition theory which deals with the division of government 
portfolio. Gamson’s law (1961) is considered one of the strongest findings in 
the social sciences. It states that there prevails a proportional relationship 
between legislative seats and portfolio allocation. Gamson describes the near 
perfect relationship in parliamentary systems between a party’s contribution 
to the coalition in terms of seat contribution and its quantitative allocation of 
cabinet portfolio. To put it simply parties are expected to demand from the 
coalition a share of payoff proportional to the amount of resources which they 
contribute to the coalition. In his work Gamson equates resources with a 
party’s seats share and payoffs with its quantitative portfolio’s share (374). 
For example if a party’s share of parliamentary seats constitutes 30 per cent of 
the total number of seats held by the coalition, then that party can expect to be 
allocated approximately 30 per cent of the ministerial portfolios.
Regarding the connection between size and SMD shares the existing
literature on the Italian mixed system provides us with some very useful
insights. What is known is that the nature of this assessment is based on the
performance of each party at the previous (usually national) elections (Di
31 In other words, while the two are indeed connected, I am not concerned with ‘choice’ of 
partners with which it is ‘rational’ for a party to form a government with in case o f victory (or 
in other words coalition formation).
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Virgilio, 1997, 1998). On the more general side, Bartolini and D’Alimonte 
(1998) suggest that if compared to the 1994 elections, in 1996 small and 
medium parties have “gained greater political weight” and that the electoral 
system is the one to blame (Bartolini and D’Alimonte, 1998: 156). This 
according to them is explained by two elements. The first is that through the 
proportional quota small parties are guaranteed survival especially for the 
leaders and their entourage. Second, the great electoral balance between the 
two coalitions and the high level of competition increases the cost of such 
defection for the main parties. In other words, their potential defection is a 
real and costly threat (Bartolini and D’Alimonte, 1998:156). In their opinion 
the proportionalisation of the plurality also has a significant effect, which is 
the “weak territorialisation of candidatures” (Bartolini and D’Alimonte, 1998: 
158). They, therefore, blame the logic of proportionalisation as the main 
obstacle to territorialisation (Bartolini and D’Alimonte, 1998:158).
On the more analytical side regarding small parties’ power, not only do 
Browne and Franklin (1973) find support of Gamson’s law but they also 
found a slight tendency for smaller parties to receive more than their 
proportional share and larger parties to receive less (1973). This is what they 
call “the relative weakness effect” (460) . They describe this effect as the 
tendency of small coalition parties to do better in the process of exchanging 
seats for ministerial shares than larger parties. While there is an almost perfect
32 Warwick and Druckman (2001) prefer to call it the “small party bias” (629, fh 9) because in 
their view this label is more descriptive of the nature of the effect.
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one-to-one proportionality between seat shares and ministerial portfolio 
shares, small parties seem to deviate from this effect.
The relative weakness effect is demonstrated by creating a new variable 
called the index of overpayment, which comes from the subtraction of the 
proportion of seats contributed by a party from the proportion of ministries 
received by that party (461). If the party contributes more seats than it 
receives ministries this index is negative, and it is positive when the party 
receives more ministries than its seats contribution. Browne and Franklin 
(1973) find that this index is correlated with party size and thus small parties 
receive bonus ministries while big parties are those which surrender them. 
They find a correlation coefficient of -0.54 indicating that the smaller the 
party the greater the overpayment (461). The literature on coalition suggests 
that this might be explained by the fact that it is likely that small parties are 
pivotal partners and their mere presence will guarantee the victory of the 
coalition. Consequently, small parties will be able to exert a high price for 
their entry. Furthermore, unlike big parties small ones do not have the ability 
to inhibit the activity of larger partners to the same extent as bigger parties. As 
such they are considered more desirable as coalition partners Browne and 
Franklin (1973) also argue that the relative weakness effect operates 
differently in coalitions of different sizes. Small parties are most successful in 
extracting bonus ministries in a coalition with few partners. In order to predict 
the probable payoffs in terms of ministerial portfolios received by each party
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in a coalition we need to know the size of the party and the size of the 
coalition it is intending to join (Browne and Franklin (1973: 464).
Di Virgilio is probably the only scholar who addresses this matter in the 
Italian political scenario. According to Di Virgilio (1998), Italian coalitions 
during the mixed era adopted several criteria for allotting SMDs (1998: 15). 
These criteria not only varied across coalitions but they also changed through 
time. Di Virgilio (2002) defines the district allocation process as a “top- 
down” one, divided into five main stages: 1) the choice of the criteria and 
information upon which to define the rating of the districts and the quota for 
each party 2) classification of districts into types in terms of winnability 3) the 
selection of coalition and sub-coalition quotas 4) the assignment of the 
districts to parties around a negotiation table on the basis of a mixture of 
‘party quota’ and ‘district rating’ criteria 5) choice of the single candidate 
which is left to each party (98). As he highlights, the decision of the weight of 
the individual components is a conflicting issue. In his 1997, and 1998 
articles, he envisages several factors as determinant in coalition agreements 
such as “the number of actors involved, their cultural orientation, the level of 
territorial differentiation in the alliance, continuity for sitting members of 
parliaments as well as the levels and the actual locations of the negotiations” 
(Di Virgilio, 1997: 91-92; 1998:14). These factors are determinant in
33 By coalition quota he means the various lists within the cartel (for example Fi, Ln, An, 
Biancofiore), while the sub-coalition quotas refer to the single parties (such as Ccd, Cdu, Ln, 
An, Fi, Npsi, Pri, Upr and many others). For more details see Di Virgilio (1998: 98), footnote 
12.
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influencing the intra-coalition decision-making processes as well as the 
coalition’s electoral performance.
In 1994, the definition of a basic criterion for the allocation of SMDs 
was a highly debated issue within the Polo (Di Virgilio, 1998: 15). The 
criterion of party incumbency did not meet opposition but the specification of 
the ‘weights’ of individual parties caused considerable disagreements (Di 
Virgilio 1998: 15). The distribution took place on the basis of quota that 
granted many districts to the Lega in the north and to An in the south thus 
compensating them for the advantage that Fi enjoys by having two alliances. 
In 1996 the opinion polls were not used to create a picture of voting intentions 
and were not given a role in determining the allotment of SMDs (Di Virgilio, 
1998: 15). Bilateral meetings were also dismissed as means of allotting 
districts. Moving to the second Italian mixed elections; the centre-right used 
parties’ performance at the previous 1995 regional elections as the allocation 
criterion.
For the centre-left in the 1994 elections, districts allocation was more or 
less proportional to their ‘assumed’ electoral strength. The centre-right instead 
adopted a ‘compensatory distribution’.
As compared to 1994, the centre-left coalition leaders in 1996 shifted 
the bargaining process from the regional level to the national level and party 
leadership conducted the negotiations. Furthermore, negotiations were not 
centralised, instead negotiations were carried out at different tables, including
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bilateral ones (Di Virgilio, 1998: 17). This resulted in an allocation of districts 
to the right side of the coalition amounting to 40% of the total amount of 
SMDs. This in itself outweighs the number of seats that would have 
distributed if the 1995 regional elections were the only criterion (Di Virgilio, 
1998: 18).
Going back to the literature on coalition, the principle that the share of 
seats is the only resource that determines the number of cabinet portfolios is 
challenged by several formal theory models. These approaches assert that 
coalition parties do not receive cabinets according to the number legislative 
seats that they contribute, but instead according to the bargaining potential 
they exercise. Others are based on the ‘ format eur models’ of bargaining which 
undermine this one-to-one relation and introduce a new source that of ‘the 
proposal power’. These suggest that the party which proposes the coalition, 
also known as formateur, should be able to exploit this privilege position in 
their own favour in terms of portfolios it receives (Baron and Ferejohn, 1989; 
Harrington, 1990; Martin and Stevenson, 2001; Ansolabehere et al. 2005). 
This potential is measured as the extent to which each party is pivotal in 
forming winning or minimal winning coalitions.
An important turn in the literature, and very relevant to this chapter is 
the work of Warwick and Druckman (2001). By taking into account the 
quality, alternatively described as ‘salience’, of cabinet portfolios that a party 
is assigned and not the mere quantity they challenge the above models. In fact,
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because they do not find that the formateur’s party receives more portfolios 
than it seats share would warrant, they indirectly suggest that maybe the party 
is extracting qualitative rents. In other words the proposer might receive a 
qualitative compensation and take its share from the most valuable portfolios 
like the prime ministership (637).34 In order to employ a measure of salience 
Warwick and Druckman (2006) conduct a survey in 14 West European 
countries in which experts were asked to provide cardinal rating of the cabinet 
portfolios in their respective countries (637). In their previous study (Warwick 
and Druckman, 2001) they use Laver and Hunt’s (1992) ordinal ranking of 
major portfolios in West European democracies. Warwick and Druckman 
(2001, 2006) reason that parties place different valuations on the ministerial 
posts to be distributed (640). Likewise, parties award different values on the 
different SMD they compete for. Warwick and Druckman (2001) in fact claim 
that the above mentioned “relative weakness effect” could be an artefact of the 
failure to take the nature of portfolios, or their salience, into account (638- 
641).
In terms of the quality of districts in the Italian scenario, since 1994 
parties adopted some sort of rating processes for SMDs according to some 
specific criteria o f ‘winnability’. In 1994 this procedure was limited due to the 
unfamiliarity of actors with the new rules of the game (Di Virgilio, 1998: 20).
34 While several scholars recognized the difference in portfolio salience (such as Laver and 
Schofield, 1990; Browne and Feste, 1975; Budge and Keman, 1990), none of their studies 
before Warwick and Druckman incorportate portfolio salience weights in a cross-national 
statistical analysis.
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In 1996, in order to create a map reflecting the degree of winnability of 
districts parties used a combination of the 1995 regional elections results and 
data from polls of voting intentions commissioned by parties. Four categories 
arouse from this data mainly: safe, marginally winnable, marginally 
unwinnable, and unwinnable (Di Virgilio, 1998: 20).
Summing up, the above section highlights that four important 
contributions emerge from the existing literature. The first concerns the 
resources attributed the explanatory power when explaining the number of 
portfolio assigned. While there is agreement that the payoff to partners in 
wining coalitions will be proportional to their resource contribution, there is 
less agreement about what is the nature of these resources. Gamson’s law 
(1961), considered one of the strongest findings in the social sciences, states 
that there prevails a proportional relationship between legislative seats and 
portfolio allocation. However, several formal bargaining models promote the 
idea of formateur over compensation.35
Second, the introduction of the “proportionalisation of the plurality” 
concept (Bartolini and D’Alimonte, 1998), which describes the process 
through which coalitions partition the single member districts SMDs among
35 A semantic statement is of useful relating to these two views. In the literature the voting 
weights while considered ‘resources* they are called ‘bargaining power’ so as to distinguish the 
different mechanism through which they are transformed into portfolios. In other words, while 
according to Gamson’ Law more parliamentary seats translate into more portfolios (and as such 
they are a resource), according to formal models of portfolio allocation more parliamentary 
seats do not necessarily translate into more portfolios. Instead, the more pivotal a party is in 
making a coalition a winning one, the more it has bargaining power and the more portfolios it 
will be assigned.
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their members in order to avoid a clash of interests and therefore they 
proportionalize the SMDs to maximise their vote shares. This phenomenon 
that enabled small parties to gain more representation in the SMDs than in the 
proportional arena However, little is found in the literature to account for this 
phenomenon and let alone test it. In fact, all that is known is that nationwide 
‘some agreements’ between parties within (and sometimes outside) each 
coalition take place to assess and decide who stands in which district. The 
only useful intuitions come from the work of Warwick and Druckman (2001, 
2006) who introduce the idea that parties place different valuations on the 
ministerial posts to be distributed and that “there is no dispute that portfolio 
payoffs ought to take into consideration the varying levels of importance of 
the portfolios, rather than just their number” (647). While formateurs (in our 
case Fi and Ds) are undercompensated in terms of numbers of SMD they 
receive, there is no reason why SMDs payoffs should be evaluated only in 
those terms. As mentioned, it is unlikely and implausible that parties would 
rate all SMDs equally and count the number each party receives. Some SMDs 
are safe in the sense that the probability that they will be won if elections take 
place are high. It is consequently possible that any shortfall in the number of 
SMDs that big parties receive is made up by the inherent values of the other 
SMDs they get.
Like Di Virgilio suggests, parties developed the concept of 
predictability “to regulate internal party dynamics” (Di Virgilio, 2004: 198-
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199). In other words, parties developed pre-electoral estimates of increasing 
precision evaluating the majoritarian electoral districts based on their 
characteristics. While in 1994 there was little familiarity with this technique, 
in the subsequent elections of 1996 and 2001 pre-electoral rating was an 
extensively used tool. In particular, in 2001 the number of districts about 
which the two alliances share the same evaluations of districts sum up to 85% 
of the total districts compared to 1996 where they shared only 53.8% (Di 
Virgilio, 2004: 199).
While the above are very useful contributions; to this stage very little is 
known about the bargaining process underlying the allocation process of 
SMDs. Furthermore, there are few indications that encourage me to have 
some obvious doubts concerning the extent of the bargaining power of small 
parties.
Consequently, turning the attention to ‘bargaining’ and its determinants 
seems an indispensable step. We know from the game theoretic literature that 
bargaining occurs whenever two or more players attempt to reach agreements 
over the “mode of allocation, distribution or redistribution of scarce 
resources” (Doron and Sened, 2001: 7). Several factors are accredited as 
elements of bargaining and considered important for determining bargaining 
outcomes such as players, differences of interest, interdependency, time 
factors, rules of progress, agreed solutions and method of enforcement (ibid.). 
In multiparty systems that adopt a full or partial majoritarian system with a
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number of SMDs to compete, an aspect of parties’ bargaining becomes the 
distribution of these limited districts among allies. Likewise, in countries with 
list systems, party members engage in bargaining in order to attain the highest 
positions of the lists. Irrespective of the system, parties or individuals within 
parties need to negotiate in order to get hold of the limited resources available 
(districts or top positions in lists).
The literature review on coalitions highlighted the existing knowledge 
gap concerning pre-electoral coalition in general and pre-electoral coalition 
bargaining in particular. Therefore, in order to put together a theoretical 
model that will lead to testable predictions about who gets what in the 
distribution of the 475 Italian SMDs I need to look elsewhere.
The literature on power provides some interesting intuitions for electoral 
bargaining. In his seminal work on ‘power’ Dowding admits that it is 
“inherently difficult to conceptualise power” (1996: 23). Because of this, 
Dowding, expanding Harsany’s work (1976), suggests that to understand an 
actor’s power we should focus on the actual resources that an actor 
commands.
Resource accounts for negotiation success are used to analyse the 
Council of Ministers of the European Union (EU). While not concerned in a 
‘divide the pie’ situation, Bailer (2004) investigates the role of the ‘resources’ 
of member states, disentangled into exogenous and endogenous ones, in 
predicting member countries’ bargaining success over achieving their goals in
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European Union negotiations. Interestingly, she finds that when it comes to 
EU negotiations, and contrary to traditional theoretical approaches, some 
resources of power such as economic resources and number of votes, rarely 
translate into bargaining success. Some other, however, like a position close 
to the agenda setter is found to have an important, but often neglected, impact.
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3.1.3 Theory and Expectations: Bargaining and its Determinants
“Who prevails in coalition bargaining depends on what political parties can offer to
one another.” 
(Lupia and Strom, 2003: 6)
Drawing inspiration from the literature on power, in this section I 
present a resource account of bargaining, portraying the resources that could 
actually influence party’s negotiation power and consequently its bargaining 
power. In the following section I expand on the three main resources that I 
envisage as essential for the understating of bargaining games among allies: 
size, blackmailing potentials, and incumbency,
i. Size as a resource.
Following the analysis introduced based on Gamson’s Law, the party’s 
contribution in terms of votes, or its size, as the classical resource advanced 
by coalition theorists. The bigger the player, the more pressure she can exert 
on a negotiation table. A party’s size could be measured in many ways, one of 
which is the total share of the population vote it gained at the previous 
elections. More votes could be seen as having more “force of law on one’s 
side” and this “leads others to be more likely to comply” (Dowding, 1996: 
55). Therefore, the greater the party’s vote share the more bargaining power it 
can exert on negotiations.
The descriptive statistics back in tables (3.2) through (3.5) are useful for 
illustrative purposes. Tables (3.2) and (3.4) show the number of districts that 
the centre-right and centre-left parties received, respectively. Tables (3.3) and
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(3.5) report the electoral size of each party. For the centre-right the descriptive 
figures are in line with the size claim. The size order for parties of the centre- 
right alliance is; (1) Fi (with 53.60% of the total coalition’s votes); (2) An 
(with 25.84% of the total coalition’s votes); (3) Udc (with 11.20% of the total 
coalition’s votes) and (4) Ln (with 9.43% of the total coalition’s votes). The 
order in terms of the number of districts received is also the same; Fi (with 
225 districts), followed by An (with 119 districts), then Udc (with 65 
districts), and finally Ln (with 44 districts). The same applies to the centre-left 
coalition, whereby the ordering of parties according to their size is (1) Ds 
(48.90% of the total coalition’s votes); (2) Margherita (32.99% of the total 
coalition’s votes); (3) Girasole (12.49% of the total coalition’s votes) and (4) 
Pdci (5.56% of the total coalition’s votes). With the exception of Margherita 
which obtained as many districts as the biggest party, the Ds; the order in 
terms of the number of districts received is very similar. In fact the order is Ds 
and Margherita first with 43.22% of the total allocated districts, followed by 
the Girasole with 12.04% of the total allocated districts, followed by the Pdci 
with only 3.01%.
As an extra test I carry out the same analysis conducted by Gamson 
(1961) and subsequently by others such as Browne and Franklin (1973). 
Specifically, I test whether party’s size (its share of votes within the coalition) 
is correlated with its share of SMDs. For the centre right the correlation 
coefficient is r=0.9974 (p<0.001). This means that .9948 of the variance of
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SMDs share is explained by size. In other words only 18 per cent of the 
variance in the dependent variable remains to be explained by all other factors 
whatsoever. It can therefore be affirmed, with few reservations, that that the 
number of SMDs received by coalition partners of the centre right is indeed 
explained almost on a one-to-one basis, by their size in their coalition. The 
same applies to the centre left where the correlation coefficient is r=0.9440 
(p<0.001). This means that .8911 of the variance of SMD share is explained 
by parties’ size. Before elaborating on the relationship between size and the 
quality of districts, I need to investigate whether the “relative weakness 
effect”, which is the tendency of small parties to do better than bigger parties 
in the process of exchanging vote shares for SMDs , introduced in the 
literature review, is prevalent in the Italian scenario. For this purpose I 
correlate the index of overpayment with size. The index of overpayment 
comes from subtracting the proportion of votes contributed by a party from 
the proportion of SMDs received by that party. If the party contributes more 
seats than it receives ministries this index is negative, and it is positive when 
the party receives more ministries than its seats contribution. For the centre 
right this analysis yields a coefficient (Pearson’s r) of -0.86, and for the centre 
left is -0.90 showing that the smaller the party is the greater the overpayment. 
The advantage ratio could also be employed. The two variables are highly 
correlated with an r of 0.92. The same applies to the centre left where the 
correlation coefficient amounts to 0.93.
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Now the logic of the relationship between the size of a party and the 
number of districts it will receive can be extended to link size with the quality 
of districts the party receives. The above correlations indicate that small 
parties obtain more SMDs than their proportional vote share and larger parties 
receive less. Consequently, following Browne and Franklin (1973) it is 
reasonable to assume that bigger parties extract qualitative rents. In other 
words they might receive a qualitative compensation and take their share from 
the most valuable portfolios, read the ones described as safe. In fact, not only 
will a party with a high vote share demand more districts to place its 
candidates, but it will also exert its power to obtain a grater share of safe 
districts. In other words, the party will employ its resources to run in districts 
where the probability of being elected is high,
ii. Blackmailing ability as a resource.
In the game theoretic literature an actors’ blackmailing ability is called 
“Best Alternative to The Negotiation Agreement” (BATNA). The negotiation 
outcome is seen as crucially dependent on the attractiveness of the bargainers’ 
alternative opportunity (Dixit and Skeath, 2004; McMillan, 1992). Similarly, 
Lupia and Strom (2003, 2007) deem “walk-away values” as an important 
determinant of ‘who gets what’ and therefore an important determinant of 
bargaining power. The “walk-away value” is what the negotiator can gain 
walking away from the bargaining table without an agreement. This 
constitutes an important bargaining chip when it hinges on the credibility of a
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bargainer’s negotiating position. In other words, “walk-away values” 
represent implicit threats to other members of the coalitions the higher they 
get, and that is the less the negotiator loses moving away from the agreement 
(ibid. p.9). In my case, I make the reasonable assumption that a party’s walk­
away values, and similarly a party’s blackmailing potential, are a function of 
its location. The location of a party hinges upon the probability of this party 
leaving the coalition to run alone or with allies. I assume that parties on the 
other extremes, further away from the centre of the political spectrum, are less 
likely to leave the coalition because they have no (other) one to ally with. On 
the contrary, parties that are closer to the centre of the political spectrum are 
more credible in their threat of leaving the coalition to join new allies.
By the same token, the party that finds itself in such a position will exert 
its blackmailing potential in order to obtain a larger number of safe districts 
that have a higher probability of winnability.
iii. Incumbency as a resource.
Being an incumbent gives a party several years of advantage to convince 
voters of its merits and provides them with record of service for the district 
and its electorate (Cain et al., 1987). It is reasonable to expect that an 
incumbent party has more chances of attracting many votes and enjoy an 
electoral advantage in those districts won at the previous election. Therefore, 
incumbency should constitute an important bargaining resource when 
negotiating for the allocation of previously won districts.
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In this analysis I rely on a measure of incumbency that reflects ‘party 
incumbency’ and not ‘legislator incumbency’. This is simply justified by the 
fact that I am assessing the bargaining potentials of parties and not of the 
running candidates.
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3.2 Two Ballots and Two Preferences: ‘Split-ticket
Voting’.
The claim that electoral rules are critical for the success of 
representative democracy is undisputed. Stripped down to their basics, 
electoral rules are nothing but ‘a mathematical formula’ through which votes 
are translated into seats, and as such they have a direct impact on political 
outcomes. Equally important, however, are the indirect effects resulting from 
political actors’ reactions to the incentives created by electoral rules. In fact, 
not only does the nature of the electoral system determine the way votes are 
translated into seats, but it also influences the way they are cast (Bawn, 1999).
The direct and indirect consequences of electoral rules represent the 
crux of Duverger’s (1954) work about the ‘mechanical’ and ‘psychological’ 
effects of electoral systems. On the one hand, the mechanical effects can be 
understood as the mathematical formula. They describe how the electoral 
rules constrain the manner in which votes are converted into seats. On the 
other hand, the psychological effects are represented in voters’ response to the 
mechanical effects. In other words, they constitute voters’ change of 
behaviour. In a majoritarian electoral system, voting for a different party 
instead of the preferred one is a method of avoiding wasting one’s vote. 
Consequently, voters’ strategic behaviour (psychological effects) is their 
attempt to bypass the direct consequences of the mathematical formula which 
could have punished her preferred party (mechanical effects).
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Going back to the core of this thesis, that is political actors’ reactions to 
the incentives created by electoral rules, this section addresses ‘voters’ as the 
political actor under scrutiny. Among the most significant and indirect effects 
of the new rules, and not a planned consequence per se, is voters’ split-ticket 
behaviour. By studying split-ticket voting I am simultaneously addressing the 
mechanical and psychological effects of an electoral system.
3.2.1 Split-ticket in Italian Mixed-Elections.
With the introduction of the majoritarian element, the 1993 reform 
conferred to voters an extra ballot. Voters under the new rules simultaneously 
express their preference twice. Once for the candidate of a ‘going alone’ 
party, or for a candidate chosen by a coalition to represent the alliance as a 
whole in the majoritarian tier, and again for a candidate that represents a 
single party list in the proportional tier. It goes without saying that amplifying 
the opportunity set of voters through the extra ballot paved the way to a more 
sophisticated form of voting. In fact, while a voter is most likely to find in 
every PR district a candidate belonging to each party list (as parties will 
rationally run in as many districts as possible to reach the 4% threshold 
determined by the reform), the majoritarian tier will not be as representative. 
In fact, as explained in the previous section, because of the majoritarian 
element, now parties need to come together under pre-electoral alliances and 
decides who runs where. Furthermore, as previously addressed, centrist 
parties of both coalitions (namely Margherita for the centre-left and Udc for
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the centre-right) are over-represented as the number of districts awarded to 
them outweighs their electoral size. Consequently, this drives unrepresented 
voters to at least consider new options, both inside and outside their coalition 
domain. In such a situation, it is likely that I will observe a discrepancy 
between the sum of votes received by the coalition in majoritarian districts, 
and the sum of proportional votes of its components in the proportional tier. A 
quick look at electoral results of the three elections held under mixed rules 
gives a better picture of the phenomenon itself. As tables (3.6) and (3.7) 
below illustrate, sometimes the coalition as a whole outperforms its 
components (like the centre-right in 1994, and the centre-left in both 1996 and 
2001) and sometimes the other way around (like the centre-left 1994, and the 
centre-right in both 1996 and 2001).
Table (3.6): Coalitions’ and Parties’ Performance in the Three Mixed 
Rules Elections.
1994 1996 2001
% smd 
votes
% pr 
votes
% smd 
votes
% pr 
votes
% smd 
votes
% pr 
votes
Centre-
Left 33.29% 34.32% 44.77% 40.80% 42.97* 34.92%*
Centre-
Right 46.17% 42.91% 40.20% 42.09% 45.38% 48.62%
Others 15.63% 15.71% 13.52% 14.52% 9.61% 13.9%
*It is important to recall that the huge discrepancy between the votes received by the centre- 
left coalition as a whole and the sum of its component list is explained by the fact that RC did 
not run in the majoritarian tier at all. In other words, the centre-left coalitions attracted the 
majoritarian votes of Rifondazione supporters, but their PR votes are not considered when 
creating the last column of the table. Source: for the 1994 elections Chiaramonte (1995: 377). 
For 1996 and 2001 elections the source is the national elections results. Totals do not always 
add up to 100 % because in some districts a number o f small local parties are excluded. 
Furthermore, in other districts some parties run under a mixed label (like Ulivo + SVP in 
2001) where this not included in the calculus.
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Table (3.7): Coalitions’ and Parties’ Performance in 2001.
2001 National Elections in Detail
% SMD votes % PR votes
Centre-Left 42.97% 34.92%
Ds 16.56%
Margherita 14.52%
Girasole 2.17%
Pdci 1.67%
Centre-Right 45.38% 48.62%
Fi 29.44%
Ln 3.94%
An 12.02%
Udc 3.22%
Others 9.61% 13.94%
Lista Pannella
Bonino 2.24%
RC 5.04%
Italia dei Valori 3.89%
Democrazia Europea 2.39%
Msft 0.39%
Source: 2001 official national elections results. Again, totals do not always add up to 100 % 
because a number of small local parties are excluded.
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Split-ticket behaviour could have serious consequences on the victory 
chances of alliances. In both the 1996, and the 2001 elections the centre-left 
coalition outperformed the collection of its parties (1996: 44.77% in the 
majoritarian tier versus 40.80% in the PR; 2001: 42.97% in the majoritarian 
tier versus 34.92% in the PR). But it is only in 2001 that the alliance won the 
elections. In both 1994 and 1996, the centre-right coalition outperformed the 
collection of its parties. However, only in 1994 this helped the coalition to 
win.
It is interesting to note that back in 1998, Bartolini and D’Alimonte use 
the term ‘^ wasted vote” phenomenon to describe split-ticket in Italy. This was 
because they noticed that in the 1996 elections minor parties such as Ln and 
Msft obtained a high number of votes, which were, however, insufficient to 
grant them any seat (Bartolini and D’Alimonte 1998:161).
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3.2.2 Split-ticket Theoretical Views.
Unlike pre-electoral coalition bargaining, the phenomenon of split-ticket 
voting in mixed electoral systems is a largely investigated one; both in terms 
of theory and empirics.
When surveying the literature of split-ticket behaviour in the U.S. 
congress or in several mixed member electoral systems, two groups of studies 
emerge. The first is categorised on the basis of addressing the determinants of 
split-ticket voting, the other on the basis of the data employed.
While studies of split-ticket voting acknowledge that this phenomenon 
may occur for a variety of reasons, case study analyses as well as comparative 
analyses differ from each other depending on which explanation they revolve 
around. Split-ticket models either focus on candidate characteristics, on 
ideology (that of voters’ and candidates’), on strategic motivations or on a 
combination of these.
Irrespective of which variable is considered important, in order to test 
their assumptions some scholars use survey or aggregate level data (the old 
classical school) while others complement this data with new data created by 
using recent and innovative methodological techniques such as ‘Ecological 
Inference Methods’ (the new school).
In the following sections I overview the most important contributions in 
the split-ticket literature dividing them into two groups, the first on the basis
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of the explanations they provide for split-ticket behaviour, the other on the 
basis of the data they employ.
(1) ‘Candidate’ centred (Personal vote), ‘Ideology’ centred and ‘strategic 
voting’ explanations of split-ticket behaviour.
The explanations provided by scholars of voting behaviour when
analysing split-ticket usually revolve around three main headings. The first is 
a candidate-centred vision of split-ticket. In other words, the gap between PR 
and SMD total votes can be explained by factors related to individual 
characteristics of candidates themselves. Studies that highlight candidates’ 
qualities over other explanations usually refer to ‘the personal vote’ as the 
determinant of spit ticket behaviour. Burden (Forthcoming), for example, in 
his study of Japanese elections addresses the role of incumbency and that of 
the absence of some parties. His analysis using a mixture of survey and 
electoral data suggests that the split-ticket phenomenon in Japanese elections 
stems from non-ideological candidate characteristics. Instead, it is 
differentials in the number and quality of candidates run by each party that 
affect split-ticket voting.
Studies that are concerned with candidate-centred explanations also 
study the role played by the absence of some parties, because it creates 
‘necessary’ split-tickets (Burden, Forthcoming; Johnston and Pattie, 2002; 
Benoit et al., 2004, 2006). In the Italian case the absence of some parties in 
the SMDs is not an exception but the norm. As repeatedly discussed in this 
thesis, parties need to coordinate entrance in the majoritarian tier in order to
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secure as many seats as possible. Consequently, only one of the many 
coalition parties will be present in each SMD.
Incumbency, another personal characteristic, is widely used. Burden and 
Kimbal (2002), for example, use it to explain variation in ticket splitting 
across US house districts. Scheiner (2005) adopts the measure of a 
candidate’s quality understood as ‘incumbency’ and other prestigious 
occupations to explain victory in Japanese SMDs. Evidence of the role played 
by incumbency, and consequently personal vote, is also found by Moser and 
Scheiner (2005) in Russia, Lithuania, Japan and New Zealand, and by Reed’s 
study of the first Japanese elections held under mixed rules (1999).
In terms of Italian studies, Maraffi (2002), Di Natale (2000, 2002) and 
Bartolini and D’Alimonte (1998) focus on candidates’ personal characteristics 
and in particular highlight the role of the leader. The most analytical insights 
concerning personal vote in Italy come from Maraffi (2002) who provides a 
more comprehensive picture concerning voting motivations of the Italian 
electorate using data from the Italian Election Studies (ITANES 2001). The 
data, reported in Table (3.8), demonstrates that when asked about what 
influenced their voting decision, the electorate gave some weight to ‘the 
coalition, the programme, the leader of the coalition, the preferred party and 
the candidate in the district’ (Maraffi 2002: 303). With the exception of the 
last (the candidate) voters used four “cognitive shortcuts” of equal importance 
in deciding whom to vote for (335).
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Table (3.8): Voting Motivations in SMDs by Percentage Points.
Relevant Issue Overall Centre-
left
Centre
right
The coalition 27.4 32.6 23.4
The programme 23.6 19.2 27.0
The leader of the 21.8 13.5 19.2
coalition
The preferred 21.9 28.2 17.0
party
The candidate in 5.3 6.5 4.4
the district
Total 100 100 199
N 2117 924 1193
Source: Maraffi (2002): 303-304.
Two main interesting elements emerge from this table. The first is the 
apparent low relevance of the candidate’s characteristics and persona as a 
determinant of voting behaviour in the SMDs. The second is that the centre- 
left and centre-right electorates rely on two different sets of decision models. 
About a third of the interviewed belonging to the centre-left uses the 
‘coalition’ as the voting criterion. Instead, almost 30% of the centre-right 
interviewed considers the programme as the main criteria.
Without underestimating the role of personal characteristics in affecting 
split-ticket behaviour, other scholars envisage ideology as playing a major 
role in explaining this behaviour. Benoit et al. (2004, 2006) study of the 1996 
Italian elections stress the role played by a voter’s distance between her 
coalitions’ candidate and what is on offer from the competition. To do this 
they create a variable called the Inter Cartel Midpoint (ICM), which 
represents the mid point between the candidates offered by each of the two 
main coalitions. This variable is used as a proxy for ideology. A big (small)
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value, for example, reflects a scenario whereby an extreme right (left) wing 
candidate faces a centrist left (right) wing candidate. Figure (3.5) below 
reports parties’ policy positions in 2001 (Benoit and Laver, 2006).36 This 
variable is often used to explain split-ticket decisions. For example, ceteris 
paribus, when a PR supporter of the Christian Democrats (Udc) finds in her 
SMD an extreme right candidate (like Lega Nord) and a centre-left candidate 
(like Margherita), she might decide to switch to the centre-left coalition 
because she finds herself closer to the moderate centre-left than to the extreme 
far right.
Figure (3.5): Policy positions of Italian parties in 2001.
2.14 3.32 4.01 5.98 g Q3 100g 12 12.38 15 59 1688 1694 1902
J  L J _ J  4  _4 1------ -^------------ 1------ l _ l --------------L
Rc*** Pdci* Verdi* Ds* Margherita* Idv*** Lpb*** Udc** Fi** Ln** An** Msft**
* Ulivo coalition, ** Cdl coalition, *** Third parties 
Source: adapted from Benoit and Laver (2006).
It is interesting to note that Burden (Forthcoming) and Benoit et al. 
(2004, 2006) have one important element in common. According to them, 
voters split their vote because they do not find in their SMD a candidate 
belonging to their preferred party. While Burden and Benoit et al. reveal that 
in Italy and Japan split-ticket is constrained or, as Burden puts it is, 
“necessary ticket splitting” (20), some scholars, instead, rely on strategic
36 See Chapter (4.2) for a detailed discussion about the measurement o f  policy positions.
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motivations for such a behaviour. Some studies even consider ‘split-ticket" 
and ‘strategic voting’ as two faces of the same coin and use the two terms 
interchangeably (Bawn, 1999; Cox, 1997; Fisher, 1973; Roberts, 1988). In her 
work, for example, Bawn (1999) defines split-ticket as the rational and 
strategic reaction of a voter in the proportional tier to the presence of single­
member districts. This is because, according to her, voters split their ballots 
strategically by giving more of their SMD votes to the larger and more 
competitive parties, saving their PR votes for smaller parties not present in 
SMDs. I find this operationalisation very limited as it does not distinguish 
between strategic and non strategic motivations behind this sophisticated form 
of behaviour.
It is important, consequently, to point out the distinction between such 
phenomenon and between ‘strategic voting’. In fact, not all split-ticket voting 
is actually ‘strategic’. Strategic voting is voting in such a way to improve the 
expected outcome of the election, not necessarily by voting one’s first 
preference. It is casting the vote in a way that avoids wasting someone’s vote. 
Split-ticket, instead, is a form of sophisticated voting that takes place when 
casting more than one single vote and doing so in a mismatched manner. 
When such a behaviour happens to have strategic motivations, we can then 
label it strategic voting. Consequently, a split-ticket vote can be seen as 
strategic behaviour under several scenarios. One is where the coalition 
candidate has no chances of winning so voters cast their vote for their second
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best in order not to waste the vote. An alternative scenario is when the 
preferred candidate’s victory is very likely and therefore a voter can cast 
another strategic vote to increase, for example, the gap between the least 
likely candidate and the second best (D’Alimonte and Chiaramonte, 1995: 
70). Finally, when such behaviour is an intentional act targeted to create 
divided governments (Alesina and Rosenthal, 1995; Fiorina, 1996).
Moser and Scheiner (2005) are more precise with their use of strategic 
voting and they use it as a counterexample of what motivates split-ticket as 
opposed to personal vote. They define strategic voting as “casting ballots for 
alternatives other than one’s first preference in order to improve the expected 
outcome of the election” (260). They theorise that while personal vote is most 
likely to be present in some degree in nearly any electoral system, when it 
comes to mixed systems its effect is weaker in those systems with linkage 
between tiers. In these systems parties have fewer incentives to encourage 
their candidates to behave personalistically and engage in personal electoral 
campaigns. This is because the benefit they could reap from this form of 
campaigning will not affect the number of seats the party will be allotted 
unless their behaviour increases support for the party as a whole. Personal 
vote justifications o f split-ticket are replaced with strategic considerations. By 
examining election results in five mixed electoral systems they find that the 
form of split-ticket in Germany is of a strategic nature, unlike that of Russia, 
New Zealand, Japan and Lithuania. This is tested by assessing the role played
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by the closeness of a race (known as marginality) on split-ticket. The logic of 
this variable dictates that in close races (where the difference between the first 
two candidates -or the margin of victory- is small) voters will rationally and 
strategically stick with the coalition candidates. When the race is not close, 
instead, fewer strategic votes will be cast. Interestingly, they suggest that in 
those occasions where the race is not close, but SMD candidates still receive 
additional votes; a substantial amount of personal voting is taking place.
Using this same definition, split-ticket was described as strategic for 
elections in many countries adopting mixed electoral systems such as 
Germany (Bawn, 1993, 1999; Gschwend et al., 2003; Moser and Scheiner, 
2005: Schoen, 1999), and New Zealand (Karp et al., 2002).
Moving on to Italian studies, elements of strategic voting are found in 
Mudambi et al. (2001a,b). In their study of the 1996 elections, while they are 
mainly interested in what affects a coalition’s probability of victory, they still 
address the “switching voter phenomenon”. They claim that ticket splitting is 
a voter’s strategic reaction to a coalition’s objectives. Parties have a ‘coalition 
focused objective’, which consists in achieving coalition victory in the 
majoritarian tier. At the same time they exhibit a ‘party focused objective’, 
which consists in promoting the party in the PR tier. The focus on each 
objective depends on the nature of districts. In safe districts inter-coalition 
competition is accentuated. When parties are confident that the SMD is 
secured, the party focused objective becomes a priority. Mudambi et al.
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suggest that under this scenario those parties that did not place the SMD 
candidate desire that the coalition's candidate wins with the smallest of 
margins. This is because such a situation would strengthen their position in 
future seats allocations at other regional elections. Consequently, the rational 
supporters of non represented coalition parties will go as far as voting for a 
non coalition candidate in that specific district, thus increasing split-ticket 
voting. On the other hand, in marginal districts where the coalition victory is 
in doubt, inter-coalition cooperation is accentuated. In this scenario the 
primary objectives becomes the coalition-focused objectives. This would 
minimise the share of supporters of non-represented coalition parties who 
would abandon the coalition.
(2) Old data versus new data.
The empirical work reported above is divided between case studies and 
comparative analyses. These different studies revolve around candidate 
centred, ideology centred or strategic-based theories of split-ticket behaviour. 
In these studies it is possible to distinguish among three different types of data 
used for the analyses. The first, and most frequently used, involves aggregate 
election results. This is employed by the like of Bawn (1999) and Reed 
(1999), Kohno (1997) and Moser and Scheiner (2005). More specifically, 
these studies use the difference between the vote percentage of a given 
candidate and the PR vote percentage won by the candidate’s party.
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The second type is data derived from surveys, which is usually used in 
conjunction with other data (Benoit et al., 2004, 2006; Burden, 2007; 
Venturino, 2004). Venturino, for example, uses survey data from ITANES 
2001 to explain right wing voters’ decision to abandon the coalition in the 
SMD race. His results demonstrate that centre-right voters’ negative rating of 
the premier affects this decision.
Finally, the need to overcome ecological fallacies and their annexed 
shortcomings associated with the two previous types of data,37 paved the way 
to more innovative techniques that seek to reach more precise split-ticket 
estimates. The third type of data is derived, in fact, from applying the new 
technique of ecological inference (Achen and Shively, 1995; King, 1997; 
King et al., 2004), which is now widely used in studies of split-ticket voting. 
Burden and Kimbal (1998), Burden (Forthcoming), Benoit et al. (2004; 2006) 
are just a few examples.
37 This topic is addressed in detail in Chapter (5).
3.2.3 Towards a Model of Split-ticket Voting for Frustrated 
Coalition Supporters.
From the above section it emerges that the literature on split-ticket
agrees on two distinct matters. The first is the difficulty of obtaining split- 
ticket estimates in multiparty systems. The other is that split-ticket behaviour 
is understood as the difference between the total number of PR and SMD 
votes. Consequently, to understand split-ticket behaviour we must understand 
what drives voters towards or away from candidates, parties and coalitions 
running in the SMD tiers.
So far, in the Italian scenario only distinct explanations were tested. For 
example personal voting alone is addressed by Maraffi (2002) and Venturino 
(2004), the role of strategic vote is investigated by Mudambi et al. (2001a,b), 
and the role of ideology alone is addressed by Benoit et al (2004), while 
ideology and strategic voting is combined in Benoit et al. (2006). However, 
given the relevance of these variables when assessed independently, it seems 
reasonable to investigate whether more than one element is at work in the 
same electoral set up. Consequently, the scope of this chapter on split-ticket 
behaviour is more empirical than theoretical. Because of their innovative 
methodology used by Benoit et al. (2006) my approach consists of chewing 
over, replicate and extend their work on split-ticket behaviour. As explained 
above, several theoretical views addressed the phenomenon of split-ticket. 
The line of reasoning followed throughout this section attributes this 
phenomenon to a combination of candidates’, voters’ and districts’
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characteristics. It is the combination of ‘who’ are the chosen candidates to run 
in a district, and ‘which voters’ preferences dominate the district, that together 
give birth to this interesting phenomenon.
In terms of the model, at the highest level of taxonomy voters are 
classified into two categories; those who support parties external to any 
coalitions, and those who support a party belonging to either of the two main 
alliances, the centre-left and centre-right. As explained in the following 
section, this dichotomy is important in relations to the above distinction about 
strategic versus sophisticated forms of voting.
At a deeper level of dichotomy, following Benoit et al. (2006), I classify 
voters of both groups into two further distinct categories; satisfied and 
frustrated. As figure (3.6) below demonstrates, satisfied voters are those who 
find in their SMD a candidate from the same party they voted for in the PR 
ballot. Frustrated ones, instead, are those who do not find in their SMD a 
candidate from the same party they voted for in the PR ballot. The latter 
voters face a more “restricted choice menu” than satisfied ones (459).
Figure (3.6): Voters’ Types.
VOTERS
Satisfied (S) Frustrated (F)
Those who find in their SMD a Those who do not find in their
candidate from the same party SMD a candidate from the same
they voted for in the PR ballot. party they voted for in the PR
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In order to explain the changes in the incentive structure of voters under 
mixed rule, my scope is to primarily focus on frustrated voters only, 
excluding satisfied ones. This choice is justified by the fact that the act of 
splitting of a satisfied voter is rather rare. In 1996, for example, Benoit et al. 
demonstrate that only between 0.03% and 0.04% of satisfied voters belonging 
to either of the two main coalitions actually split their vote (478). In other 
words, almost every satisfied voter is a party sticker. In fact, with the 
exception of unintended mistakes, when, if at all, would a coalition supporter 
who finds in her SMD a candidate that belongs to the same party of her PR 
preference opt for another candidate in the other coalition or who is not 
member of any coalition? In such scenario strategic voting is ruled out simply 
because by abandoning one’s coalition a voter cannot be better off. 
Consequently, apart from an unintended mistake, the reasonable explanation 
of a satisfied voter’s split could be that the ‘other’ candidate is more 
appealing to this particular voter. In other words, a ‘personal vote’ based on 
the characteristics of the candidate alone (such as gender), is a plausible 
explanation of this behaviour. However, such an act would consist in wasting 
the vote. A satisfied supporter of either alliance can only increase the chances 
of victory of their preferred party, or its block, by sticking with their party.
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For obvious reasons the choice to split of a coalition’s frustrated voter 
is much more comprehensible and much more intriguing, and consequently is 
the focus of this analysis. The absence of a candidate that belongs to the same 
party of her first preference (understood as her PR vote) puts the voter in a 
situation to choose between to stick with the coalition of her PR preference, to 
split to the opposing coalition or to split to a third party. Splitting the vote 
would inflict a loss to her PR preference’s coalition and thus it will not 
contribute to its probability of winning. Therefore, it is reasonable to theorise 
that splitters must have rather strong incentives that push them towards other 
candidates to undergo such transgression.
As explained in detail in the data and research section, the data available 
to me is aggregate data; the 2001 national election results. This type of 
information stands as an obstacle in the face of testing theories that rely on 
individual level covariates. In other words, the use of aggregate data to extract 
clues about individual behaviour implies that we are making an ecological 
inference.
In the attempt to overcome the ecological inference problem, I use 
Bayesian simulations, namely King’s algorithm, to create district level 
estimates.39 In other words, I obtain split-ticket estimates for frustrated 
coalition supporters in each of the 475 majoritarian districts. Given that each 
coalition is composed of 4 parties (Fi, Ln, An, and Udc for the centre-right
38 As opposed to a voter of a party who is not a member of any coalition (a third party).
See footnote n. 3.
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and Ds, Margherita, Pdci, and Girasole for the centre-left) I obtain a total of 
1425 split-ticket estimates.40 Therefore, with this specific type of data 
available, the most appropriate type of covariates that can be tested are also 
district level covariates. Consequently, in order to simultaneously test the 
various existing explanations of split-ticket, I employ data that account for a 
candidate’s position (policy distance), for voters’ preferences and for the 
districts’ nature.
Ideology
In their analysis of the 1996 Italian elections Benoit et al. (2006) define 
the “Inter-Coalition Midpoint” (ICM) as the “point halfway between the 
positions of parties of the candidates offered by each coalition in the 
constituency in question” (14). They theorise that the position of the ICM 
affects the level of coalition splitting. For example, when in a specific SMD 
the Ulivo places a left-wing candidate while the Cdl places a centrist 
candidate, the ICM will be to the left of the centre of the spectrum (a small 
ICM). In such a case they assume that Ulivo voters have more incentives to 
split compared to Cdl supporters. Conversely, when the Cdl places a right 
wing candidate and the Ulivo places a centrist one (high ICM), Cdl supporters 
will have more incentives to switch compared to Ulivo ones. In other words, 
they expect the ‘frustrated Ulivo supporters who switch to CdV estimates to
40 In fact, only one of the four parties has an SMD candidate in the specific district. Therefore, 
we have 3 groups of frustrated voters for each coalition in each district.
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be negatively related to the position of the ICM, while the ‘frustrated Cdl 
supporters who switch to Ulivo’ estimates to be positively related. 
Consequently, the first step is to test this theory on the 2001 elections.
While the above seems very intuitive, it overlooks an important element, 
and that is the distribution of voters in each district. For example, in the above 
scenario when a far left candidate (such as Pdci) faces a centre-right candidate 
(such as Udc) the above logic predicts high rates of ‘Ulivo’ to ‘Cdl’ 
switching. However, this sole definition does not take in consideration that 
the switching will be different in those districts where the Pdci receives 40% 
of the coalition vote compared to those districts where the Margherita (the 
most centrist of all centre-left parties) receives 40%. Figures (3.7 and 3.8) 
below portray this important distinction by comparing two similar scenarios 
in terms of parties on offer but with a different electorate composition. In 
other words, in order to have a more accurate reflection of reality I must 
control for the distribution of voters in the district, whether the coalitions’ 
electorate is more biased to the right or to the left.
Ill
Figure (3.7): Split-ticket Voting Scenario With Extreme Left Median 
Voter (model A).
Cc CoICM
Figure (3.8): Split-ticket Voting Scenario With Central Left Median
Voter (model B).
Cc ICM Co
Cc is the Coalition candidate, p is the median voter in that district, ICM is the Inter Cartel 
Mid point, and Co is the candidate o f  opposition. The spectrum is divided into two by the 
thick line in the middle. Figures A and B portray two different districts in terms o f the voters’ 
orientation, but with the same offer in terms o f candidates. In the first one the location o f p 
reflects a very left wing district. Instead in figure B the location o f  p reflects a more centrist 
district. Because the ICM is the same in the two districts, Benoit et al. would predict splitting 
behaviour among the leftist supporters (because the ICM is located to the left o f  the centre. 
However, the two curves, which represent the distribution o f  voters across the district, 
suggest that in the case o f B I should expect more levels o f  splitting by the leftist supporters. 
Unlike in A, in B in fact the distance between p and Co is less then the distance between p 
and Cc.
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Strategic Voting
Strategic considerations are considered to play an important role in this 
circumstance. In fact, in those districts where there is a close race, frustrated 
voters that choose to stick might do that as a strategic vote in order to increase 
the probability of victory of their preferred party’s coalition.
A district’s safety, measured as the absolute difference between the first 
and second candidate, is a relevant variable in studies of Italian electoral 
behaviour (Benoit et al., 2004; Mudambi et al. 2001a,b). Rational voters who 
desire victory for their preferred party or for the coalition to which their party 
belongs to, might tend to behave differently, ceteris paribus, in those districts 
where there is close competition vis-a-vis those districts where victory is a 
sure (lost) matter. Sticking is expected to increase in those districts where the 
race is close so as to increase the chances of victory.
Personal Vote
As widely illustrated in the literature, good candidates are considered 
important to winning SMD seats. In line with the U.S literature, quality is 
defined as having been elected to office, or in other words incumbency 
(Jacobson, 2004). Previous office holding experience is considered to play an 
important role in attracting votes. Consequently, it is important to investigate 
whether the nature of candidate competition is key to understanding split- 
ticket voting in Italian mixed elections.
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3.3 Dual Candidacy and Legislative Behaviour in the 
Italian XIII Legislature.
The last topic under consideration in this theoretical chapter is that of 
MPs behaviour under mixed rules. Several models of political economy focus 
on the link between the electoral system and the agency problem. In fact, the 
principal-agent problem is one of the central paradigms in representative 
politics. The principal-agent relationship is characterised by difference in 
interest between the two, and as such it is applicable to various political 
scenarios and situations. For example, the relationship between voters 
(principals) and representatives (agents) has been widely addressed by the like 
of Persson and Tabellini (2000) who develop a ‘career concern model’ as well 
as ‘an accountability model of elections’ in order to formally address the 
distinct impacts that electoral systems exert on MPs’ performance and their 
accountability (225). Their work suggests that incentives for good 
performance might be diluted in proportional systems of representation and as 
such they are less powerful compared to majoritarian electoral systems in 
disciplining politicians (234).
Compared to pure systems, a less developed account of this link is 
available when the electoral system under discussion is a mixed one. In fact, 
how does a mixed system affect the incentive structure of legislators and 
consequently affect their behaviour in Parliament? Studies of legislative 
behaviour have commonly addressed the tendency of members of parliament
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to comply with party lines in both proportional and majoritarian systems of 
representation. Mixed electoral systems combine the two together and as such 
they engender new questions regarding accountability and compliance of MPs 
with party lines.
To begin with, it is necessary to illustrate how the new rules affect 
legislators’ incentives. Interestingly enough, the roots of such incentive 
change are indirect, as they go back to the electoral stage. In fact, unlike pure 
proportional or pure majoritarian electoral systems, candidates in mixed 
systems running for parliament have direct access to parliamentary seats 
through more than one channel. They, in fact, can choose between running in 
the proportional tier alone, running in the majoritarian one alone, or more 
interestingly, running in two tiers simultaneously.
Consequently, mixed rules affect the possible ways or paths through 
which a legislator can reach her seat. In turn, this could affect her tendency to 
comply with party lines differently, compared to those colleagues running in a 
single tier only. Therefore, the question arising is if mixed rules, characterised 
by this new third option (running in both tiers), affect an MP’s tendency to 
comply with party lines in the legislative arena. In the next three sections I 
will go over voting behaviour in the Italian Parliament, I address the major 
contributions provided by the relevant literature and finally I present my own 
theoretical model.
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3.3.1 Legislative Behaviour in the Italian XIII Legislature.
How Italian MPs vote is of great relevance for the implications on policy 
outcomes. Voting behaviour in parliament could be dictated by personal 
believes, by party discipline or by both. When information about individual 
MPs’ policy preferences is unavailable, it is rather complicated to unveil the 
real motivations that drive legislative behaviour. However, by looking at 
voting behaviour and by applying appropriate scaling methods, I can at least 
measure MPs ‘revealed’ policy preferences.
Landi and Pelizzo’s (2006a) study of the XIII legislature covered roll call 
votes for 630 bills and a total of 651 MPs. By applying the NOMINATE 
scaling method (thoroughly explained in Chapter 5.3) they created a map of 
the Italian political space which gives a picture of the location of parties and 
the dimensions governing the XIII Italian Parliament. They suggest that the 
horizontal dimension reflects loyalty to either the centre-left or the centre- 
right coalitions. In the second dimension, instead, parties’ positions reflect a 
north-south divide. Table (3.9) below reports the parties’ average 
NOMINATE score for the XIII legislature on the two dimensions.
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Table (3.9): Parties’ means NOMINATE scores in the XIII legislature.
Party NOMINATE SCORES 
First dimension
NOMINATE SCORES 
Second dimension
Verdi -0.896 -0.074
Pdci -0.870 0.475
Pds -0.761 -0.078
Popolari -0.759 0.159
Ri -0.734 0.020
Prc -0.407 0.858
Udeur -0.189 -0.362
Ccd 0.109 -0.236
Fi 0.239 -0.159
An 0.372 -0.449
Ln 0.782 0.550
Figure (3.9) shows the location of the 651 MPs in the first and second 
dimension produced by NOMINATE. Relative spread of MPs groupings 
gives an indication of how often they vote with each other. Figure (3.10), 
instead, shows the average coordinates by party.
117
Figure (3.9): Nominate Scores Coordinates for 651 MPs in the XIII 
Italian Legislature.
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Figure (3.10): Average NOMINATE Coordinates by Parties.
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The intense concentration of dots in Figure (3.9) reflects the closeness of 
same party MPs to each other and their gravitation around a spatial location 
that can be interpreted as their party of origin (clearly indicated in Figure 
3.10). Obviously, not every MP’s pattern of voting is in line with her party. 
The Lega Nord’s MP located on the right axis of Figure (3.9) is one example 
of an MP who is deviant from party lines (as the Lega Nord party’s 
coordinates are positioned more to the north east of the graph). The natural 
question that comes to mind is: how does the structure of the Italian mixed 
electoral system affect the decision of this ‘outlier’ of Lega Nord, for 
example, to distance herself from party lines?
3.3.2 Previous Work and Evidence of Contamination Effects.
Given its direct impact and consequence on policy, parliamentary 
behaviour is an increasingly studied topic. The study of MPs’ voting 
behaviour has been widely addressed by scholars of all electoral systems and 
a particular attention is given to the relatively new chamber of the European 
Parliament (Hix, 2001, 2002). The key question addressed in those studies is 
the extent to which members of the European Parliament (MEPs) vote with 
party lines and what affects this tendency or lack thereof.
The first step towards understanding legislative behaviour is to find a 
common measurement of such behaviour. Several opinions and approaches 
reign as how to measure this variable. Generally speaking, the literature is 
divided between studies that employ simple roll call data (Depaw and Martin,
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2005; Ferrara, 2004b; Haspel et a l, 1998; Rasch, 1999; Remington and 
Smith, 1995; Thames, 2001) and those which apply a scaling method to roll 
calls such as NOMINATE or OC (Hix and Jun, 2006; Hix et al., 2005; Noury 
and Mielcova, 200541).42
Those scholars who use simple roll calls are interested in measuring the 
number of times that a legislator’s vote matches that of her party. For 
example, in their studies of the Ukranian parliament and that of the XIV 
Italian chamber, Herron (2001) and Ferrara (2004b) measure party loyalty 
operationalised as the propensity of legislator to vote in line with her party as 
a percentage of the total votes in which the legislator could have potentially 
participated (% of all votes). More precisely, the percentage of votes where a 
legislator’s behaviour (yea, nay, abstained, did not vote and absent43) matched 
the modal behaviour of the parliamentary group of which she is a member is 
calculated. This excludes votes in which the legislator’s absence is justified 
(like for example when an MP is in a mission). However, Ferrara postulates 
that in some instances the ‘non voting’ behaviour might simply not be an 
indicator of an MP ‘voting with her feet’ but it might reflect the fact that she 
is elsewhere discussing matters, drinking coffee or having a cigarette with
41 Noury and Mielcova (2005) is an interesting piece of work where legislative behaviour is 
analysed as the independent variable rather than the dependent one. In fact, they investigate 
the relationship between legislative behaviour and the propensity of voters to punish or 
reward MP. Consequently, they address the impact of voting with party lines on the 
probability o f being re-elected.
2 There are some exceptions to the use o f roll calls or to their different scaling methods. For 
example both Lancaster and Patterson (1990) and Judge and Ilons:zky (1995) study legislative 
behaviour of German and Hungarian deputies respectively employing survey data.
43 This latter, ‘absent’, was only used in Herron’s (2001) operationalisation.
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colleagues (Ferrara, 2004b; 20). Consequently, to factor-in this detail, Ferrara 
also operationalises party loyalty as a percentage of votes cast rather than as a 
percentage of total votes. Similarly, Thames (2001) creates a dependent 
variable that measures the percentage of times that an individual MPs vote in 
line with partisan majority. Again, Thames considers only the total votes cast 
and excludes where the MP abstained or where she failed to vote.
NOMINATE as a scaling method, which is described in detail in 
Chapter 6.1, has increasingly become the industry standard to establish the 
revealed behaviour of MPs. This is because this method generates ideal point 
estimates of legislators’ position on a multi-dimensional policy space. As an 
example of the use of NOMINATE we can look at Hix (2002). In his study of 
voting behaviour of MEPs he uses NOMINATE scores and operationalises 
the propensity of an MP to vote against her party as “the absolute distance 
between an MEP’s NOMINATE score and the mean NOMINATE score of all 
the MEPs in her EP party” (693).
After having operationalised ‘legislative behaviour’, the second steps in 
our analysis is concerned with addressing what affects such behaviour. As 
addressed in Chapter (2) section (2.1.2.c), conventional wisdom and several 
studies convey that pure PR systems of representation with close lists are 
more successful in disciplining their members. In these systems MPs greatly 
rely on their party for accessing resources such as ballots entry, financial 
resources or career advancement. On the contrary, legislators elected in SMDs
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need not to entirely rely on their party for resources, as they must appeal to 
local constituents in order to win seats. However when moving to mixed 
systems of representation the question that arises is: which features will 
characterise the incentive of legislators? Proportional or majoritarian traits 
will be prevalent, or will it be a mixture of the two?
From my previous discussion on contamination it emerges that 
contamination effects theory suggests that mixed electoral systems do not 
simultaneously exhibit the same characteristics of both majoritarian and 
proportional systems because the interaction of those two tiers creates a new 
hybrid system with its own identity and features (Ferrara et al., 2005). 
Consequently, by studying the legislative behaviour of those MPs who run in 
the proportional districts only (similar to pre-reform) or in the majoritarian 
districts only and comparing it to the behaviour of those who run in two tiers 
simultaneously (only possible during the mix-rules era), I could shed some 
further light on the issue of whether this new system portrays new and unique 
traits from a legislative behaviour standpoint.
Extremely relevant to this study is the work conducted for Germany 
(Lancaster and Patterson, 1990), Hungary (Judge and Ilonskzki, 1995), Russia 
(Haspel et al., 1998; Remington and Smith, 1995; Thames, 2001; Smith and 
Remington, 2001), and Ukraine (Herron, 2002). As touched upon in more 
detail below, all of these analyses address the effect of seat type or mandate 
on legislative behaviour and consequently test directly or indirectly the
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assumptions of contamination theory. Nevertheless, there is no agreement on 
the matter as these studies reach quite diverging conclusions.
Those analyses that find a relationship among mandate and legislative 
behaviour (Thames, 2001; Lancaster and Patterson, 1990) theorise that 
legislators elected through PR ballot are more dependent on their party for 
election and career advancement vis-a-vis SMD ones. In fact, those legislators 
are elected because their party leaders appointed them in a high enough rank 
position of their party list. Consequently, if the legislator wants to maximise 
her chances of being re-elected, pleasing party leaders through cohesive 
legislative behaviour appears to be more important and effective than pleasing 
voters. Furthermore, those candidates who find themselves on lower lists 
positions might need to please their party leaders in order to increase their 
chances of being upgraded on the party list at future elections.
In his study of the Russian Duma, Thames (2001) studies the effect of 
mandate on legislative behaviour between 1994 and 1998. One of the 
acknowledged weaknesses of his dependent variable is, however, the 
exclusion of intended non-voting and abstention from the measurement. 
Unlike Ferrara (2004) who creates two dependent variables; one in which all 
votes are counted (potential and actual) and one in which only actual votes 
cast are counted, Thames excludes the latter thus awarding every vote equal 
weight. The interesting change brought about by Thames is that he 
distinguishes among issue areas. His study, in fact, suggests the existence of a
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PR-SMD divide in legislative voting behaviour of MPs in the Russian Duma 
between 1994 and 1998. Interestingly, Thames argues that the distinguished 
features of the Russian party systems characterised by weak parties and their 
limited ability to attract parties might be a relevant element that affected his 
conclusions.
Judge and Ilonskzki (1995) and Lancaster and Patterson (1990) study 
two different countries but adopt the same tool of research, that of survey 
data. Judge and Ilonskzki (1995) use an opinion survey to study the 
Parliament of Hungary in 1990. The data constitutes valuable research 
material especially because the 1990 Parliament was both the first 
democratically elected parliament and the first under mixed rules. Using data 
from a survey, involving 185 out of the 498 members of the German 
Bundestag between 1983 and 1986, Lancaster and Patterson’s (1990) analysis 
focuses on the impact of mandate on an MPs’ tendency to serve local interests 
(also known as pork barrel politics). In their study of Germany they find 
evidence in favour of a PR-SMD divide in the legislative behaviour of 
German MPs. The conclusions of their paper do not contradict conventional 
wisdom about the existence of a PR-SMD divide in legislative behaviour. 
However, the main problem related to this study and that of Judge and 
Ilonskzki (1995) consists in the nature of the data used. In both cases deputies 
of both mandates were asked to express their perceptions about the 
importance of pork barrel as opposed to other focus of representation. While
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they both find a systematic difference between PR and SMD deputies, their 
analysis does not allow us to single out the role of neither mandate nor that of 
party discipline on legislative behaviour. Let alone that it does not help 
identifying other institutional factors that might be relevant. Furthermore, the 
studies, while very interesting and revealing, rely on cross tabulations only, 
which reveal correlation but not necessarily causality.
Another analysis conducted by Haspel et al. (1998) uses roll call data to 
address the effect of mandate on legislative behaviour in the Russian Duma 
between 1994 and 1995. Initially, they find difference between the behaviour 
of SMD and PR deputies. However, they also point out to the fact that this 
result could be misleading because of the unequal distribution of MPs across 
categories and factions. Consequently, when they address the relevance of 
mandate within factions, they find no significant differences.
Remington and Smith (1995), and more recently Smith and Remington 
(2001), use roll call data to study cohesion in the Russian Duma. While they 
do not provide explanations for their results, their work sheds further light on 
legislative behaviour inside the Duma, contributing, however, to the mix 
picture already available. In fact, unlike Thames (2001) they demonstrate that 
deputies’ seat type is not useful for predicting their legislative behaviour. This 
is not because they find no link between seat type and legislative behaviour, 
but instead it is because their findings are inconsistent with expectations about 
the effects of PR-SMD divide on cohesiveness. In other words, the results of
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their analysis indicate that district deputies are more cohesive than party list 
ones.
Unsatisfied with the study of mandate alone in explaining MPs electoral 
behaviour, Herron (2002) extends existing work and stresses the importance 
of studying dual candidacy and the safety of a district. His starting point is a 
recurring idea of this thesis whereby mixed electoral systems are not 
considered the mere addition of pure proportional and majoritarian ones. 
Instead, in mixed systems the incentives associated with pure laws interact 
and create a new incentive structure (Cox and Schoppa, 2002; Herron and 
Nisihkawa, 2001). Intuitively, because this interaction concept extends to the 
legislative realm as well, Herron rejects the mandate-geographical 
representation equivalence consisting in the divide between PR (as national) 
and SMD (as local) established by the legislative behaviour literature. In his 
study of the Verkhovna Rada (the unicameral parliament of Ukraine) Herron 
evaluates mandate, dual candidacy and the safety of district in influencing 
deputies’ behaviour. In line with contamination theory expectations he finds 
that the connection between a deputy’s seat type and her legislative behaviour 
is more complex than that hypothesised by scholars of pure systems. It is a 
candidate’s electoral path to her legislative seat and not the mandate that 
matters when explaining legislative behaviour. When dual candidacy was 
introduced as a dummy variable (1 for MPs who run in both tiers and 0 
otherwise) it failed to explain variance in legislative behaviour. When,
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however, variables that more accurately represent MP’s path were constructed 
(variables that reflect simultaneously mandate, dual candidacy and the safety 
of a seat), some effects of electoral variables emerged. For example, it 
transpires that, everything else equal, MPs with dual candidacy who run in 
majoritarian districts which are not safe and who also run low on PR lists 
have a higher tendency to vote with party lines compared to other MPs. This 
is because by complying with party lines deputies signal loyalty towards their 
party and could, therefore, hope to obtain better seats in terms of quality at the 
following elections. Ferrara (2004b), following Herron (2002), also uses the 
type of the MP’s political mandate (proportional or majoritarian) combined 
with indicators of electoral path to study legislative behaviour.
While the fact that parties’ control over access to parliamentary seats is 
very strong for PR candidates, it is true for several electoral systems. The 
Italian case, among others, is a particular case whereby SMD candidates 
develop a strong dependency relationship with their parties not weaker than 
that of PR ones. Legislators elected through the SMD ballot, like those elected 
under PR, have incentives to please their party leaders if they want to increase 
their chances of being re-elected. In fact, although the allocation of districts is 
the result of a bargaining game among parties (see Chapter 2.1), the choice of 
which single candidate who will run in the specific SMD belongs to the party 
alone. Consequently, while satisfaction of the electorate would be necessary 
to ensure re-election in the same district, satisfaction of party leaders is
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fundamental to be taken in consideration to run as a candidate in the first 
place.44 Furthermore, pleasing party leaders is also important for the ‘career- 
driven’ candidate. In fact, a possible scenario for a ‘good behaving’ candidate 
could be the upgrade from running in a lost or in marginal majoritarian 
districts to running in a safe ones, or to gain a higher rank in a PR list. 
Consequently, this in itself stands as preliminary evidence that mandate, in 
the Italian party scenario, does not necessarily reflect a geographical (local 
versus national) divide.
One striking element emerges from the above literature review. While 
there are many diverging and inconclusive views concerning the role of 
mandate in affecting legislative behaviour, academics agree on two facts. The 
first is that legislators care, among other things, about re-election. The second 
is that MPs legislative behaviour reflects a trade off between pleasing the 
party and pleasing the electorate.
Summing up, the literature disentangles electoral systems on the basis of 
“two inherently incompatible principles - national and local representation” 
(Thames, 2001: 870). In this dichotomy PR systems are the one biased 
towards nationalisation and majoritarian systems are biased towards 
localisation.
44 The same cannot be said about all mixed systems. In the Russian Duma for example, where 
Thames (2001) finds systematic difference between PR and SMD deputies, he remarks that 
“the key to winning single-member district elections in Russia often has less to do with party 
affiliation than with the candidate’s independent control of other electoral resource” (875).
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Building up form the idea of trade off (national versus local), in their 
model of ‘How Unorganised Interests Get Represented’ Denzau and 
Munger’s (1986) investigate another form of trade off. They look into 
legislators’ trade off between pleasing voters and between pleasing organised 
interest groups, which in turn affects their probability of being re-elected. 
According to them the national versus local paradigm occurs at the 
legislator’s individual level. The legislator’s dilemma consists in finding the 
best mode of allocating her total available service efforts in order to maximise 
her probability of re-election. Expanding this model, Bawn and Thies (2003) 
emphasise that the chances of re-election are affected by nomination and 
nomination quality first. In other words, legislators need to gain access to both 
PR and/or SMD electoral districts and they especially prefer access to 
favourable and safer ones. Only after this is guaranteed they can, 
subsequently, spend efforts to maximise the probabilities of obtaining enough 
votes to win the seats they compete in.
The mixed rules implemented in the Italian electoral scenario make it as 
such that being selected to run in a district {S) can be disentangled into two 
parts. That is; being selected to run in only one tier, and being selected to run 
in two tiers (the first column of Table (3.10)). In terms of victory, these 
candidates can either win the SMD seat only, the PR only or win both. 
Therefore, legislators in the Italian parliament fit one of the 6 categories 
below (A, B, C, D, E, F and F).
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Table (3.10): Electoral Path and Mandate of Italian MPs Under Mixed 
Rules.
SEAT WON 
(Mandate)
OH
3 S'
K Cu O4
^•a
Q o W o H «> O 13W w ►J W t/J
w
PR SMD
BOTH
CHOSE
SMD
CHOSE
PR
PR A
SMD B
BOTH C D E F
While in the US, for example, nominations for MPs take place as 
‘district level primaries’, in the Italian case, like it is in many other 
Parliamentary systems, nominations are centrally controlled by party 
nomination. Nevertheless, we still witness a situation whereby, using Bawn 
and Thies’ (2003) language, candidates need votes from the unorganised 
(voters) and need resources, understood as seats, from the organised (parties) 
(11). Consequently, a model which addresses how legislators’ incentives in 
terms of their mandate and electoral path (single or dual candidacy as well as
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single and dual victory) affect their tendency to care more about the organised 
vs. the organised or vice versa, is needed.45
3.3.3 Theory and Expectation.
Explanations o f legislative voting behaviour.
Legislators first need to gain access to electoral seats and then they need 
to obtain enough votes to win them. Consequently, to develop an account of 
legislative incentives under mixed rules a key factor is to incorporate 
elements that affect both requirements. Legislators, thus, need to please their 
parties, which guarantee access to seats in terms of both quantity and quality. 
Subsequently, they need to please voters who can help them gain victory over 
those seats.
For this purpose, I look at a combination of the theoretical work of 
Denzau and Munger’s (1986) and Bawn and Thies (2003). In fact, I adopt the 
concept of trade off that an MP faces when allocating her total available 
service (understood as votes) between voters’ and parties’ interests. In other 
words, in order to maximise her chance of re-election ( RL)> the legislator 
wants to maximise the probability of being selected to run in a PR or SMD 
district (S) , and wants to maximise the probability of winning enough votes to
win the selected districts (V). To put it formally RL = m ax /(£ ,F ).
45 It is useful to remember that while Denzau and Munger (1986) and subsequently Bawn and 
Thies (2003) refer to pressure groups as the ‘organised’, I leave them out of the analysis and 
focus on parties as the organised entity MPs seek to please. In other words I only distinguish 
between the provider of electoral seats (parties) and the providers o f votes (the electorate as 
one).
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Therefore, in this simplified model, an MP faces the trade off between voting 
in line with national interests (voting according to party lines) and between 
voting in line with more local interests (drifting away from party lines), with 
the exception of those situations in which the two coincide. Following this 
line of reasoning, voting in parliament is a democratic tool through which 
parties (as collection of MPs) seek to serve the interests of their electorate. As 
a consequence, it is reasonable to assume that when legislators stray from 
party lines in terms of voting behaviour they do so because 1) the two 
interests (national vs. local) do not match and 2) they choose, for some 
reasons, to favour the latter interests over the former.46
After postulating this conjecture, which is a simplified account and 
might not be always the case, but it can be, nevertheless, a reasonable and 
good approximation of reality, it is necessary to expand on the conditions 
under which such defection behaviour could prevail.47 Going back to Table 
(3.10) above we can observe that there are two categories of legislators who 
might feel strong enough and confident enough that their deviant behaviour 
might not be necessarily punished in the future. Those are MPs who fall 
within categories E and F. On the one hand, unlike legislators of categories A 
and B, these MPs were selected by their parties to run in both majoritarian
46 This also stems from the simplifying assumptions that we have a two dimensional policy 
preference parliament: national versus local. Therefore, voting behaviour reflects one or the 
other and not a third option.
47 In fact, in this simple model o f local versus national interests I do not take in consideration 
situations whereby MPs decide to deviate from their party for personal convictions or other 
more complex motives.
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and proportional tiers. In other words, they are invested with a double share of 
party trust. On the other hand, unlike legislators of category C and D who are 
also nominated twice, these MPs won both tiers simultaneously. In other 
words, they are invested with double trust from the electorate as well. 
Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that, in those circumstances whereby 
national and local interests do not coincide, MPs invested with an 
‘intentional’ double mandate (understood in terms of double candidacy and 
double victory) have stronger incentives compared to other categories of MPs 
to deviate from party lines. By being elected twice, and thus reflecting strong 
electorate support, these MPs feel more confident that their party will forgo 
the option of punishing them, by not nominating them for example, at future 
elections. Instead, legislators falling within categories A and B fear similar 
degrees of party retaliation in case of deviant behaviour. In fact, given that 
nominations belong to parties in majoritarian and proportional tiers alike, 
similar logics should govern both categories of MPs. The same applies for 
categories of C and D. These MPs, in fact, were nominated twice (and as such 
they were invested with party trust twice), but they were empowered by 
voters only once.
While there are several elements in common between this work and the 
other work of legislative behaviour under mixed rules, this work represents a 
departure from such work in three major ways. First, the most obvious 
element is the classification of MPs. Most analyses use a dichotomous
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variable to classify PR and SMD candidates (that is simply 0 and 1). To 
control for the way an MP reaches her seat, some scholars (Herron 2002, and 
Ferrara 2004b) create new sets of variables that control for dual candidacy 
(i.e. when the MP runs in both proportional and majoritarian tiers), and for 
multiple elections (i.e. the when the MP wins both the proportional and the 
majoritarian tiers). In other words, each MP can fall into one, two, or three of 
the above categories. In this work, however, I combine the mandate and the 
electoral path into one single variable. The operationalisation in this section 
takes into account that even though an MP covers an SMD seats she could 
have run in both the plurality and proportional tiers. It is also possible that she 
won both tiers but chose the plurality one, or that she only won the plurality. 
From this, it emerges that mandate is far more complex than the simple PR vs. 
SMD dichotomy and that there are six possible scenarios to account for the 
‘way’ an MP reaches Parliament: (A) she stood in an SMD district only and 
won it, (B) she stood in a PR district only and won it, (C) she stood in both 
SMD and PR districts but winning only the SMD seat, (D) she stood in both 
SMD and PR districts but only winning PR seat (E) she stood in both SMD 
and PR districts winning both and choosing the SMD and finally (F) she stood 
in both SMD and PR districts winning both and choosing the PR.
Second, I use NOMINATE instead of simple roll calls. This choice is 
justified by two major elements. On the one hand, at the more descriptive 
level, simple roll calls cannot shed any light on the directionality of legislative
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behaviour. In other words, NOMINATE scores help us understand whether 
each MPs is situated to the right or the left of her average party mean. This 
opens the door to more detailed analysis to explain such deviant behaviour 
and gives us some hints as to when MPs skew towards the right or left of their 
party. On the other hand, as repeatedly emphasised throughout this chapter 
NOMINATE has increasingly become the industry standard for generating 
ideal point estimates on a multi-dimensional policy space. The estimates 
hence tell us about the dimensionality of the policy space within a Parliament 
and where are MPs situated in such a space. Not surprisingly, former analyses 
yield ambiguous results when using simple RC, in the sense that the main 
variable under scrutiny (mandate) changes significance with the change in the 
operationalisation of the dependent variable (see Ferrara, 2004b). In fact, only 
when non-voting is included in the measurement of party discipline (the 
paper’s dependent variable); the results suggest that mandate does exert an 
impact on legislative behaviour. Consequently, an extra analysis using 
NOMINATES can help shed some further light on this matter.
Finally, an obvious but less central element involves the use of parties 
rather than groups as the main unit of analysis. In fact, a great deal of the 
reasoning behind contamination theory, in one of its assertions whereby 
mandate is not a relevant determinant of legislative behaviour, revolves 
around the extensive role of parties in granting access to parliamentary seats 
for both PR and PL candidates. In the Italian case in particular, parties
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maintain a monopoly concerning exerting control over such access.48 
Therefore, it is parties and not political groups that MPs need to please in 
order to increase their chances of accessing seats and thus winning them at 
fiiture elections. Furthermore, like table (3.11) shows, although national 
parties and parliamentary groups compositions are rather similar, they do not 
coincide.
Table (3.11): Party Group Membership.
Group
Party Ds-
Ulivo
Democratici Misto Popolari Unione
Democratica
An Comunista Fi Ln Total
An 0 0 1 0 0 92 0 2 1 96
Ccd 0 0 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 11
Cdu 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 2 0 9
Democratici 1 16 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 18
Fi 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 110 0 113
Ln 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 1 48 54
Pdci 0 0 0 0 0 0 19 0 0 19
Pds 164 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 167
Popolari 1 1 0 54 0 0 0 0 0 56
Prc 0 0 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 15
RI 0 1 15 0 0 0 0 1 0 17
Udeur 0 0 0 1 19 0 0 0 0 20
Verdi 0 0 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 14
Total 166 18 73 56 19 92 20 116 49 609
Source: Italian Ministry o f Intern.
48 This is true for every coalition candidate.
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To test the role that double candidacy plays in affecting legislators voting 
behaviour I will investigate a mixture of candidate and district variables. As 
mentioned above, unlike previous work, in this thesis measures of electoral 
path (type of candidacy) and measures of electoral performance (type of 
victory) are measured simultaneously. In fact, I should expect candidates who 
are selected to run in more than one district to feel more confident about their 
party’s support and, therefore, exhibit a different legislative behaviour than 
those MP who where selected to run in only one of the two tiers.
Furthermore, I expect there to be another systematic difference between 
candidates who run in both tiers and who win one of the two compared to 
those who run in both tiers and win both. In fact, candidates belonging to this 
deeper level of taxonomy, running in both and winning both, will feel as the 
most confident, as they have high party trust (they are selected twice) and 
high voters’ trust (they won twice). This high level of confidence, in turn, will 
translate in more freedom and lower probability to comply with party lines.
As for control variables, I test for both personal and district level 
characteristics. In terms of personal characteristics, I investigate the role 
played by incumbency, tenure and gender. An incumbent legislator, who, 
therefore, is at least at her second consecutive legislature, might feel that her 
dual victory is a signal of popularity that the party should not ignore in order 
to win that seat again. Therefore, given her popular support she is less 
dependent on the party vis-a-vis a freshly elected legislator and she can thus
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afford to skew away from time to time. The same cannot be said about a 
newly elected legislator who needs to prove herself to both her party and the 
electorate and is, therefore, more inclined to vote along party lines to gain its 
much needed future support. A similar logic applies for tenure. I expect tenure 
to be negatively correlated with an MPs’ tendency to comply with her party 
lines.
The gender of candidates also falls in the personal characteristics. While 
women and men alike who fall in the above (A through E) categories need to 
increase their chances of being re-elected, it is women who are comparatively 
badly represented in both chambers. This discrimination might create the 
feeling that they must prove themselves more than men, and therefore ceteris 
paribus tend to vote along party lines more than men.
In terms of seat-related characteristics, it easy to identify those 
legislators who would like to improve the nature of the district (in term of 
winnability) in which they were elected. Legislators who run in lost seats 
(majoritarian mandate) and those who are low on a PR list (proportional 
mandate), and thus who in both cases luckily made it to Parliament, would 
obviously prefer to get a better seat at future elections to increase their 
chances of victory.
I also expect district-related characteristics to be connected with 
personal ones. For example, as party leaders usually run in safe districts or 
they run high on party lists, I expect the effect of seat safety to be different for
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different seniority levels. This is because those who serve for several 
legislatures are usually party leaders themselves or at least powerful members 
who not only vote along party lines but also dictate those lines.
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CHAPTER 4 - THE IMPACT OF MIXED
ELECTORAL RULES ON THE INCENTIVE 
STRUCTURE OF PARTIES.
As explained in detail in Chapter (3.1), the introduction of mixed 
electoral rules, in general, and the adoption of an abundant majoritarian 
element in the elections of the Italian Lower House, in particular, imposed on 
parties the need to come together under unprecedented pre-electoral alliances. 
That same theoretical chapter highlights the weaknesses prevailing throughout 
the general political science literature concerning the theme of pre-electoral 
alliances. Not only is the existing work about post-electoral forms of 
coalitions; but it also predominantly addresses those (post-electoral) coalitions 
formed ‘to establish a government’, leaving those formed ‘to divide a pie’ 
under-investigated. Therefore, very little is known as to what affects intra­
coalition bargaining when the parties involved attempt to reach agreements in 
‘divide the pie’ situations.
More specifically, in the Italian context, pre-electoral bargaining 
consists in the distribution of the 475 single member districts among the 
alliances’ partners. When it comes to the relevant literature on Italian politics, 
it appears that scholars have simply focused on describing the process of pre- 
electoral coalition formation. In a few instances (such as Di Virgilio, 1998, 
2002, 2004) some more tentative explanations are brought forward arguing, 
for example, that past electoral performance is the one and only criterion that
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determines bargaining power. This gave birth to a number of contentions 
attributing to the new rules of the game an important role in increasing small 
parties’ bargaining power (Bartolini et al., 2004). The bargaining power of 
small parties is, thus, explained by asserting that small parties retain ‘electoral 
blackmailing power’ in the sense that they can threat to defect from the 
coalition and present their own candidates at the election.
However, if looking back to the figures of advantage ratios associated 
with the 2001 elections, reported in Tables (3.3 and 3.5), we notice that there 
are some fallacies and weaknesses with some of the above interpretations. In 
fact, when we consider the advantage ratio as an index of power, then the 
‘small is powerful’ assertion applies to Udc and Ln, but it does not apply to 
Pdci and Girasole. While the advantage ratios are only descriptive statistics, 
they do suggest that not all small parties obtained an overall number of seats 
that is disproportionately higher than their electoral success. Finally, up to 
date there is no existing empirical work which can either corroborate the 
above assertions or provide a better framework for determining what actually 
affects parties’ pre-electoral bargaining power.
This is why in Chapter (3.2) I formulate a resource-based account of pre- 
electoral intra-coalition bargaining. Its purpose is to provide a theoretical 
framework to explain what affects parties’ power around the negotiations’ 
table. Consequently, by looking at the partition of the 475 SMDs among 
partners within each of the two coalitions in the 2001 elections, the scope of
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this chapter is to empirically investigate such a model by testing a set of 
relevant resource-based hypotheses.
The 2001 Italian general elections represent an ideal case study to test 
my hypotheses. In fact, these elections were the third elections conducted 
under the new mixed electoral system, and, consequently, parties had by then 
adapted to the new rules of the game. An important remark is of duty 
concerning the complexity of the Italian party scenario in terms of the 
structural changes between 2000 and 2001. As explained in detail below, I use 
the total vote each party obtained in the 2000 regional elections and the 1999 
European ones where appropriate, as an index of size (one of the resources 
that affect bargaining).49 However, between the 2000 regional elections and 
the 2001 political elections the centre-left, unlike the centre-right, underwent 
several fission and fusions. This renders the creation of the size index for thia 
alliance a very difficult endeavour. One of the greatest challenges, for 
example, is to re-create the size of La Margherita and the Girasole. In fact, 
given that these two actors did not exist back in 2000 I had to track all the 
votes of its original members. Given the difficulty of identifying all the 
original components of these two parties (as not all of them joined La 
Margherita or the Girasole but were, instead, scattered here and there), I 
cannot track back all the votes. This might stand as an obstacle towards the
49 This is because in few regions there were no regional elections in the year 2000. 
Consequently, they were replaced by the 1999 European elections results. As explained in 
detail in the coming sections, appropriate tests are conducted to control that this change did 
not cause any bias or inefficiency.
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creation of a precise index. In other words, the index that I create for the 
centre-left might not accurately reflect these two parties’ true electoral gains.
The parties that compose the Cdl undertook fewer structural changes. 
Between the 2000 regional elections and the 2001 general elections, the only 
major change on the right side of the political spectrum is the fusion of the 
two Christian parties, the Ccd (Centro Cristiano Democratico) and the Cdu 
(Cristiani Democratici Uniti), under the label of Udc (Unione Democratica 
Cristiana). Fusions, unlike fissions, are easier to manipulate and are 
consequently less subject to error. In fact, by simply summing up the regional 
votes of the two Christian parties it is easy to recreate the index of Udc in 
2001.
This chapter is structured as follows. First, I provide an overview of the 
required methodology. Then I introduce the data and variables necessary to 
test my resource-based theory. Detailed hypotheses are introduced in 
connection with every relevant variable. Finally, I conclude with a discussion 
of the main results.
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4.1 Methodology.
As repeatedly discussed throughout this thesis, very little is known about 
the mechanisms of Italian pre-electoral district allocation. Therefore, the way I 
look at this ‘game’ might have some implications for the empirical model to 
be adopted. On the one hand, the process could be viewed as a two-stage 
game where allocation decisions (quantity and quality) might be either 
mutually dependent or mutually independent. On the other hand, the results 
could be the outcome of a package deal where the number and type of districts 
are chosen at one point in time. As mentioned in Chapter (3), the only insights 
available on this matter come from Di Virgilio (2002), where he defines the 
allocation process as a “top-down” one divided into five main stages: 1) the 
choice of the criteria and information upon which to define the rating of the 
districts and the quota for each party 2) classification of districts into types in 
terms of winnability 3) the selection of coalition and sub-coalition quotas 4) 
the assignment of the districts to parties around a negotiation table on the 
basis of a mixture o f ‘party quota’ and ‘district rating’ criteria 5) choice of the 
single candidate which is left to each party (98).
The above, especially point (4), suggests that the ‘package deal’ 
scenario, vis-a-vis the ‘two stage game’ might actually be a more plausible 
one. Therefore, the choice of the mixed logit model I use to explain both the 
quality and the quantity of the districts allocated can, thus, be justified. 
Several models are devised for categorical dependent variables.
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Notwithstanding the differences, they all share a complex nature and various 
difficulties when interpreting their results. For choices involving alternatives 
among three or more categories, using the characteristics of those same 
alternatives as explanatory variables, McFadden’s conditional logit model 
(1974) is appropriate (Greene 2000, 862-864).50 Here, I apply such a model 
because I need to investigate the probability that a party is assigned a district 
given both the attributes of the parties themselves and given the attributes of 
the selected districts. Unlike other models, the one in this thesis is particularly 
interesting, but complex, because there is actually no “chooser”.
In the conditional logit model the probability of observing outcome m is 
given by:
where z im contains values of the explanatory variables for outcome m for 
party /. y  is a parameter that indicates the effect of each zk on the probability 
of observing the outcome (Long and Freese, 2005). In the equation above, the 
coefficients for a variable are the same for each outcome (a single yk for
each zk) but there are different (J) values of the variable for each outcome.
The above model, however, needs to be slightly modified in order to
incorporate the characteristics of the district as well as those of the party
50 Sometimes this model was referred to as the Luce model, or the multinomial model (Long, 
1997; Powers and Xie, 2000).
exp(zimr)
for m = 1 to J
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(which is the outcome). This amended version is also called ‘mixed model’ 
because it combines features of the multinomial logit (MNL) with that of the 
conditional logit. A mixed model is thus necessary because it allows for 
testing simultaneously party-specific characteristics and district specific 
characteristics. The above equation, to model the probability that (y=j) where 
j= 1, 2, . . . ,  j, then becomes:
D , .1 , „ exp(z a+x]Pj)
p*(y, = J  *,>Zj) = ^  = s fecexP(z»a +*iA)
where zy and xf denote the two types of explanatory variables; district
related such as safety and party related such as size, incumbency and location. 
This is essentially carried out by adding individual level characteristics to the 
original conditional logit model through a number (J-l) of dummy variables 
multiplied by all district level covariates (Powers and Xie, 2000). It is 
important to note that interaction terms between all individual level covariates 
and the specific dummies must be included in the model. Failure to do so 
results in model misspecification (ibid.).
In order to identify the model, I need to normalise on any of the 
alternatives and set its p  coefficient to zero (in this paper I set the p  
coefficient of the largest parties, Forza Italia for the centre-right and the 
Democratici di Sinistra for the centre-left, to zero).
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4.2 Data and Variables.
Dependent Variable.
To begin with, I run two regression models; one for the centre-right 
coalition and one for the centre-left. Consequently, there are two dependent 
variables. For the centre-right (left) analysis, the dependent variable is the 
party which the Cdl (Ulivo) coalition selected among its members to stand in 
each of the 475 single member districts for the 2001 general elections.
For the centre-right, there are originally six parties to choose from, but 
only the main four are considered in this analysis, namely Forza Italia (Fi), 
Lega Nord (Ln), Alleanza Nazionale (An), and Unione dei Democratici (Udc). 
The two excluded components, the Indipendenti Cdl and the Nuovo Psi, ran in 
only 6 of the 475 districts. In terms of descriptive statistics, the four parties of 
the centre-right contended 453 of the overall SMDs. The remaining 22 
districts are either missing data or were districts assigned to either of the 
excluded two parties.
Table (4.1): District Allocation for the Centre-right (2001 elections).
Udc Fi An Ln Total
Frequency 65 225 119 44 453
As for the centre-left; districts were also distributed among four partners, 
namely Democratici di Sinistra (Ds), La Margherita, Girasole, and Partito 
dei Comunisti Italiani (Pdci). These four parties considered in the analysis
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contended 465 of the 475 districts. This leaves only 10 districts out of the 
analysis.
Table (4.2): District Allocation for the Centre-left (2001 elections).______
Party Margherita Girasole Ds Pdci Total
Frequency 201 56 201 14 465
Explanatory Variables and Hypotheses.
Two distinct sets of characteristics emerge, from the theoretical
framework developed in Chapter (3.2), as relevant when explaining pre- 
electoral coalition bargaining. Namely, party-specific resources and district- 
specific variables.
Party-specific resources
Size: to measure the extent to which the size of a party influences the 
probability that such a party is chosen to run in a specific district, I use the 
votes received at the previous regional elections. However, regional elections 
did not take place in all the 20 regions in the year 2000. Therefore, in those 
(few) instances where such elections did not take place I use the 1999 
European elections results instead. Di Virgilio’s work supports the use of this 
variable, as he suggests that the two allies used the regional results as the main 
indicator of parties’ strength in 2001 (2002: 100). The introduction of this first 
variable brings us to the first two hypotheses related to the connection 
between size and parties’ bargaining power over the allocation of SMDs. As
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argued in Chapter (3), the greater the party’s vote share, the more bargaining 
power it can exert on a negotiation table. This translates into hypotheses (1) 
and (2):
HI: “The greater the size o f a party (the greater its legitimacy), the greater its 
bargaining power and the more districts it obtains out o f coalition 
negotiations. ”
H2: “The greater the size o f a party (the greater its legitimacy, the greater is 
its bargaining power over the obtainment o f more valuable (safer) districts (in 
terms o f winnability). ”
Hypotheses 1 and 2 lead me to expect ‘Size’ to be positively correlated 
with the probability of being assigned a greater number of districts in general, 
and to be positively correlated with the probability of being assigned a greater 
number of safe districts, in particular.
Location: In the theoretical section I have highlighted how a party’s 
location could affect its blackmailing ability. The location of a party hinges on 
the probability of this party leaving the coalition to run alone or with allies. In 
order to test the impact that the location of a party plays, I need a proxy for 
parties’ positions. Party policy position is among the most important variables 
of this research. The ‘best way’ to empirically estimate such variable has been 
at the heart of heated debate. Two main approaches emerge; the first is the 
“party manifesto based estimate” led by Budge et al. (2001) through the 
Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP). The second is that of “expert survey 
analysis” led by Benoit and Laver (2006, 2007a). The first derives parties’
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policy positions from extensive hand coding of party manifestos. The latter, 
instead, derives policy positions by asking several country specialists to place 
parties on a left-right dimension.
Benoit and Laver (2007a) compare estimates of the left-right positions 
of political parties derived from their expert survey with manifesto-based 
estimates of policy positions, created by the CMP. Through the analysis of the 
expert survey results they demonstrate that the “substantive meaning of left 
and right is not constant, either from country to country or even across time 
within a single country” (103). The implication of this result is that scales 
built from pre-defined and fixed components of left-right (such as the CMP) 
will poorly fit real party policy positions when applied across space and time. 
Furthermore, by comparing estimates of both methods, Benoit and Laver 
(2007a) demonstrate that while the estimates converge on average, there are 
nonetheless, important differences across countries (ibid.). With smaller 
measurement errors, expert survey estimates are more accurate.51 
Consequently, I choose to use Benoit and Laver’s (2006) values from the 
survey of expert placement of parties on policy positions. The location of the 
party on a right-wing dimension takes different values for each party and it 
increases the more right-wing the party is. Table (4.3) below shows the 
calculated estimates of Italian parties’ policy positions by Benoit and Laver 
(2006).
51 The debate about which method is more accurate is an open (me. In fact, several papers 
were subsequently published by these authors on the matter. See for Example Benoit and 
Laver (2007b) and Budge and Pennings (2007).
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Table (4,3): Centre-Right and Centre-Left Parties Policies’ Positions.
Centre-right
parties
Udc Fi Ln An
Policy 12.38 15.59 16.88 16.94
position
Centre-left Margherita Girasole Ds Pdci
parties
Policy 8.04 6.30 5.98 3.33
position
One basic problem with this operationalisation, however, is that the 
values of parties’ location do not vary at the district level. This means that 
there are essentially 4 values repeated in 475 districts. While the actual n of 
each regression adds up to a max of 1900 observations,52 there are only 4 
unique values. It is not very easy to get around this problem since I am not 
able to measure different party positions at the district level. However, in 
order to increase the values, slightly, I follow Benoit et al. (2005) and take the 
mid-point between the possible Centre-Right candidates and the actual 
candidate chosen by the Ulivo. This produces an Inter Cartel Midpoint (ICM)
e'y
that has 24 values (or 4!). Although still a discrete number, it is more than 4, 
and it also varies at the district level.54
As addressed in detail in the theoretical section, I theorise that the 
location of a party hinges on the probability of this party leaving the coalition 
to run alone or with allies. I assume that parties on the other extremes, further
52 As explained in the methodology section this is because in each districts there are four 
parties to choose from. The value 1900 comes from 475 times four.
The symbol (!) stands for factorial.
54 Note that this mode of specification presumes that the centre-right (left) would choose their 
candidate based on the other coalition’s choice, which may not at all be the case
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away from the centre of the political spectrum, are less likely to leave the 
coalition because they have no (other) one to ally with. On the contrary, 
parties that are closer to the centre of the political spectrum are more credible 
in their threat of leaving the coalition to join new allies. By the same token, 
the party that finds itself in such a position will exert its blackmailing 
potential in order to obtain a larger number of safe districts that have a higher 
probability of winnability. This brings us to the next two hypotheses:
H3: “The closer a party, within the coalition, to the centre o f the political 
spectrum, the higher its blackmailing potentials and the higher its probability 
o f being allocated a greater number o f districts. ”
H4: “The closer a party, within the coalition, to the centre, the higher its 
blackmailing potentials and the higher its probability o f being assigned a 
greater number o f safe districts. ”
Incumbency: In order to test the impact of being an incumbent in a district on
the likelihood of being allocated the same district I introduce a dummy
variable. ‘Incumbency’ is coded 1 if the party won the specific district at the
previous general elections (1996 elections), and 0 otherwise. I expect this
variable to be positively correlated with the probability of being assigned a
greater number of districts. This brings me to the next hypothesis:
H5: “Party incumbency in a specific district increases the probability o f being 
allocated the same district. ”
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Dummy variables: a vector of party dummies is introduced. For the centre- 
right the dummies are Fi, Ln, An and Udc, whereby Fi is the excluded 
reference category. For the centre-left the parties are Ds, Margherita, Girasole 
and Pdci, with Ds as the reference category. The introduction of these party 
dummies is a necessary requirement of the mixed logit model.
District- specific variables
Safety: in order to introduce a measure for the type of districts (or rating), I 
construct a continuous variable that describes the value of the percentage vote 
difference between the first and the second candidate for each of the two 
alliances at the previous 2000 regional or 1999 European elections. The bigger 
the value of this variable, the safer is the district for the alliance because the 
difference between the winning candidate and the loosing candidate increases. 
With very few exceptions the first two candidates in every district belong to 
either of the two main coalitions. Consequently, the values of this variable are 
the same for both alliances except for their sign.
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4.3 Analysis and Results.
The scope of this analysis is to assess the role that a party 
resources play in the quantitative and qualitative allocation of 
districts among allies. On the one hand (for the purpose of 
explaining the quantity allocation), I introduce three individual 
variables that account for party resources (size, incumbency, and 
party location through the inter-coalition mid point).
It is important to highlight that when I introduce the variable 
ICM the algorithm used to maximise the log likelihood function fails 
to converge. According to my theoretical model I hypothesize that a 
party’s location plays a role in the process of distributing SMDs 
among allies. When using the policy position of each party I end up 
with only four values, one for each party in every coalition. To 
increase the number of values I substitute the individual values with 
the ICM. Now that this variable appears to be unsuitable to run the 
models I must resort to another measure which can take into account 
the unique policy position of each party. The only way to surmount 
this obstacle is to use fixed effects, or party dummies, as a proxy for 
party location. The introduction of party dummies is also dictated by 
the econometric model. Mixed logit models impose that ‘choice 
dummies’ must be introduced (Powers and Xie 2000). This way, not 
only I allow party dummies to have separate effects on the dependent
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variable but each party represents a unique policy position. One 
drawback is that dummy influence might also capture other effects, 
such as size. This is not an issue because size is introduced in the 
model as explanatory variable. This covariate controls the share of 
votes each party contributes. While ‘ideology’ is another 
characteristic that might be captured by party dummies and which I 
cannot isolate, it is not theoretically linked to the resources a party 
retains. Therefore, it is safe to assume that these dummies are a good 
proxy for location.
For example, the differences observed in the following analysis 
between Ln and An (which are on the right side of the centre-right 
coalition) and between Udc (which is on the other side of the 
coalition) might reflect the importance played by location without the 
need to specify it directly. As highlighted in Chapter (4.1) the mixed 
model requires that I include the number of (J-l) of dummy 
multiplied by all district level covariates (Powers and Xie, 2000). 
Consequently, I interact the party dummies with size and 
incumbency.
On the other hand (for the purpose of explaining the quality 
allocation), in the same model I introduce the interaction between 
parties’ size and the measure of district safety in order to assess 
whether the effect of size changes with the change of the safety of 
districts. Subsequently, I introduce an extra model whereby the
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above variables, with the exception of the interaction between size 
and safety, are tested in different districts with different levels of 
safety. For this, I split the sample and estimate the model for safe 
and non-safe districts, where a safe district is operatonalized as the 
one whereby the difference between the first and second candidate is 
higher than 8% (D’Alimonte and Bartolini, 1997b: 132; Bartolini 
and D’Alimonte, 1995:328).
4.2.A Quantitative distribution.
Table (4.4) and (4.5) exhibit the log and odd ratio results, 
respectively, of the mixed logit regressions. The first column 
displays results for the centre-left alliance and the second for the 
centre-right one. The first most noteworthy result that emerges from 
looking at the tables is with reference to Hypotheses (1) and (5) of 
this chapter. In line with the classical views, for both alliances size 
and incumbency are statistically significant and portray the expected 
signs. Consequently, they are useful elements when explaining the 
allocation of districts for both the centre-left and the centre-right. In 
other words, these two resources are two good proxies of anticipated 
electoral gains and as such they exert a positive influence on the 
likelihood of being allocated a district. The bigger a party, the more 
power it can exert on the ‘quantity’ negotiation table. Similarly, 
incumbent parties are more successful in obtaining those districts 
where they won at the previous elections, because by placing an old
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winner, the coalition could increase its chances of winning that same 
district again.
As introduced in the theoretical section and in the data part, in 
order to assess the role that a party’s blackmailing ability plays in the 
division game, party dummies are introduced.55
Beginning with the centre-right, I tested for the joint 
significance for the three dummy variables and I had to reject the 
null hypothesis that they are all jointly equal to zero. Nevertheless, 
individually, only Udc portrays a coefficient that is statistical 
significant from the reference category (Fi). Its negative sign (or odd 
ratio smaller than one) suggests that, ceteris paribus, compared to Fi, 
it is less likely that Udc will be allocated a district. An and Ln, which 
have very similar party location values (16.88, and 16.94 
respectively), also portray a negative, although not significant, 
coefficient. While Udc portrays a statistically significant but 
negative coefficient, its value (smaller than the values of both An and 
Ln) suggests that its central position tends to be associated with a 
lower likelihood of being allocated a district with respect to Fi but a 
higher likelihood if compared to An and Ln.
Turning to the centre-left, party dummies also provide 
interesting insights. In this case, the dummies are jointly statistically
55 Like just stated in the previous section, I use party dummies as proxies for 
location rather than the ICM simply because when the variable ICM is introduced 
the algorithm used to maximise the log likelihood function fails to converge.
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different from zero. In particular, Margherita, which is the most 
centrist party with a location value of 8.04, portrays a positive 
coefficient (odd ratio greater than one). This implies that, ceteris 
paribus, it is more likely that it will be assigned a district vis-a-vis 
the reference category of Ds. Likewise, Pdci and Girasole have odd 
ratios smaller than one, suggesting the opposite effect. Furthermore, 
Pdci, which is on the left of Girasole (3.33 and 5.98 respectively), 
has an even smaller likelihood of being allocated a district with 
respect to Ds.56
If we look at the interaction variables, on the centre right we 
find that Size* Udc is positive and statistically significant. This 
suggests that the size effect is stronger for Udc compared to other 
parties in the alliance. The same cannot be said about the interaction 
between the dummies and the incumbency variable. On the left side 
spectrum we obtain a mixed picture, whereby the interaction 
between size and Margherita is the only statistically significant 
interaction but it portrays a negative sign. This suggests that the 
effect of size is weaker than it is for the reference category Ds. 
Given the insignificance of the other two interactions we can say 
very little in terms of comparisons. Like it is the case for the centre
56 The chi square statistic (17.15), with p value o f 0.000) suggests that they are 
statistically different from each other.
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right the interactions between incumbency and the party dummies do 
not yield statistically significant coefficients.
Consequently, a noteworthy intuition, which is indirectly 
drawn for the centre-right results but directly drawn for the centre- 
left coalition, is that these results support Hypothesis (3). According 
to this hypothesis the closer a party, within its coalition, to the centre 
of the political spectrum the higher its blackmailing potentials and 
the higher its probability of being allocated a greater number of 
districts. While for the centre right it is less likely that the most 
centrist party Udc receives a seat vis-a-vis Fi, the probability it 
receives a seat is higher than the probability of the other allies. On 
the centre left side Margherita the most centrist party of the coalition 
has a higher likelihood of being allocated a district with respect to 
Ds.
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Table (4.4): Mixed Logit Regression Coefficients Results: 2001
Partition of SMDs.
CDL ULIVO
Size 0.039 0.045
(2.26)* (2.47)*
Incumbency 1.755 1.916
(4.81)** (6.57)**
Udc -1.302
(-2.52)*
Ln -0.721
(-1.30)
An -0.399
(-0.70)
Margherita 1.367
(3.40)**
Girasole -1.954
(-3.39)**
Pdci -0.113
(-0.26)
Size*Udc 0.075
(1.74)
Size*Ln 0.051
(1.48)
Size*An 0.003
(0.08)
Size*Margherita -0.051
(-2.12)*
Size*GirasoIe -0.030
(-0.53)
Size*Pdci 0.124
(0.78)
Incumbency*Udc -0.091
(-0.14)
Incumbency*Ln -0.179
(-0.24)
Incumbency*An 0.986
(1.85)*
Incumbency*Margherita
Incunibency*Girasole -0.257
(-0.38)
Incumbency*Pdci 16.325
(0.02)
Size*safety 0.042 .038
(2.33)* (2.18)*
Observations 1752 1618
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses * significant at 5%; 
** significant at 1%.
160
Table (4.5): Mixed Logit Regression Coefficients Results: 2001
Partition of SMDs (odd ratios).______________________________
CDL ULIVO
Size 1.039 1.046
(2.26)* (2.47)*
Incumbency 5.783 6.796
(4.81)** (6.57)**
Udc 0.271
(-2.52)*
Ln 0.486
(-1.30)
An 0.670
(-0.70)
Margherita 3.926
(3.40)**
Girasole 0 .141
(-3.39)**
Pdci 0.892
(-0.26)
Size*Udc 1.077
(1.74)*
Size*Ln 1.051
(1.48)
Size*An 1.002
(0.08)
Size*Margherita 0.949
(-2.12)*
Size*Girasole 0.970
(-0.53)
Size*Pdci 1.132
(0.53)
Incumbency*Udc 0.192
(-0.14)
Incumbency*Ln 0.836
(-0.24)
Incumbency*An 2.681
(1.85)*
Incumbency*Margherita
Incumbency*Girasole 0 .7 7 3
(-0.78)
Incumbency*Pdci 1.230
(0.38)
Size*safety 1.001 1.012
(1.82)* (2.18)*
Observations 1752 1618
Absolute value o f  z statistics in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%.
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4.2.B Qualitative distribution.
Before addressing Hypotheses (2) and (4) about the effect of a 
party’s size and location on the probability of being assigned an 
SMD, I need to introduce back the concept of ‘index of 
overpayment’ addressed in the previous chapters.
Like I show in Chapter (3.1.3) section (i), while there is a 
correlation between size and the number of SMDs, there is a 
tendency for small parties to be slightly overpaid. Through the use of 
both the advantage ratio and the overpayment index I find evidence 
of what is known in the literature as the relative weakness effect 
(Browne and Franklin, 1973). What I can investigate is whether and 
the extent of which SMDs tend to be associated with parties overpaid 
and underpaid in the exchange of SMDs for votes. Consequently, I 
correlate the proportional share of each SMD type (safe, or not safe) 
received by each party in each of the two coalitions with the index o f 
overpayment for that party. Since large parties are more likely to 
receive SMDs of all types than are small parties, I need to 
standardize the data by dividing the number of SMDs of each type 
received by the total number of SMDS of all types received by the 
party. This yields the proportion of share of each SMDs type that 
each party receives. The resulting coefficients of the correlation 
between safe districts and the overpayment index (-0.93, for the 
centre right and -0.90 for the centre left) indicate that the safe
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districts tend to go to parties underpaid in the exchange (large ones). 
Contrarily, I obtain positive coefficients when I correlate districts 
which are not safe with the overpayment index. This suggests that 
that these districts tend to go to parties overpaid in the exchange 
(smaller parties).
Given this overpayment it is reasonable to assume then that 
bigger parties are extracting qualitative rents and receive a higher 
number of better (read safe) districts in exchange of this 
underpayment. If we look at the interaction between size and safety 
in Table (4.4) and (4.5) we can get some clear support. In fact, the 
interaction for both alliances is positive and statistically significant, 
suggesting that the effect of size is stronger in safer districts. In other 
words this corroborates Hypothesis (2) related to the positive role 
that size plays in the allocation of safe districts.
In order to have stronger predictions about the role o f size in 
safe districts and in order to investigate Hypothesis (4) about the role 
of party location in the qualitative allocation, I run the same analysis 
of Tables (4.4) and (4.5) in a split sample. Tables (4.6) through (4.9) 
display the results in safe districts and lost ones.
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Table (4.6) Mixed Logit Regression Coefficients Results: 2001
Partition of Safe SMDs.
CDL ULIVO
Size 0.055 0.071
(2.18)* (2.08)*
Incumbency 2.594 3.135
(2.42)* (3.92)**
Udc 0.179
(0.25)
Ln -0.819
(-1.30)
An -0.585
(-0.87)
Margherita 2.094
(3.53)**
Girasole 0.612
(0.90)
Pdci -0.147
(-0.13)
Size*Udc 0.069
(1.16)
Size*Ln 0.026
(0.48)
Size*An -0.041
(-0.92)
Size*Margherita -0.072
(-2.13)*
Size*GirasoIe -0.043
(-0.49)
Size*Pdci -0.580
(-0.80)
Incumbency*Udc -0.944
(-0.67)
Incumbency*Ln
Incumbency*An -0.551
(-0.45)
Incumbency*Margherita
Incumbency*GirasoIe -1.414
(-1.04)
Incumbency*Pdci
1
Observations | 382 521
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%. lncumbency*Ln, Incumbency *Margherita and 
Incumbency*Pdci dropped due to collinearity.
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Table (4.7) Mixed Logit Regression Coefficients Results: 2001
Partition of Safe SMDs (C>dd Ratios).a
CDL ULIVO
Size 1.056 1.073
(2.18)* (2.08)*
Incumbency 13.382 6.292
(2.42 )* (5.16)**
Udc 1.196
(0.25)
Ln 0.440
(-1.30)
An 0.557
(-0.87 )
Margherita 1.457
(3.53)**
Girasole 0.354
(-1.58)
Pdci 0.092
(-1.95)*
Size*Udc 1.071
(1.16)
Size*Ln 1.026
(0.48)
Size* An 0.960
(-0.92)
Size*Margherita 1.009
(-0.34)
Size*Girasole 1.041
(-0.45)
Size*Pdlci 1.147
(-0.29)
Incumbency*Udc 0.389
(-0.67)
Incumbency*Ln
Incumbency*An 0.576
(-0.45)
Incumbency*Margherita
Incumbency*Girasole 0.0872
(-0.19)
Incumbency*Pdci 1.223
(0.02)
Observations 382 521
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%. aIncumbency*Ln, and Incumbency *Margherita dropped 
due to collinearity.
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Table (4.8) Mixed Logit Regression Coefficients Results: 2001
Partition of Lost SMDs. *
CDL ULIVO
Size 0.0234 0.023
(0.95) (1.53)
Incumbency 1.618 1.798
(3.98)** (5.72)**
Udc -0.935
(-1.08)
Ln -2.237
( -2.5)*
An -1.101
(-1.19)
Margherita 0.708
(1.66)*
Girasole -0.729
(-1.44)
Pdci -3.830
(-3.89)**
Size*Udc 0.081
(1.32)
Size*Ln 0 .086
(1.75)
Size* An 0.043
(0.96) *
Size*Margherita -0.020
(-0.84)
Size*GirasoIe 0.012
(0.17)
Size*Pdci 0.739
(2.45)*
Incumbency*Udc -0.069
(-0.09)
Incumbency*Ln 0.057
(0.06 )
Incumbency*An 1.433
(2.14) *
Incumbency*Margherita
Incumbency*Girasole -0.171
(-0.23)
Incumbency*Pdci 15.715
(0.03)
Observations 1374
Absolute value o f  z  statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%. a Incumbency *Ln, and Incumbency*Margherita dropped 
due to collinearity.
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Table (4.9) Mixed Logit Regression Coefficients Results: 2001
Partition of Lost SMDs (Odd Ratios). *_______________________
CDL ULIVO
Size 1.023 1.024
(0.95) (1.53)
Incumbency 5.046 6.039
(3.98)** (5.72)**
Udc 0.332
(-1.19)
Ln 0.106
(-2.59)*
An 0.392
(-1.08)
Margherita 2.031
(1.66)*
Girasole 0.482
(-1.44)
Pdci 0.021
(-3.89)**
Size*Udc 1.090
(1.75)*
Size*Ln 1.084
(1.32)
Size*An 1.044
(0.96)
Size*Margherita 0.979
(-0.89)
Size*Girasole 1.012
(0.17)
Size*Pdci 2.095
(2.45)*
Incumbency*Udc 0.932
(-0.09)*
Incumbency*Ln 1.059
(0.06)
Incumbency*An 4.192
( 2.14)*
Incumbency*Margherita
Incumbency*Girasole 0.842
(-0.23)
Incumbency*Pdci 1.463
(0.02)
Observations 1374 1173
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; **
significant at 1%.a Incumbency *Margherita dropped due to collinearity.
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Tables (4.6) and (4.7) display the results for safe districts, 
where the difference between the first and the second candidate is 
higher than 8%. The first and foremost interesting results are the 
coefficients for size and incumbency for both alliances. The odd 
ratios in table (4.7) clearly support Hypothesis (2) and expand 
Hypothesis (5). They show that both variables are positive and 
statistically significant for the centre left and the centre right. The 
size safety suggests that size and incumbency play a strong and 
positive role in the allocation of safe SMDs.
In terms of Hypothesis (4) a look at the coefficients of the 
dummy variables provides some interesting insights but inconsistent 
across the two alliances. The coefficient of Margherita, the most 
centrist of the centre left parties, which I use as a proxy of centrality, 
is both positive and significant. This suggest that being in the centre 
in the left coalition can be considered a threatening devise and 
therefore increase the likelihood of being assigned a safe SMD. The 
same cannot be said about the centre right where none of the party 
dummies portray a significant coefficient. Nonetheless, a look at the 
directionality of the coefficients shows that ceteris paribus Udc is 
less likely to be allocated a safe district compared to the reference 
category Fi, but more likely compared to Ln and An.
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The other interesting result comes from looking at the size 
variable in Tables (4.8) and (4.9), which display the analysis I run in 
lost districts. While incumbency clearly plays a positive role 
irrespective of the district’s type, for both alliances size does not 
appear to be relevant in explaining the allocation of lost SMDs. 
These results add robustness to Hypotheses (1) and (2) relating size 
with quantitative and qualitative allocation of SMDs.
Notwithstanding these interesting results, we must be cautious 
when making inferences. There is, in fact, still a possibility that there 
is a degree of randomness in the translation of votes into SMDs in 
terms of their quality. It may be the case that in some instances a 
party gets a safe SMD too many or too few in exchange for its votes’ 
contribution but that such pattern is globally random, systematically 
favouring small parties, centrist parties or another category.
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4.4 Conclusions.
To what degree do mixed electoral systems affect parties’ incentives in 
the pre-electoral arena? The phenomenon of pre-electoral coalition formation 
and the distribution of the 475 SMDs within each alliance, through the 1994, 
1996 and 2001 elections, reflect per se a symptom of change in the incentive 
structures of parties. What influences parties’ coalition bargaining which in 
turn affects the distribution of those seats is both theoretically and empirically 
under-investigated. While in Chapter (3) I introduced a theoretical framework 
with the scope of theorizing about parties’ bargaining power, in this chapter 
my purpose was to test the formulated theoretical model. The results presented 
support the claim of the importance of some party resources in explaining the 
partition of SMDs among coalition members. The key finding is that a party’s 
location near to the centre of the political spectrum is evidence of a potential 
threat device. The data also provides direct and indirect evidence regarding 
the role played by a party’s policy location in exerting power over the 
quantitative allocation of districts. Similarly, in line with my expectations, 
size and incumbency are two resources that prove to be good indicators for 
explaining bargaining power over the quantity allocation of SMDs. The same 
can be said about the qualitative allocation. Not only does the interaction 
between size and safety suggest that ceteris paribus the effect of size is 
stronger in safe districts, but also the analysis of the split sample supports the 
size vs. safe district relation.
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Overall, the results of this study represent unique and unprecedented 
material. On the one hand, the descriptive statistics presented in Chapter (3) 
encourage us to be cautious when theorizing about the high bargaining power 
of small parties. On the other hand, the statistical analysis presented in this 
chapter highlight the role of parties’ resources in explaining bargaining. In 
particular, it provides evidence about the under-investigated resource, namely 
parties’ threatening potential reflected by their location in the political 
spectrum.
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CHAPTER 5 - THE IMPACT OF MIXED
ELECTORAL RULES ON THE INCENTIVE 
STRUCTURE OF VOTERS.
This Chapter addresses another interesting electoral phenomenon, that of 
split-ticket voting, which, as I demonstrate in Chapter (2), permeates the three 
Italian elections held under mixed rules. Several aspects of this phenomenon 
could be analysed. On the one hand, why does it happen and the conditions 
under which it increases deserve our attention. On the other hand, the 
connection between this phenomenon and parties’ chances of winning the 
elections is also worth the attention. Given that the scope of this thesis 
revolves around the study of the impact of mixed rules on the incentive 
structure of political actors, it becomes apparent that I am only interested in 
investigating the former.
In Chapter (3.2) I address the main theoretical and empirical work 
concerning split-ticket voting. The theoretical literature reviewed uncovered 
the lack of consensus among scholars as to what affects split-ticket behaviour. 
Some consider voters and electoral rules as the main causes of split-ticket 
voting (Bawn, 1999; Cox, 1997; Fisher, 1973; Reed, 1999; Roberts, 1988; 
Schoen 1999). A second group considers candidates and their individual 
characteristics as the main cause (Karp et al., 2002; Burden and Kimball, 
1998; Moser and Scheiner, 2005). The final group acknowledges the merits of 
both explanations and consequently investigates together voters, electoral
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rules and candidates’ characteristics (Benoit et al. 2006). Again, by virtue of 
the scope of this thesis, the approach adopted by the last group of research is 
more appealing. Therefore, I investigate split-ticket behaviour by looking at a 
mixture of candidates’, voters’ and districts’ characteristics.
The overview of the empirical literature reveals another division within 
the split-ticket voting literature. In fact, the body of empirical knowledge is 
divided into two groups. On the one hand, most of the existing empirical 
work makes use of survey data whereby a sample of voters is asked about the 
way they cast their vote at the last elections. For the reasons explained in 
detail below, more recent analyses take some distance from using this type of 
data and introduce a more sophisticated way of elaborating election results. 
Namely, Bayesian simulations are adopted in order to reproduce unavailable 
individual level data. While currently in expansion, this methodology has still 
a limited use in political science, especially due to the insistency of many 
scholars to use survey data.
In order to explain split-ticket voting in the Italian 2001 elections, in this 
chapter I chew over the existing theoretical explanations, I replicate the 
analysis conducted by others (as Benoit et al,. 2006) using a different 
database, and consequently I contribute to the existing body of empirical 
knowledge. To conduct the analysis I use two types of data. First, in line with 
most electoral studies on voters’ behaviour, I rely on data produced by 
surveys conducted, in this case, by the Italian National Elections Studies
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(ITANES) for the 2001 elections. This exercise is useful to address the extent 
to which PR votes can be used as a proxy for voters’ first preferences. 
Furthermore, this is necessary as it highlights the shortcomings inherent in this 
data in connection to split-ticket estimates. As I demonstrate below, there is 
evidence that the data provides inaccurate estimates, which impels the need to 
look elsewhere. The second type of data consists in the above mentioned 
Bayesian simulations employing the election results of 2001.
This chapter is structured as follows. First, I introduce the data and 
variables necessary to test the theoretical arguments advanced in Chapter 
(3.2). Detailed hypotheses are introduced in connection with every relevant 
variable. This is followed by a discussion of the methodological tools 
employed. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the results.
57 See footnote 3.
5.1 Data and Variables.
Survey Data.
As previously mentioned, ‘split-ticket voting’ reflects the expression of 
different voting patterns. It consists in casting a divided vote when facing two 
distinct voting choices. In the Italian mixed election context this occurs when 
voters vote for different alliances in each of the two electoral tiers (plurality 
and proportionality). To understand this phenomenon information about the 
way every individual voter behaves in every district for each of the two ballots 
is, therefore, ideally needed. Unfortunately, for cost and confidentiality 
reasons, no such information is always available.
Survey data, when obtainable, is a suitable surrogate but usually not very 
revealing. First, due to sampling error, the finite sample of voters interviewed 
is likely to produce uncertain estimates. The sample might not be perfectly 
representative of the voters’ population due to both imperfections in the 
sampling frame or due to response bias (Weslye, 1991; Burden, 2006). 
Second, is the problem that one cannot decompose the sample into smaller 
units of aggregation because of the number of cases required for such analysis 
(Voss et al., 1995). While we might have a large N database, the data 
available at the district level might not be sufficient. Take as an example the 
Italian case where there are 475 majoritarian districts. An N of 10000 
observations would imply about only a meagre 21 observations per district. A 
more specific example could be drawn from the 2001 Italian National Election
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Studies (ITANES) survey results. This study asks a sample of Italians how 
they voted in the most recent elections. A total of 3209 people were 
interviewed, which implies that relatively few respondents come from each of 
the 475 districts.
A clear benefit of survey data, which must be acknowledged, is that it is 
useful to assess the underlying assumptions made in the aggregate data 
analysis. A key assumption in the literature of mixed electoral systems is that 
PR votes closely reflect voters’ party preferences (Burden, 2000; 2006; and 
Forthcoming). This is why voters rarely defect from their party identification 
in the proportional tier. On the contrary, voters are more likely to defect from 
the candidate identification in the majoritarian tier because of other 
considerations that sometimes might outdo partisanship (Burden, 2006).
To test this assumption for coalition supporters I compare the PR and 
SMD votes of survey respondents with their revealed preferred party. By 
tabulating ITANES (2001) questions C33 “What party do you feel closest to?” 
and QE20 “Can you tell me which list/coalition you voted for in the PR 
ballot?” I can relate party support to vote choice. For simplicity I grouped 
parties under coalition labels. Table (5.1) below validates the assumption that 
PR votes reflect sincere party preference.
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Table (5.1): Validating the Claim of the Sincere Nature of PR vote.
Coalition of 
Party that the 
respondent feels 
closest to
Coalition of party receiving PR vote
Cdl Ulivo Other
Cdl 0.97 
(0.96, 0.98)
0.008
(0.001,0.014)
0.02
(0.01,0.03)
Ulivo 0.02 
(0.01, 0.04)
0.93 
(0.90, 0.95)
0.05 
(0.032, 0.07)
Source: ITANES (2001). Questions C33 and QE20. 95% Confidence intervals in parentheses.
The Table demonstrates quite clearly that PR vote proxies party 
preferences, with 97% of voters who feel closest to a party of the Cdl voting 
for the same party or at least for the Cdl in the PR tier. Similarly, 93% of 
voters who feel closest to a party of the Ulivo vote for the same party or at 
least for the Ulivo in the PR tier.
Next, in order to obtain the picture of the splitting and sticking estimates 
according to these data, in Table (5.2) I tabulate question E l8 “Who is the 
coalition of party receiving your PR vote?” and question E20 “Who is the 
Coalition of party receiving your plurality vote?” While the Ulivo sticking 
estimates are slightly higher then the centre-right ones (0.962 compared to
0.96) they are almost identical. There is strong evidence that these results do 
not reflect the aggregate data I obtain from pure election results.
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Table (5.2): Cross-tabulation of Coalitions Receiving PR Vote and 
Coalition of Party Receiving Plurality Vote.__________________________
Coalition of party receiving Plurality vote
Coalition of party Cdl Ulivo Other
receiving PR vote
Cdl 0.96 0.02 0.02
(0.95, 0.97) (0.01,0.03) (0.01,0.03)
Ulivo 0.018 0.962 0.019
(0.008, 0 .02) (0.95, 0.98) (0.009, 0.029)
Other 0.06 0.50 0.44
(0.04, 0.09) (0.44, 0.55) (0.38, 0.49)
Source: ITANES 2001, Question E18 and questions E20, with 95% confidence intervals in 
parentheses.
A quick look at these cross tabulations reveal some clear inaccuracies. 
Unlike aggregate election data, survey results suggest that sticking estimates 
for both the Cdl and the Ulivo are rather similar. However, Table (5.3) below 
which reports actual parties’ performance in the 2001 elections (which is 
actually column three of Table (3.6)) suggests otherwise. By comparing the 
two tables it becomes apparent that sticking and splitting estimates from the 
survey are not remotely similar. This suggests that other means must be 
pursued in order to obtain these estimates. As it is the case for the U.S. and 
Japan, Italian surveys appear to overstate the amount o f straight ticket voting 
(Burden, 2000; Burden, 2007; Burden and Kimbal, 2002). Consequently, not 
only are ecological inference (El) estimates helpful; they are necessary.
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Table (543): Coalitions9 and Parties’ Performance in the 2001 House
Elections.
2001
% SMD votes % PR votes
Centre-Left 42.97* 34.92%*
Centre-Right 45.38% 48.62%
Others 9.61% 13.9%
*It is important to recall that the huge discrepancy is explained by the fact that Rifondazione 
Comunista decided o f ‘not running’ in the SMDs. Source: for the 1994 elections Chiaramonte 
(1995: 377). For 1996 and 2001 elections the source is the national elections results. Totals do 
not always add up to 100 % because in some districts a number of small local parties are 
excluded. Furthermore, in other districts some parties run under a mixed label (like Ulivo + 
SVP) and where this not included in the calculus.
Aggregate Data.
When the ideal survey data to study split-ticket voting is not available, 
or is inaccurate, scholars usually opt for other measures such as SMD-PR vote 
gap. To be more specific, they use the difference between the vote percentage 
of a given candidate and the PR vote percentage won by the candidate’s party 
(Bawn, 1999; Kohno, 1997; Moser and Sheiner, 2005; Reed, 1999). Others, 
like Mudambi and Navarra (2004) in their study of the 1994 and 1996 Italian 
general elections, use the ‘Split preference voting index expectation’ defined 
as:
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-------------- , where PPL is percentage of plurality voting and PPR is
PPL
percentage of PR voting.58
Mudambi et al. (2001a) use an even more basic form of this equation 
and simply look at the difference between PPR and PPL (150). The 
shortcomings of such indices for the study of split-ticket voting are simple and 
clear. On the one hand, these measures do not help in explaining where the 
extra votes come from or where the lost votes go. Rusk (1970) describes this 
as the inability to “detect mutual crossovers between parties” (1224). On the 
other hand, PPL and PPR are aggregate measures, so the use of such data to 
extract clues about individual behaviour implies that we are making ‘an 
ecological inference*.
Take the hypothetical situation where there are two main coalitions 
CL(a) and CR(B), where CL and CR stand for the centre-left, and the centre-
right coalitions respectively. The subscripts (A, and B) refer to the collection 
of parties which compose each of them [(a, a2 ,...,aw) , and ( \ 62, >—>£„)]•
The available information is how many votes were cast for each of the two 
groups or in other words the sum of votes received by those parties belonging 
to each coalition in the plurality tier. I also know how many votes each party 
[(a, a2 ,...,«„), and(6, b2 ,...,£„) ] individually receives in the proportional tier.
58 In both the above case PR votes are considered sincere expressions of preferences. In fact, 
the more votes a party receives in the PR tier the more are its chances of gaining 
representations. This link is weakened when the threshold increases.
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However, the information that I am interested in is individual voting 
behaviour or at least sub-aggregates such as how many a, party supporters
stick with the coalition CL in a particular district given aggregates such as the 
total number of a, supporters in a specific district and given the total amount
of votes received by CL . But why is obtaining such information a problem? 
Assume that in one district thirty percent of the voting population supports 
party ax (an information I know by looking at this party’s PR votes) and at
the same time CL received thirty percent of total SMD votes cast in that 
district. Also assume that in another district forty percent of the voting 
population supports party a, and simultaneously forty percent of the total
electorate votes for CL. Thus it seems that there is a perfect positive 
correlation between voting fora, and votes for CL . In other words it appears 
that all a, party supporters consistently vote for the coalition their party
belongs to. However intuitive this relation might be, votes in the second 
district might come from quite a different sector; party a, supporters in this 
district may not have voted for CL at all. Postulating influences on the 
behaviour of individuals acquired from aggregate data, or in other words 
hypothesizing about the behaviour of individuals by using data from whole 
populations, is often misleading.
Consequently, while useful, ecological inference is usually perceived as 
a problem because some information generally related to the quantities of
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interest is generally lost during the process of aggregation. The problem is 
well known in political science since Ogbum and Goltra (1919) introduced it 
in the very first multivariate statistical analysis that was ever done in political 
science and published in a political journal. This has been among the longest 
standing unsolved problems in quantitative social science (King, 1997).
The exact problem of ecological inference could be conceptualised as a 
standard contingency table with missing data whereby the marginals based on 
the aggregate data are known, but the cell percentages are unknown (Achen 
and Shively, 1995; King, 1997; King et al., 2004). Table (5.4) illustrates the 
Italian case, where, to complicate matters further, there are three groups and 
not two like the example above. What I observe is (a) the total votes that the
centre-left coalition (Ulivo) obtained as a whole in SMDs ( N y 1^ ), (b) the 
total votes that the centre-right coalition (Cdl) obtained as a whole in SMDs
( Np**0 ), (c) the total votes that other non-allied parties obtained as a whole
in SMDs ( N q110), (d) the total sum of PR votes received by all parties that
belong to the Ulivo coalition ( ^ u Party)-> (e) the total sum of PR votes received
xrPr
by all parties that belong to the Cdl coalition ( i y  Pparty ) and finally (f) the
total sum of PR votes received by all parties that are non allied ( N oparty )• If 
every voter casts a straight vote, which is the same as saying that each voter
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votes in the plurality and proportional tiers for the same alliance, then the 
values of both N SMD a n d ^  would be the same.59
Table (5.4): Description of the Basic Ecological Inference Problem in 
Each Italian SMD: Contingency Table With Missing Data.
Ulivo
parties’
supporter
Cdl
parties’
Supporter
Supporters 
of Other 
parties
Ulivo
Coalition
Cdl
Coalition
Other
Parties
Stickers
UU
(?)
Switchers
UP
(?)
Switchers
UO
(?)
Switchers Stickers Switchers
PU PP PO
(?) (?) (?)
Switchers Switchers Stickers
OU OP 0 0  or OO'
(?) (?) (?)
j^ t SMD
iyu
n smo j^ t SMD 
iV0
N VtUparty
N PrPparty
N VrOparty
59 We should be aware that straight voting is a sufficient but not necessary condition for 
observing equal N SMD and N **  . In fact if split-ticket results in an equal loss and equal
gain of votes we can still observe equal N  SMD and .
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Having outlined the above, the non-observed split (straight) ticket 
estimates are what I am interested in. The question marks in the first raw, 
under UU, UP, and UO denote the number of frustrated60 voters that support a 
party in the centre-Left ‘Ulivo' coalition in the PR tier and who: vote for the 
Ulivo coalition in the majoritarian tier (UU), who vote for the Cdl coalition in 
the majoritarian tier (UP), and who vote for an ‘other’ non-coalesced party in 
the majoritarian tier (UO), respectively. As King (1997) explains, “several 
combinations of numbers could be placed in these cells without contradicting 
the row and column marginals” (13). This logic is referred to in the literature 
as the methods of bounds.
More formally, the basic problem illustrated in Table (5.5) has two main 
observed variables ( T. and X i )61 and four unobserved quantities of interest
{Pi  > P  i" > >  4 ) f°r each observation.
60 For a justification of the use ‘frustrated’ please refer back to Chapter 3.B.
61 Whereby ( T{) is broken into (Vf) and (1- Vi).
Table (5.5) : The Ecological Inference Problem at the Constituency Level .
Voting probabilities
Vote for non-party p candidate
Vote for rival
coalition’s
candidate
Vote for non
coalition
candidate
Vote for party 
p candidate
Vote for 
party p’s 
list 4 1 - 4 Pi 1-P -
Vote for a 
non-p list I
1—H P 7 1 - p ? \ - X ,
v,; 1-v, T, 1 -T , N,
Note: For reasons of comparability and convenience, King’s (1997) notation is used.
National statistics provide the values in the margins of the table: X.t is 
the proportion of party p's  list vote in district z, Vi is the plurality vote 
proportion of the rival coalition candidate as a fraction of the sum of the 
plurality vote proportions of the rival coalition candidate and the non coalition 
candidate(s), Ti is the sum of the plurality vote proportions of the rival
coalition candidate and the non-coalition candidate(s), and N. is the adjusted
number of valid votes in the SMD (means of total list and plurality valid 
votes).
However, the values of concern are those in the inner cells of the table,
i.e. and P i  , which cannot be observed: ^  is the share of party p 's
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supporters that voted for the rival coalition candidate, and 1 is the share
of party p 's  supporters that voted for the non-coalition candidate, whereas /i, 
is the share of those who support another party than p that voted for the rival
coalition candidate, and 1 — ^  is the share of those who support another
party than p  that voted for the non-coalition candidate. P \  is split-ticket
estimate for party p 's  supporters and 1 P i  is the share of straight ticket
voters. P™ is the split-ticket estimate for those who support another party
than p and 1— P™ is the share of voters except of party p  who cast a straight 
ticket.
While the extended formal explanation can be found in King (1997), in 
this section I only provide the non-technical intuition behind the method, 
which is sufficient to get an idea of where the estimates come from.
King’s method relies on the method of bounds, which through the
knowledge of both Ti and X i it restricts P \  and P™ (the cell quantity of
interest) to a narrower region than the [0,1] interval (Duncan and Davis, 
1953). Consequently, these bounds increase the information needed in a 
statistical model. King’s technique imposes a probabilistic distribution of the
quantities of interest that assumes that P^ and P™ are distributed as truncated
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bivariate normal (TBN) conditional on X i . Using this distributional 
assumption a tomography plot ( P J  by P \ ) is created, whereby each line
represents a district. The true values of P ]  and P™ must thus fall somewhere
on the line. Then a normality assumption is made in order to identify a mode 
on such tomography whereby most of the lines cross and where the estimates
are improved by ‘borrowing strength’ from other districts. Intuitively, P \  and
O w
P i are most likely nearest the mode, which is the peak of the three- 
dimensional normal bell shape. Maximum likelihood estimation is then 
performed to estimate five intermediate parameters that will be subsequently 
retransformed and rescaled. Posterior distribution using importance sampling
is used to draw values from these parameters. The means of P \  and Pi
distributions are used as points estimated, and standard errors and confidence 
intervals are based upon the variation of the simulated values.
These parameters ( ^  , P ^ , ^7 , P™ ) do not reflect the row proportions
that I am seeking to estimate; therefore, as I demonstrate in table (5.6), several 
transformations are needed in order to get the straight and split-tickets voting. 
Estimating these values does not just provide far more and better information 
about voting behaviour of different voters; it also creates new dependent 
variables that can then be used to study other influences on voter’s decision 
(Benoit et al., 2004).
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Table (5.6): Quantities to be Estimated and Transformed, as Required By 
Kingfs Parameterisation.________ ________________________________
Pr(UU) E ( l - $ * )
Proportion of frustrated Ulivo voters 
who stayed with an Ulivo candidate.
Pr(PP) Proportion of frustrated Cdl voters 
who stayed with a Cdl candidate.
Pr (UP)
E( %  )E( )
Proportion of frustrated Ulivo voters 
who voted for a Cdl candidate.
Pr (PU)
e(^ T )
Proportion of frustrated Cdl voters 
who voted for an Ulivo candidate.
Pr(PO) Proportion of frustrated Cdl voters 
who voted for a candidate from the 
other cartel.
Pr(UO)
E ( l-A ? )E ( /? f )
Proportion of frustrated Ulivo voters 
who voted for a candidate from the 
other cartel.
Source: Benoit et aL (2004: 341).
King’s (1997) approach has some strong advantages over previous 
solutions. For one thing, it offers realistic assessments of the ecological 
uncertainty of ecological estimates. King’s method has been evaluated with 
real data in several studies and is robust for aggregation bias. Also, his 
solution corrects for a variety of other serious statistical problems that affect 
ecological inference, such as the production of unrealistic results, as for 
instance percentages that add up to more than 100%.
A final remark concerning the validity of this statistical method is of 
duty. As explained, ecological inference problems arise from the lack of 
individual level information. As such, there is no unique method including
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King’s that will produce precise and accurate results in every instance. Having 
said this, statistics is a field in constant development and improvement, and 
this is the best solution available to us so far.
Explanatory Variables.
As I highlight in the theoretical section of Chapter (3.2), the overview of 
the relevant literature reveals that explanations of split-ticket behaviour are 
usually either candidate centred (focusing on individual characteristics of 
candidates), ideology centred (focusing on the distance between voters and 
candidates) and strategic consideration centred (highlighting the relevance of 
close races). The theoretical intuitions that I develop in that chapter highlight 
the need to assess a mixture of these explanations rather than selecting one 
alone. Consequently, the variables I use in this analysis reflect this holistic 
approach.
Parties’ policy position: To address the role that ideology plays in affecting 
split-ticket behaviour, I need a measure that describes the positions of SMD 
running candidates. While voters possess imperfect information about policy 
positions of individual MPs, they use parties’ policy preferences to draw 
useful inferences (Giannetti and Laver, 2008). Therefore, I adopt parties’ 
policy positions as proxies for individual MP’s positions.
Consequently, I go back to a concept I have already mentioned in this 
thesis, that of the “Inter-Coalition Midpoint” (ICM). In their analysis of the 
1996 Italian elections Benoit et al. (2006) define the ICM as the “point
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halfway between the positions of parties of the candidates offered by each 
coalition in the constituency in question” (14). They theorise that the position 
of the ICM affects the level of coalition splitting. When in a specific SMD the 
Ulivo places a left-wing candidate while the Cdl places a centrist candidate, 
the ICM will be to the left of the centre of the spectrum. In such a case they 
assume that Ulivo voters have more incentives to split compared to Cdl 
supporters. Conversely, when the Cdl places a right wing candidate and the 
Ulivo places a centrist one, Cdl supporters will have more incentives to switch 
compared to the Ulivo ones. In other words, they expect the F-UP to be 
negatively related to the position of the ICM, while F-PU to be positively 
related. This brings me to the first hypothesis of this chapter, the sixth of the 
thesis:
Hypothesis (6): The ICM is negatively (positively) related to Ulivo (Cdl) 
supporters split-ticket voting. ”
The nature of the electorate: this variable is necessary in order to control for 
whether the electorate is more biased to the right, or to the left. To do so, I 
first create a proxy for the nature of each district’s electorate. I do this for both 
the centre-left’s and the centre-right’s electorates. If we consider a party’s PR 
vote as the true representation of its electoral power, then by taking the 
average of the multiplication of the percentage share of PR votes of each party 
(of each coalition and within each district) with their policy positions we can 
obtain a proxy for that district’s policy position. This proxy takes values
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between 3.69 (min) and 7.07 (max) for the centre-left with an average value of 
(5.81). For the centre-right it takes values between 12.38 (min) and 16.88 
(max) with an average value of (15.61). Then I create a dummy for each 
coalition, which I call “Electoratetype”. For the centre-left electorate, the 
dummy takes values of 0 when the proxy is smaller than 5.81 (more left wing 
electorate), and takes values of 1 when the proxy is bigger than 5.81 (more 
centrist). By the same token the dummy for the centre-right electorate takes 
values of 0 when the proxy is bigger than 15.61 (more right wing electorate), 
and takes values of 1 when the proxy is smaller than 15.61 (more centrist). 
Finally, I interact the ICM with “Electorate type” to analyse the role played 
by the ICM when the district is moderate-intensive, or more extreme­
intensive. In fact, I expect that the presence of extreme candidates does not 
contribute to high levels of split-ticket (as opposed to what hypothesised 
above) in those districts with an abundant ‘extreme’ (right or left) electorate. 
For example, if a district is predominantly Lega Nord-mtensive, then the 
presence of a Lega Nord candidate against a Margherita candidate should not 
lead, everything else equal, to high split rates among voters. This brings me to 
the second hypothesis of this chapter, the seventh of the thesis:
Hypothesis (7): “the impact o f the ICM is weaker in those districts where the 
median voter is skewed to the right (left). ”
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Strategic voting: A variable that captures voters’ strategic considerations is 
utilized in many papers such as Bawn (1999) and Moser and Sheiner (2005). 
As they explain, many theories of strategic voting suggest that the number of 
strategic votes cast in close races is higher than those cast in those that are not 
close. What is troublesome, however, is that in both articles the authors use 
‘the difference between the vote percentage won by the candidates in the first 
and second place’ for the same elections under scrutiny. This causes 
endogeneity because it is not possible to identify and isolate the causal effect 
of the closeness of the race over strategic voting and vice versa. For the 
purpose of my analysis, I construct a continuous variable, “Closeness”, that 
describes the absolute percentage vote difference between the first two 
candidates at the previous 2000 regional elections.63 The smaller the value of 
this variable, the higher its competitiveness (marginal district). The 
expectations are that at high level of competitiveness voters have stronger 
incentives to stick with their cartels. However, at low level of competitiveness 
(safe or lost districts), voters might feel that their votes are not very significant 
or decisive, and therefore we observe increased rates of split-ticket behaviour. 
This brings me to the third hypothesis of this chapter, the eighth of the thesis:
62 Sheiner (2005:268) admits this shortcoming but justifies the replacement with the lack o f 
appropriate data.
As I explained in Chapter 4 ,1 use the regional elections because they were the closest ones. 
In fact the previous national elections took place in 1996. The 2000 regional elections took 
place in all but four regions. For those regions I use the European elections results for the 
same year instead. I ran a test to check that this difference is not statistically significant.
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Hypothesis (8): "Split-ticket voting decrease in those districts where there is a 
close race compared to those districts which are a sure victory or a sure 
loss. ”
In his paper on Japanese election, Burden (Forthcoming) theorises a 
similar relation between the degree of competition within a district and split- 
ticket behaviour. In some cases, however, voters might refrain from 
supporting their party or the coalition their party belongs to even in those 
districts when it matters the most (marginal ones), because they are casting a 
personal vote. They opt for an opponent candidate because they personally 
like him more compared to the candidate who is on offer by the coalition. In 
other words, the absence of strategic voting could be interpreted as an indirect 
evidence for personal voting.
Incumbency: In order to test the role that personal voting plays in split-ticket 
behaviour I introduce a dummy variable. ‘Incumbency’ is coded 1 if the 
candidate won the specific district at the previous general elections (1996 
elections), and 0 otherwise. I expect this variable to be negatively correlated 
with the probability of splitting the vote. This brings me to the last hypothesis 
of this chapter:
H9: “Party incumbency in a specific district decreases the probability o f split- 
ticket behaviour. ”
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5.2 M ethodology.
Following Benoit et al. (2006) I apply the literature recommendation 
concerning the use of the estimated values from King’s and Benoit’s EzI as 
dependent variables in second-stage regressions.64 As common practice 
suggests, any quantities not originally included as covariates in the first-stage 
El estimation are not used in the second stage either (Adolph et al., 2003: 86-  
94). Furthermore, to take into account Heteroskedasticity, I use weighted least 
squares (WLS) using the estimated El standard errors as weights.
As highlighted by Benoit et al. (2006: 476), split-ticket can be explained 
by a myriad of explanations. Limitations in terms of scope, estimation 
technique and measurement error can be attributed to the model, used in their 
paper as well as to its expanded version adopted here. Nevertheless, the 
several theoretically consistent, and significant relationships found provide 
strong evidence of a relationship between policy and vote choice at least 
among centre-right frustrated voters.
64 This is known on the literature as EI-R.
5.3 A nalysis and Results.
Table (5.7) reports the aggregate estimated rates of frustrated voters’ 
coalition sticking and splitting in the plurality districts obtained using King’s 
extended El method. These aggregates are measured by weighting the 
individual districts estimates by the number of voters. Consistent with the 
observed aggregate marginals, King’s estimates reveal sticking rates for Ulivo 
parties supporters of 81% (F-UU) compared to Cdl rates of 64.4% (F-PP). 
Interestingly enough, unlike the previous 1996 elections where a similar 
splitting trend was observed (Cdl losing about 35.4% of its supporters 
compared to Ulivo’s loss of 18.9%) the split-ticket phenomenon did not cause 
the defeat of the Cdl.65
Similar to the 1996 elections, in the event of switching, supporters of 
either of the two coalitions portray very low support rates for non-coalesced 
parties in the majoritarian tier. In fact, F-UO and F-PO portray values of 0.5% 
and 2% respectively.
65 In 1996 the rate of coalition splitting for voters of Cdl in the PR tier was 35% (F-PU) 
compared to Ulivo’s 21% (F-UP) (Benoit et al, 2006: 473).
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Table (5.7): Mean Estimates of Frustrated Voters’ Behaviour.
SMD
PR Ulivo Coalition Cdl Coalition Other parties
Sticker Switchers Switchers
Ulivo F-UU F-UP F-UO
Supporter 0.810 0.139 0.050
(0.730) (0.228) (0.03)
Switchers Stickers Switchers
Cdl F-PU F-PP F-PO0.325 00.644 0.029Supporter (0.125) (0.133) (0.028)
Supporters 
of Other
Switchers Switchers Stickers
F-OU F-OP F-OO
parties 0.332 0.635 0.032(0.162) (0.623) (0.04)
* Standard errors in parentheses.
As mentioned before, the purpose of this chapter is to chew over 
replicate and extend the innovative work of Benoit at al (2006). In fact, while 
the main drive for party splitting for the authors is party proximity, I control 
for the districts’ nature, in terms of both its electorate and of its winnability, 
which is needed in order to have a more complete picture of the situation. 
Therefore, I begin by testing the role of ICM alone in explaining split-ticket 
voting and I later expand this basic model demonstrating how the control 
variables improve the model. I begin by running equation (1) exhibiting the
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results throughout Table (5.7). Therefore, in the first model I estimate the 
following equation:
DV] = a + j3jicm + e ... (1)
Where DVj reflects the split-ticket estimates obtained with EzI programme. 
Table (6.8): Second-Stage Weighted Least Square with (ICM) Only.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
F-UU F-UP F-PP F-PU
Icm -0.003 -0.004 -0.034 0.027
(2.85)** (2.92)** (24.31)** (19.17)**
Constant 0.837 0.164 1.020 0.028
(65.89)** (9.74)** (58.55)** (1.79)
Observations 1272 1272 1083 1079
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.30 0.25
Absolute value oft statistics in parentheses* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
I begin by discussing the results for the centre-right coalition (Cdl). 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table (5.8) are in line with the expectations and 
demonstrate that coalition sticking (F-PP) is negatively related to the Inter- 
Coalition Midpoint while coalition splitting (F-PU) portrays a positive sign. 
This suggests that Cdl voters tend to support the other coalition and split their 
vote in the scenario whereby the Inter-Coalition Midpoint tends to be to the 
right of the centre. This scenario takes place when, for example, the centre- 
right coalition places an extreme right candidate while the centre-left places a 
centrist one (column 4). Consistently with this result, when the Inter-Coalition 
Midpoint increases, coalition sticking tends to fall (column 3). This comes in
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support of Benoit et al (2006), whereby they find the same results for the 1996 
elections.
For the centre-left, however, the results are puzzling. Unlike Benoit et al. 
(2006) who find the Inter-Coalition Midpoint to be positively correlated with 
centre-left sticking rates and negatively correlated with splitting rates, my 
results are not similar. In fact, while the coefficients are all statistically 
significant, not all signs conform to the expectations of the model. In fact, the 
results reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table (5.8) suggest that the Inter- 
Coalition Midpoint has the same ‘negative’ effect on sticking and splitting 
rates of centre-left voters. Furthermore, as I demonstrate below, most of these 
inconsistencies, on the centre-left side, with the theoretical expectations are 
carried on in the extended model discussed below. There is reason to believe 
that the behaviour of Rifondazione Comunista (the extreme left party which 
did not run in the SMDs but ran only in PR districts) affect the validity of the 
model for the voters of the centre-left. In fact, unlike centre-right voters, a 
fraction of centre-left ones face different choice options across the two tiers.
As I explain in the theory section, I argue that it might be important to 
take into account the nature of each district to assess the presence and extent 
of strategic considerations. By ‘the nature of a district’ I mean both its safety 
in terms of winnability, as well as in terms of the nature of the electorate. 
Furthermore, a control for personal voting should also be introduced. For
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these purposes, like equation (2) below shows, I augment the original equation 
with three more variables:
DVi =a + fi]icmi + j32Incumbency + /?3Closeness + P jcm  * Electorate type + £...(2)
In particular, I have added “Incumbency” to control for personal voting 
and ‘Closeness’ to control for strategic voting. I also added an interaction term 
between the Inter-Coalition Midpoint and the dummy that describes the nature 
of the electorate. This is done in order to allow for the Inter-Coalition 
Midpoint to have a different impact on the dependent variable depending on 
the safety of the district as well as the distribution of voters. Table (5.8) below 
reports the results of this second expanded model.
Table (5.9): Complete Second Stage Weighted Least Square (WLS) 
Model.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
F-UU F-UP F-PP F-PU
Icm -0.003 -0.002 -0.034 0.016
(2.61)** (1.36) (19.09)** (8.18)**
Incumbency 0.001 0.002 -0.00041 -0.006
(0.81) (0.44) (0.10) (1.42)
Closeness 0.0005 0.007 -0.002 0.0004
(0.11) (2.67)** (16.19)** (2.80)**
Icm*Electorate_type 0.000 0.000 -0.006 0.006
(8.21)** (1.51) (18.39)** (19.58)**
Constant 0.815 0.102 1.072 0.065
(66.82)** (6.94)** (52.80)** (2.94)**
Observations 1272 1272 1083 1079
R-squared 0.12 0.28 0.51 0.32
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * Significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
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While I will start by addressing the results concerning the centre-right 
coalition, the variable Incumbency needs to be singled out right away. The 
sign of this variable is in line with theory only in two instances; column (1) 
and (4). This would suggest that when centre-left voters find a centre-left 
incumbent as a candidate in their district they are more likely to stick with 
their coalition. Similarly, centre-right voters who find a centre-right 
incumbent as a candidate in their district are less likely to cast a split-ticket 
vote. Nevertheless, not only are the incumbency estimates for centre-left 
splitters and centre-right stickers inconsistent with expectations, but the 
coefficients for all four estimates are statistically insignificant. This indicates 
that there is no evidence, in this model, for a role of personal characteristics 
when explaining split and stick voting among Italian voters.
I move now to the discussion of the other variables of the extended 
model starting with the centre-right. To begin with, in this extended model the 
Inter-Coalition Midpoint (ICM) still portrays statistically significant 
coefficients with the expected signs. As the Inter-Coalition Midpoint 
increases, I observe decreased rates of sticking and increased rates of ticket 
splitting among centre-right voters. The marginal effect of Inter-Coalition 
Midpoint on coalition sticking should also be measured, and it is calculated 
as/?, + pJem*Electorate type. Given that, for centre-right stickers, /?,and 
p 4 are all negative and “Electoratetype” takes on values equal or greater 
than zero, the marginal effect of Inter-Coalition Midpoint on centre-right
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coalition sticking rates is negative as suggested by the econometric estimates 
of the baseline specification (equation 1). However, the significance of/?4 
suggests that the impact of Inter-Coalition Midpoint coalition sticking varies 
with the nature of the electorate. In line with Hypotheses (7), when taking into 
account the distribution of voters in the districts, coalition-sticking estimates 
portray an opposite and statistically significant sign (column 4). The negative 
sign of /?4 suggests that the Inter-Coalition Midpoint has a stronger negative 
impact in reducing coalition sticking in those districts where the median voter 
is to the left of the centre of the coalition (in other words in those districts with 
a higher concentration of centrist voters like Udc). Likewise, the Inter- 
Coalition Midpoint has a weaker negative impact on splitting and sticking in 
those districts where the median voter is to the right of the centre (where there 
is a rightward bias)
The results portrayed in Table (5.8) reinforce the results of Benoit et al. 
(2006) as Inter-Coalition Midpoint has a positive impact on centre-right 
coalition splitting and a negative impact on centre-right coalition sticking. 
Nevertheless, this new operationalisation suggests that the effect of the Inter- 
Coalition Midpoint does vary according to the different nature of the 
electorate. This sheds some more light on the dynamics that govern voters’ 
electoral behaviour. In fact, notwithstanding the small magnitude of 
interaction terms’ coefficients, the results suggest that choosing extreme 
candidates to run in a district always increases the level of centre-right
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coalition splitting. However, this effect tends to be stronger in more moderate 
districts.
Finally, both sign and significance of the variable ‘Closeness’ suggest 
that some forms of strategic consideration do take place. In line with 
Hypothesis (8), the negative sign of F-PP (that is the share of Polo frustrated 
voters who stick with the Polo candidate) suggests that as “Closeness” 
decreases (i.e. the difference between the first two candidates decreases) 
sticking increases. As hypothesised, in those districts where the run is close, 
voters strategically stick with their coalition. Similarly, the positive sign for 
splitting estimates, suggests that as “Closeness” decreases splitting also 
decreases.
Turning to the centre-left, econometric estimates do not deliver results as 
neat and as consistent with theory as it is the case for the centre-right. There 
are serious indications that the centre-left party scenario in Italy in 2001 
stands as an obstacle in the face of the creation of accurate variables. As 
quickly touched upon above, in the 2001 elections the extreme left party 
Rifondazione Comunista decided not to enter the majoritarian competition. 
This causes serious repercussions as it creates substantial noise in the 
variables that are used for the Bayesian estimations. In fact, the difference 
between the sum of the proportional votes received by parties within the Ulivo 
coalition and the sum of votes received by the Ulivo in the majoritarian tier do 
not only reflect conventional trends of vote-splitting towards the Cdl coalition.
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This vote gap (portrayed in Table 4.2) in fact reflects by far Rifondazione’s 
supporters who vote for their party in the proportional tier. Under this 
unconventional trend of massive ‘aggregate’ splitting, I believe that perhaps it 
might not be entirely correct to rely on King’s algorithm. In fact, while some 
could suggest running King’s algorithm considering Rifondazione Comunista 
as part of the Ulivo coalition, estimates drawn from ITANES 2001 suggest 
that this is not entirely correct. In fact, while the majority of those voters who 
reported voting for Rifondazione Comunista in the proportional tier supported 
Ulivo in the majoritarian elections, a non-negligible minority (about 11%) 
declared of supporting the Cdl and other minor parties (questions El 8 and E20 
of ITANES 2001).
Columns (1) and (2) in Tables (5.7) and (5.8) portray the regression 
results of the basic model and of the more extended model. Whilst many 
variables appear to be statistically significant, very few of the covariates 
exhibit the expected sign. With the above intricate dynamics taking place on 
the centre-left’s side, the 2001 results for this alliance represent a unique 
scenario that apparently does not lend itself to the use of King’s methodology.
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5.4  Conclusions.
To what degree do mixed electoral systems affect the incentive structure 
of voters? Using a Bayesian algorithm to simulate missing individual level 
data I investigated the role of the distance between the PR candidate and the 
SMD candidate in affecting voters’ incentives to split. The nature of the 
variables used is dictated by the nature of the data. In fact, because in this 
analysis I employ aggregate level data, aggregate level variables are a must.
In terms of results, due to the poor quality of the data for the centre-left, 
the analysis conducted on this alliance is rather inconclusive. In fact, the data I 
use to make inference about the left coalition is not ‘clean’. As mentioned 
before, the extreme left party Rifondazione made an electoral agreement with 
the Ulivo coalition about not running in SMDs. In other words, when I create 
the aggregate values of vote shares for Ulivo voters, the value is biased as it 
also includes Rifondazione voters. Consequently, I cannot isolate the impact 
on split-ticket decisions that might result from this action.
The same cannot be said about the centre-right, where building the 
database was more straightforward due to a less colourful party scenario in 
terms of old and new units. This analysis confirms the work carried out by 
Benoit et al. (2006) concerning the important role played by the distance 
between the PR and SMD candidates. This distance, known as the variable 
Inter-Coalition Midpoint, operationalised as the point halfway between the 
positions of parties of the candidates offered by each coalition in the
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constituency in question, appears to play a central role in explaining split- 
ticket voting. Unsatisfied with this variable alone, I extended the analysis to 
study the role of this variable in different scenarios. More specifically, I 
investigated how the impact of this variable changes in different districts in 
terms of the nature of its voters. The results highlight the importance of taking 
into account this element. The results also demonstrate how, for the centre- 
right, the positive impact of Inter-Coalition Midpoint on coalition splitting is 
higher in those districts with a high concentration of non-centrist candidates. 
As the distance between the position of a voters’ preferred candidate 
(operationalised as his PR choice) and the position of the candidate selected 
by the coalition to run in the SMD increases, split-ticket increase. This 
phenomenon is stronger in those districts more biased to the centre, or in other 
words where the ratio of centrist voters to extreme right voters is high. 
Furthermore, the results reveal voters’ strategic considerations. In fact, less 
split-ticket occurs in those districts where there is a close race between the 
first two candidates. Overall, these results suggest the prevalence of 
ideological and strategic explanation for split-ticket voting over explanations 
based on candidates’ specific characteristics.
205
CHAPTER 6 - THE IMPACT OF MIXED
ELECTORAL RULES ON THE INCENTIVE 
STRUCTURE OF LEGISLATORS.
To investigate how the rules adopted in Italy between 1994 and 2006 
affect the incentive structure of legislators, and consequently affect their 
behaviour, is the last of the three main questions posed by this thesis. As I 
highlight in the theoretical Chapter (3.3), from a theoretical standpoint the 
academic research in this realm focuses on comparing the behaviour of MPs 
who are elected through the PR tier and those who are elected through the 
majoritarian one. In other words, available research focuses on the 
relationship between mandate and legislative behaviour under distinct 
electoral rules. From Chapter (3) it emerges that the general trend is to 
theorise that legislators who are elected through the PR ballot are more 
dependent on their party for election and career advancement vis-a-vis SMD 
ones.
However, such existing theoretical account looks at mixed systems as 
the union of two separate units. The interaction logics previously touched 
upon urge us to develop a model that takes this interaction into account. This 
is why I supplement the above views with my new theoretical model 
borrowed and adjusted from the political economy literature combining the 
work of Denzau and Munger’s (1986) and that of Bawn and Thies (2003).
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In my model the important assumption is that ‘in order to maximise her 
chances of re-election an MP faces the trade off between voting in line with 
national interests (voting according to party lines) and between voting in line 
with more local interests (drifting away from party lines). This is with the 
exception, of course, of those situations where the two coincide. 
Consequently, I theorise that an MP would drift away from party lines in those 
instances where she believes that such behaviour would not affect in a 
negative way her chances of being re-elected. The scope of the theoretical 
model consists in identifying a set of MP’s characteristics and districts’ 
characteristics that make MPs drift away from party lines and consequently 
favour local politics versus national ones.
From the empirical standpoint, after examining the existing research in 
mixed electoral contexts, I found that there is no clear agreement as these 
studies reach quite diverging conclusions on the role that mandate plays in 
explaining legislative voting behaviour. As I also discuss, the work of Ferrara 
(2004), which follows from the work of Herron (2002), makes some relevant 
steps ahead compared to previous work (s.a. Haspel et al., 1998;Remington 
and Smith, 1995; Thames, 2001; Smith and Remington, 2001). In fact, both 
Ferrara and Herron go beyond the classical approach of simply looking at 
mandate (proportional or majoritarian mandates) and they enrich the analysis 
by using separate indicators of electoral path (winning the PR tier only, 
winning the plurality tier only, or winning both). While this per se represents
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an improvement of the original work on legislative behaviour, I demonstrate 
in Chapter (3.3) an essential drawback of such an approach. In fact, in reality 
one cannot separate between the political mandate of an MP and her electoral 
path. Therefore, classifying MPs according to their mandate (PR or SMD) 
alone is inaccurate. The classification must simultaneously reflect ‘mandate* 
and ‘electoral path’, which leads to a six-category variable. Another important 
improvement of this thesis, highlights in that Chapter, is the use of RC data as 
opposed to simple roll call votes.
This chapter is structured as follows. First, I introduce the data and 
variables necessary to test the theoretical arguments advanced in Chapter 
(3.3). Detailed hypotheses are introduced in connection with every relevant 
variable. This is followed by a discussion of the methodological tools 
employed. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the main results.
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6.1 Data and Variables.
Dependent Variable
It is standard practice in studies of party discipline and those of legislative 
behaviour to look at the distance between MPs’ positions and that of their 
party. Consequently, measures of both positions are necessary. There are 
several ways to assign policy positions to politicians. A simple and 
straightforward method is to directly ask them to make a subjective evaluation 
by placing themselves on scaled right-left continuum. This is similar to Benoit 
and Laver’s (2006) approach whereby they ask a number of political experts 
to make a subjective judgement about parties’ right-left placement. An 
alternative, more mathematically challenging, but more practical and feasible 
method is to infer policy position from studying politicians’ voting patterns. 
This method is called NOMINATE.
NOMINATE theoretical grounding lies in the spatial theory of voting, 
whereby MPs are assumed to have single peaked preferences (where peaks are 
called bliss points) over an ^-dimensional space, which is the task of the 
NOMINATE method itself to identify. NOMINATE calculates the ‘revealed’ 
position of each MP based on an alternating three step algorithm using roll 
call votes (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997).66
66 NOMINATE assumes that each legislator I has a utility function over the policy outcome y  
on vote j  of: U jjy ^ j j y + S j j y  = / ? e x p w h e r e b y  s  is the number of policy 
dimensions ( h = \ s ) , p  is the number o f legislators (r=l ,2, q is the number of roll-
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The specific data used in this chapter comes from applying the above 
method to 242 bills collected that were voted by 642 MPs during the XIII 
Italian legislature (Landi and Pelizzo, 2006a).
With this data Landi and Pelizzo (2006a) create a map of the Italian 
political space, which gives a picture of the location of parties and the 
dimensions governing the XIII Italian Parliament. They suggest that the 
horizontal dimension reflects loyalty to either the centre-left or the centre- 
right coalitions. In the second dimension, instead, parties’ positions reflect a 
north-south divide.
The analysis of this chapter is only concerned with the study of 
legislative behaviour through looking at the first dimension mainly because of 
the nature of the second dimension. As Landi and Pelizzo (2006a: 20) note, 
the distribution of parties along the second dimension is correlated with 
territorial ties of parties, i.e. a North-South divide. By looking at the
call votes (j=l,2, u ijy is the deterministic portion of the utility function while £jjy is 
the stochastic portion, and d  is the Eucledian distance between xt and z  -y (the former being a 
vector of x i ’s ideal points of lengths s and the latter being a vector of roll call votes o f
lengths s). Finally, the coefficient [5 is a constant, whereby as increases, the deterministic 
component of the function also increases relative to £  resulting in perfect spatial voting. 
Instead, as /?  decreases, voting becomes random. The assumption that the stochastic term £  
reflects a logit distribution allows the likelihood that a legislators votes, ‘yes’ or ‘no’, to be 
computed using standard logit arithmetic. Finally, by maximising the constructed likelihood 
function we can obtain the model’s parameters or in other words the dimensions of the 
political space as well as the ideal point of each legislator. For a more detail account see Poole 
and Rosenthal, 1997: 233-251.
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improvement in Aggregate Proportional Reduction in Error (APRE) reported 
in Table (6.1) below, and when moving from one to two dimensions, we only 
note an improvement of 6.8%. Such figure is not considerably ‘high’ 
according to the relevant literature standards. Furthermore, while the 
percentage of correct classified in the first dimension (PCC1), which is a 
goodness of fit statistics, is 96.192, adding a second dimension improves the 
PCC only very minimally (PCC” equals 97.694). This leads me to assume that 
the second dimension is only noise and can be therefore discarded from the 
analysis.
Table (6.1): Summary Statistics of NOMINATE Scores.
Roll-calls read 630
Cutoff for bills 0.025
Number rejected 388
Number accepted 242
Legislators read 651
Cutoff for MPs 20
Legislators read 651
Cutoff for MPs 20
Number rejected 9
Number accepted 642
PCC(l) 96.192
APRE(l) 0.827
PCC(2) 97.694
APRE(2) 0.895
PCC(3) 97.94
APRE(3) 0.906
APRE(2) - APRE(l) 6.8%
APRE(3) - APRE(2) 1.1%
Source: Landi and Pelizzo (2006a: 6).
67 APRE scores indicate how classification results from a simple spatial model improve upon 
classification results from a more basic benchmark model. A higher APRE signifies a greater 
degree of improvement.
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Figure (6.1) below provides a graphical illustration o f the distribution of
Deputies’ NOMINATE scores on the first dimension.
Figure (6.1): Distribution of Deputies' NOMINATE Scores on the First 
Dimension.
Table (6.2): Descriptive Statistics of the Logarithmic Function of the 
Dependent Variable (DV).
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Ln(DV)* 599 -3.30 1.16 -6.91 0.14
*The dependent variable is operationalised as the natural logarithm of the absolute distance 
between a legislator’s NOMINATE score and the mean NOMINATE of all the legislators in 
her party on the first dimension
The choice of the logarithmic function is dictated by the nature of the 
data. Figure (6.2), which shows a histogram of the frequency of the ‘absolute 
distance between an MP and her party’, indicates that its frequency is clearly 
log-normally distributed. This implies that its logarithm is normally 
distributed, and is graphically displayed in Figure (6.3). Therefore, as it is 
common in applied econometrics, I have taken the log of the ‘absolute 
distance between an MP and her party’ as my dependent variable.
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Figure (6.2): The lognormal Distribution of the Absolute Distance
Between an MP and Her Party Mean.
300j
The absolute distance between an MP and her party mean
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Figure (6.3): The Natural Logarithm of the Absolute Distance Between 
an MP and Her Party Mean.  ___  ____________
The natural logarithm o f  the absolute distance between an MP and her party mean
Explanatory Variables
In order to test the theoretical model and to develop appropriate 
hypotheses, the first step is to classify MP depending on both their mandate
choose the SMD one. Consequently, this category (number 4 below) is 
omitted from the analysis.
Table (6.3): Possible Ways of Competing in Districts and Obtaining a 
Parliamentary Seat.______________________________________________
Category Number of observations
1) Running in a PR district only and 99
winning it.
2) Running in an SMD district only and 409
winning it.
3) Running in both tiers - winning in 16
both - choosing the SMD one.
4) Running in both tiers - winning in
both - choosing the PR one 0*
5) Running in both tiers - winning only 56
the SMD one.
6) Running in both tiers - winning only 62
the PR one.
Total 642
* This category is excluded
As explained in the theory section (3.3), the explanatory variables used 
in my theoretical model fall into two categories; candidate-specific variables 
and district-specific ones.
Candidate-specific variables
Path. This variable reflects the path of each MP to her seat. As 
originally theorised, I will look at three different models in which this variable 
is assessed at different levels of analysis.
In the first model (see Figure 6.4 for a graphical illustration) I simply 
compare those MPs who run in either tier only (as those running in a pure 
proportional or majoritarian system) with those who run in both tiers
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simultaneously. For this purpose I use variable (PRorSMD) that takes the 
value o f 1 for MPs running in only one tier and 0 otherwise.
Figure (6.4): Legislative Behaviour Mode! n.l
A MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT 
RUNS IN
_______________________
EITHER A PR OR AN SMD DISTRICT BOTH
(PRorSMD) (Baseline category)
The weakness of this operationalisation consists that it reflects a level o f
aggregation that excludes information about the mode o f victory (winning
both or just one seat). Nevertheless, running in both tiers does reflect the fact
that a party invested the candidate with a double share o f party trust.
Compared to the other category o f running in only one tier, double runner
MPs might have confidence in the fact that deviations form party lines might
not be very costly. This brings me to hypothesis number (10):
Hypothesis (10): “Candidates running in both the proportional and
majoritarian tiers simultaneously display a lower tendency to comply with 
party lines compared to legislator who run in only one tier. ”
In the second model (see Figure 6.5 for a graphical illustration) I break 
down the first category into two distinct ones, obtaining a total o f three 
categories: SMDonly (equals 1 when an MP runs in a SMD district only, 0 
otherwise), PRonly (equals 1 when an MP runs in a PR district only, 0
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otherwise) and Both (equals 1 when an MP runs in both districts, 0 
otherwise).
Figure (6.5): Legislative Behaviour Model n.2.
R OF PARLf AM
RUNS IN
f  '
EITHER A PR OR AN 
SMD DISTRICT
1
ONLY SMD
(SMD_only=l, 0 otherwise)
ONLY PR
(Pr_only=l, 0 otherwise)
BOTH DISTRICTS
BOTH 
(Bas«iine category)
The intuitions developed in the theoretical chapter coupled with the 
above onerationalisation lead me to the second hvriothesis-ofihis-diaDtei^-------
an MP runs in both SMD and PR districts and wins only the PR one, 0 
otherwise), and Ranboth_wonboth_choseSMD (equals 1 when an MP runs 
in both SMD and PR districts, wins both and choosing the SMD one, 0 
otherwise). Among the 642 MPs of this analysis 409 fall in the first category, 
99 in the second, 16 in the third, 56 in the fourth and 62 in the fifth.
Figure (6.6): Legislative Behaviour Model n. 3.
EITHER A 
PR OR AN 
SMD 
DISTRICT
1
A MEMBER OF 
PARLIAMENT
RUNS IN
BOTH DISTRICTS
Ran in a SMD 
district only 
and won it
(baselii
Ran in a PR 
district only 
and won it. 
(PR_only=l, 
0
Won only the SMD 
district.
(Ranbothv 
y=l, 0 otherwise)
Won only the PR 
district.
w
(RanbothwonPRonly 
=1,0 otherwise)
Won both and 
choose the SMD 
district* 
(Ranboth won
* The original model theorises an additional option: won both districts and chose the PR one. 
However, there are no observations under this option and it was, therefore, excluded from the 
graph and from the analysis.
This brings me to the third hypothesis o f this chapter, the twelfth of this 
thesis:
Hypothesis (12): “Candidates running in both the proportional and 
majoritarian tiers simultaneously and winning both will display a lower 
tendency to comply with party lines compared to legislator who run in both 
but win only one o f the two. ”
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Incumbency. Incumbency is coded 1 for those MPs who also served in 
the previous legislature and 0 otherwise. Incumbent legislators are expected to 
have gained both party and voters’ support and therefore are less party 
dependant in their endeavour to gain re-election vis-a-vis newly elected ones. 
I consequently expect this variable to display a positive sign.
Tenure. Tenure reflects the number of legislatures that an MP served in 
Parliament and it ranges between 0 and 13.1 introduce this variable to control 
for the fact that party leaders, or important party members, are often elected in 
safe districts or high in party lists. Failing to control for this variable could 
lead to under estimating the effect of seat safety (both PR and SMD) on the 
propensity of an Italian legislator to vote against her party. Consequently, the 
next hypothesis becomes:
Hypothesis (13): “Incumbent legislators or those with multiple mandates 
display a lower tendency to comply with party lines compared to legislators at 
the first mandate. ”
Parties. I introduce 11 dummies to control for the type of partisan 
affiliation using the party Forza Italia (Fi) as the reference category. This is in 
line with the literature on legislative behaviour in order to control for possible 
variation in the cohesiveness of political parties (Haspel et al. 1998; Herron, 
2002; Remington and Smith 1995; Thames, 2001). Controlling for factions is
68 Again, a positive (negative) dependent variable sign suggests a larger (smaller) absolute 
distance between the legislator’s NOMINATE score and that o f the mean of her party. In 
other words, less (more) cohesion.
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necessary. In the case that some included regressors are correlated with the 
party dummies, failing to control for that would lead to biased coefficients. 
Also in line with the literature deputies are coded on the basis of their final 
partisan affiliation, not their initial one. However, as an extra robustness check 
I run the models excluding those candidates who switch.
Switch. Among the 642 MPs of this analysis, 58 switched party between 
1996 and 2001. To control for the effect of changing factional affiliation, I 
included the dummy variable switch that is commonly used in the literature 
(Thames, 2002; Herron, 2002). In this instance is coded 1 for those legislators 
who left their party for another one during the legislature and 0 otherwise. It is 
interesting to note that this sample is one of moderate rates of switching if 
compared to other Parliaments. For example in the Russian Duma between 
1994 and 1995 the rate of switching was about 25%, which renders it more 
difficult to define factional affiliation (Haspel et al., 1998: 427).
Gender. This control variable is coded 1 for female MPs and 0 for male 
ones. Given the low number of female candidates in the Italian political 
scenario, it is reasonable to expect female MPs to portray higher rates of 
sticking with party line to improve their probability of being selected by their 
party at future elections. Consequently, I introduce hypothesis (14):
Hypothesis (14): “Female legislators have a greater tendency to comply with 
party lines compared to male legislators. ”
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Finally, a last remark about other candidate specific variables is of duty. 
Following Herron (2002), for those MPs with dual candidacy, I created four 
dichotomous variables to test their theory about the simultaneous impact of 
the SMD safety and the list rank (safe/high, safe/low, unsafe/high and 
unsafe/low). Nevertheless, I excluded them from the analysis because one of 
them displayed very little variability, which turns out to be not estimable. 
Even when the three remaining variables are added they are not statistically 
significant. As for the remaining variables of my model, they maintained their 
sign even if their statistically significance drops somewhat for some of them.
District-specific variables.
District Type. In order to control for the role that the type of district 
plays in affecting legislative behaviour of MPs, I introduce two variables one 
for SMD districts and one for PR ones. The safety of SMD seats, 
Safety(SMD), is measured by taking the natural logarithm of the absolute 
difference in percentages between the first and second candidates. The smaller 
the value the more contested the district. The value of this variables ranges 
between 0.03% and 67.42% for SMD districts and it takes a value of 0 for PR 
ones.69 Less safety can be translated in more ‘need’ at future elections of a 
better (safer) district to increase the chances of victory. Therefore, I expect 
Safety(SMD) to display positive a sign. The safety of a PR seat, Safety(PR),
69 This variable has an average of 11%, and values above 50% occur in only 5 districts.
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is measured as the natural logarithm of a continuous variable measured by 
“dividing the effective vote received by their party list in a constituency where 
they were elected by the number of Hare quotas needed for them to be 
guaranteed a seat” (Ferrara, 2002: 13-14). When the raw figure (without 
logarithm) is higher than 1, it means that the party received an effective vote 
higher than the quotas actually needed to win that particular seat (given the 
candidate’s position on the list). If the figure is lower than one, it means that 
the candidate was elected thanks to remainders or thanks to another 
candidate’s renunciation. Therefore, I also expect this variable to positively 
affect the propensity of MPs to vote against her party lines.70 This brings me 
to the last hypothesis of this chapter:
Hypothesis (14): “Legislators in lost seats in terms o f ‘winnability' need the 
party to improve their electoral conditions and therefore portray a more 
cohesive behaviour more in line with the party vis-a-vis other legislators. ”
70 In the analysis section I mention that PR legislators who are highly ranked chi list will be 
likely top behave differently than those on a low rank. In the relevant literature such ranking 
is considered ‘high’ when the ratio of the party effective PR vote to the Hare quota needed for 
the MP to get a seat in the district where die was nominated is greater or equal to one (Ferrara 
2002: 14). When I created a dummy variable on this basis, it correlated at more than 80% with 
the explanatory variable Prsafety. Therefore, a high Prsafety can also be said to correspond 
to a high list ranking.
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6.2. Methodology.
To test the above hypotheses I run three different models. All the
regressions are estimated with OLS with robust standard errors adjusted for
correlation within clusters, where clusters are parties. This takes into account
the possibility that error terms are correlated for MPs belonging to the same
party. Failing to control for this effect might lead to biased standard errors,
invalidating the statistical inference (Greene 2003).
The three models differ in the categorization of an MP’s path to her
electoral seat. So, with the exception of the operationalisation of this variable
the control variables remain the same. To begin with, and in order to test
whether MPs who run in one tier behave differently than those who run in two
simultaneous tiers I run the following model:71
lny, = p 0 + p x PRorSMDi + p 2Incumbi + P^Gender{ + P4Switch{ +
+ p 5Safetysmdi ++p6Safetypri + p 1Safetysmd* tenure. + p^Safetypr* tenure. + 
+ p 9Gender * tenure. + w, ...(l)
whereby y. is the absolute distance between a legislator’s NOMINATE score
and the mean NOMINATE of all the legislators in her party on the first 
dimension.
71 A full set o f 11 party dummies was also included in the regression. It was omitted from the 
equation few practicality. See operationalisation of ui — vg + ei in the text.
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In the second model I run the following equation:
In y i = P0 + p xPRonlyt + /32SMDonlyi + p^Incumbj + pfiendert + p 5Switchi + 
+ p f)Safetysmdi + P1Safetypri + p^Safetysmd * tenure. + p 9Safetypr * tenure. + 
+ p mGender * tenuret + wf. ...(2)
Finally, the equation of the lull model looks as follows:
In y t =P0+ p xPRonlyi + p 2Ranboth _wonSMDonlyi + p^Ranboth _ wonPRonly + 
+ PiRanboth wonboth choseSMD + P5Incumbi + p^Gender. + /?7Switch, +
+ p iSafetysmdi + +P9Safetypri + p XQSafetysmd * tenure. + p xxSafetypr * tenuret + 
+ p l2Gender * tenure. + ur ..(3)
In all the above equations ui can be expressed as follows:
11 — y 4" e
' 8 ',  where v is a fixed party effect and e is the classic error term. In
other words, I estimate the equations above including a full set of party 
dummies which are, therefore, treated as fixed effects and which are estimated 
together with the other regressors. To further take into account potential 
correlation within parties I have used standard errors robust to within group 
clustering.
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6.3. Analysis and Results.
A quick look at the results of the three models suggests that no matter 
which of the three levels of analysis is considered, the coefficients and their 
significance in the rest of the model are not particularly affected. This is 
further evidence to the robustness of the models as a whole.
As in all the three models, in the first one I investigate candidate- 
specific and district-specific variables and their role in affecting the propensity 
of a legislator to vote against her party. In particular, I compare the legislative 
behaviour of MPs who run in either tier (that is only PR or only SMD) to 
those who run in both tiers simultaneously. As Table (6.4) demonstrates, 
among the candidate-specific variables only the control variables ‘Switch’ and 
several party dummies appear to be statistically significant at different
nosignificance level. Surprisingly, and unlike postulated through hypotheses 
(11) and (13), ‘Incumbency’ and ‘Gender’ do not display significant 
coefficients and consequently do not help explaining legislator’s voting 
behaviour. In terms of the variable ‘PRorSMD’ (Cohrnml), the coefficient 
suggests that those legislators who only run in one tier do not appear to 
portray a higher propensity to vote against their party in respect to those who 
run in both. It is important to reiterate that this model reflects a high level of 
aggregation. Legislators who run in either a PR or an SMD district are
72 Note that most o f the party dummies are individually statistically significant. I also tested 
for joint significance o f the party dummies and I had to reject the null hypothesis that they are 
jointly equal to zero at the conventional levels of confidence.
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aggregated together under one roof. Likewise, legislators who run in both 
tiers, but who actually win either or both, are aggregated also under one tier.
Moving to the district-specific variables, I only find ‘Safety(SMD)’, the 
natural logarithm of the safety of the SMD, to portray a positive and 
significant sign. As anticipated in Hypothesis (14), this result suggests that as 
the safety of SMD increases, the propensity of an MP to vote against their 
party lines increase. In fact, MPs who occupy more precarious majoritarian 
seats need their party more than those standing in safer and more winnable 
seats. Consequently, they display stronger incentives to demonstrate loyalty to 
their party, by voting more in favour of its lines, so as to win its needed future 
support. The same cannot be said about PR legislators who are placed on 
lower party lists.
As I explain in the above data section, I include the variable ‘Tenure’ as 
an interaction with ‘Safety(SMD)’ and ‘Safety(PR)’ in order to control for the 
fact that party leaders or important party members (both with a long tenure) 
are often elected in safe districts or high in party lists. Failing to control for 
this variable could lead to under estimate the effect of seat safety (both PR and 
SMD) on the propensity of an Italian legislator to vote against her party. 
When such interactions are included, the coefficient of ‘Safety(SMD)’ and 
‘Safety(PR)’ should be interpreted as the impact of ‘Safety(SMD)’ (or 
Safety(PR)) on the dependent variable for a legislator with 0 level of tenure. 
Again, only the interaction with ‘Safety(SMD)’ shows signs of significance.
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The negative sign suggests that at higher levels of seniority the effect of 
‘Safety(SMD)’ on the propensity of legislators to vote against their party gets 
weaker. On the one hand, it is not such a big finding per se to find that more 
senior legislators, who run in safe districts, vote with party lines (as I 
previously mentioned they are the one who dictate those line). However, 
failing to control for this effect would tend to produce an ‘average’ magnitude 
for the ‘Safety(SMD)’ that could be misleading for non-senior legislators. For 
example, for SMD legislators a higher seat safety tends to increase the 
propensity of an MP to vote against her party lines but only for legislators at 
their first or second legislature (i.e. with a tenure lower or equal than 1). For 
MPs with tenure between 2 and 5 the effect of seat safety on the dependent 
variable is not significantly different from zero. For MPs with a tenure higher 
than 5 the impact of seat safety is to increase party loyalty. Mathematically, 
the marginal impact of safety on the propensity of an MP to vote against her 
party lines can be expressed as
d Y  u  *  - ^—--------------= b + c* seniority
dSMDsafety , whereby “Y” is the dependent variable,
is the coefficient of ‘Safety(SMD)’, and “c” is the coefficient of the 
interaction term between ‘Safety(SMD)’ and seniority.
While the gender per se of a legislator does not seem to affect her 
propensity to vote against her party, the variable’s interaction with tenure
73 In this analysis there is a total of 14 legislators who served in 6 or more legislatures.
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suggests different results. In fact, female legislators at their first or second 
legislature do not behave differently than their fellow male colleagues. 
However, female legislators who are at their third legislature and above, 
portray a higher propensity to vote against party line vis-a-vis their male 
colleagues. In both the above cases, the results demonstrate how an increase in 
the seniority, indirectly associated with power and leadership, signifies less 
need of the party future support and translated in more detachment from party 
lines.
Model (2) provides very similar results to the previous model regarding 
the candidate-specific and district-specific variables. In this model I 
disaggregate the original variable ‘Path’ into three distinct categories: MPs 
who run in a SMD district only (SMD only), those who run in a PR district 
only (PRonly) and those who run in both tiers simultaneously (the baseline 
category). Column two of Table (6.4) shows the results consistent with the 
analysis of model (l).74 In particular, legislators who fit categories 
‘SMD only’ and ‘PR only’ do not behave differently than those belonging to 
the reference category (those who run in both). The effects of ‘Safety(SMD)’ 
and its interaction with tenure appear to be similar to those in model (1). The 
only difference is that for MPs with tenure higher than 7 (and not 6) the 
impact of seat safety appears to increase party loyalty. In this model, the
74 The only change is that the control variable for party LN is not significant at the 1% level of 
significance.
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behaviour of female legislators with long tenures does not seem to have an 
important role in affecting their legislative behaviour.
Finally, model (3) is the one that mostly reflects the real picture of 
Italian MPs’ composition in terms of mandate and electoral Path. In fact 
‘Path’ is here disaggregated at the most basic level o f analysis. I create five 
categories that reflect each and every possible path of an MP to her seat (see 
Data section for a detailed explanation). While all the other variables remain 
highly unchanged the results at this different level of analysis provide new and 
interesting results. On the one hand, legislators who belong to the categories 
‘Pronly’, ‘RanbothwonSMDonly’, ‘RanbothwonPRonly’ do not appear 
to portray a different behaviour vis-a-vis the excluded category (legislators 
who run in an SMD district only). However, the same cannot be said about 
legislators in the category ‘RanbothwonbothchoseSMD’ who behave 
different than everyone else. This result is interesting from two perspectives. 
First, it indicates that legislators who have both a strong party support 
(highlighted by the fact that they run in two districts simultaneously) and who 
have a strong voter support (highlighted by the fact that they won in both 
districts) feel stronger and consequently need the party less than those who 
only run in one of the two tier and those who run in both but won only one. 
Unlike legislators who run only in one tiers, and unlike those who run in two 
tiers but win only one, MPs with double candidacy and double victory are 
invested with double trust from both their parties and their electorate.
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Consequently, the data supports the theoretical expectations according to 
which when national and local interests do not coincide MPs invested with an 
‘intentional’ double mandate (understood in terms of double candidacy and 
double victory) feel strong enough to deviate from party lines compared to 
other categories of MPs.
Second, the opportunity of running into two tiers simultaneously is a 
consequence of the new mixed rules. These new rules create five distinct 
categories of legislators, two of which are similar to those running under pure 
proportional and pure majoritarian systems. Nevertheless, belonging to any of 
those two categories does not seem to affect in any way the propensity to vote 
against their party lines suggesting that the new rules do in fact develop a new 
and distinct identity as opposed to pure proportional or majoritarian systems. 
To add strength to this view is the evidence from column three about the 
effect of belonging to category ‘Ranboth wonboth choseSMD’ on the 
propensity of a legislator to vote against her party. As in model 1 and 2, only 
‘Safety(SMD)’ and its interaction appear to be statistically significant. The 
results in this model do not vary much from the other two. In fact, a higher 
seat safety tends to increase the propensity of an MP to vote against her party 
lines but only for legislators at their first, second or third legislature. For MPs 
with tenure between 3 and 6 the effect of seat safety on the dependent variable 
is not significantly different from zero. For MPs with tenure higher than 7 the
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impact of seat safety is to increase party loyalty, in conformity with the 
conclusion above stated.
As a final remark, with the exception of Ln, Udeur, and Verdi, party 
effects for all other parties are highly statistically significant in all the analyses
ne
in which they are included. This strongly suggests that the party internal 
dynamics strongly affect whether MPs vote in line with the majority of their 
party.
75 The Party LN was actually significant in the second analysis.
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Table (6.4): The Impact of District-Specific and Candidate-Specific 
Characteristics on Legislative Behaviour-Party Fixed Effects Model with 
Clustering.___________ _____________ _____________ _____________
(1) (2) (3) i
Candidate specific 
variables:
j
PRorSMD -0.200 i
(baseline is running in both) (1.42) .... . ........ ■ ■ —  i i
SMD only -0.313 i
(1.79) I
PR only 0.127 I
(baseline is running in both) (0.42) i
PR only 0.500 |
(1.20) |
Ranboth wonSMD only 0.194 1
(1.15) |
Ranboth wonPR only 0.470 !
(1.18) i
Ranboth wonboth choseS 
MD
0.405 |
(baseline SMDonly) (2.34)* |
Incumbency 0.052 0.038 0.030 j
(0.75) (0.58) (0.44) 1
Gender -0.042 -0.072 -0.048 !
(0.26) (0.49) (0.36) |
Switch76 1.175 1.164 1.150 it
|
(29.52)** (26.63)** (22.18)** j
PARTIES: An 0.291 0.308 0.313 i
(11.22)** (8.92)** 00 Os VO w * *
Pds 0.591 0.616 0.611 I
(18.20)** (23.26)** (27.16)** !
Ccd 1.168 1.201 1.204 [
(29.93)** (23.97)** (18.36)** 1
Ln 0.041 0.082 0.063 1
(1.43) (2.34)* (0.99) j
Prc 1.135 1.047 1.047 I
(18.26)** (9.58)** (10.00)** J
Ri 0.549 0.582 0.609 1
(7.35)** (6.86)** (6.16)** |
Verdi -0.025 -0.004 0.023 |
(0.75) (0.13) (0.49) i
Popolari -0.758 -0.727 -0.714 1
(31.36)** (22.72)** (23.89)** I
Pdci -1.658 -1.702 -1.682 |
(23.46)** (19.76)** (14.59)** I
76 In these three models for those candidates who switch party factions are defined as the 
parties o f origin and not the party o f arrival. When I run the same models defining party 
factions as those o f arrival the results are unchanged. The same happens when Switch is 
totally excluded from the three analyses.
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Udeur -0.152 -0.107 -0.091
(1.79) (1.13) (0.92)
Democratici -0.349 -0.298 -0.276
(18.54)** (6.96)** (5.16)**
District Specific and 
interacted variables:
Safety(SMD) 0.122 0.151 0.161
(3.42)** (2.70)* (2.52)*
Safety(PR) -0.059 0.137 0.187
(0.31) (0.53) (0.66)
Safety(PR)*tenure 0.108 0.114 0.121
(0.57) (0.60) (0.64)
Safetyf SMD)*tenure -0.038 -0.040 -0.038
(3.19)** (3.11)** (3.45)**
Gender*tenure 0.138 0.124 0.122
(2.16)* (1.83) (1.79)
Constant -3.524 -3.509 -3.842
(26.81)** (26.34)** (26.05)**
Observations 579 579 579
R-squared 0.20 0.20 0.21
Robust t statistics in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
As a further robustness check, I also estimate the models represented by 
equations 1, 2, and 3 without parties’ fixed effects. As before, I have used 
standard errors robust to within group clustering. The results are displayed in 
Table (6.5) below.77
As it is clear by comparing the results of the two tables, not only do I 
find no change in terms of the significance of the main variables of interest, 
but also the magnitude of the coefficients is barely affected.
77 As an additional robustness check I estimated the three above equations treating the parties 
effects as random, rather than fixed, effects. The results of interest are unaffected.
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Table (6.5): The Impact of District-Specific and Candidate-Specific 
Characteristics on Legislative Behaviour-OLS With Clustering._______
(1) (2) (3)
Candidate specific variables'.
PRorSMD -0.115
(baseline is: running in both) (0.79)
SMD only -0.225
(1.23)
PR only 0.191
(baseline is: running in both) (0.70)
PR only 0.470
(1.22)
Ranboth wonSMD only 0.020
(0.15)
Ranboth wonPR only 0.364
(0.90)
Ranboth wonboth choseSMD 0.663
(baseline is: SMDonly) (4.20)**
Incumbency 0.110 0.093 0.086
(0.77) _ (0.67) (0.60)
Gender 0.036 0.005 0.032
(0.17) (0.03) (0.18)
Switch 0.085 0.065 0.061
(0.17) (0.12) (0.12)
District Specific and interacted 
variables:
Safety(SMD) 0.144 0.174 0.182
(3.41)** (2.84)* (2.81)*
Safety(PR) -0.217 -0.025 0.017
Safety(SMD) (1.04) (0.11) (0.06)
Safety(PR)*tenure 0.133 0.136 0.143
(0.71) (0.72) (0.76)
Safety( SMD)*tenure -0.034 -0.036 -0.033
(2.72)* (2.77)* (2.76)*
Gender*tenure 0.168 0.156 0.151
(2.16) (1.94) (1.83)
Constant -3.472 -3.437 -3.680
(21.75)** (23.53)** (13.08)**
Observations 579 579 579
R-squared 0.03 0.04 0.05
Robust t statistics in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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A final remark about the risks of endogeneity is of duty. In this study I 
treat several candidate specific variables and district specific variables as 
exogenous factors that affect the probability of MPs of voting with party lines. 
While the results of my analyses above provide some interesting and new 
insights about legislative behaviour, some might advance some reservations. 
For example, the data shows that legislators who run in both districts and win 
both are less likely to comply with party lines compared with other MPs who 
belong to any of the other categories. Nevertheless, some may allude to the 
fact that these MPs who have a dual mandate are chosen to run in both 
districts exactly because of their voting record. Similarly they might allude at 
the fact that the selection of candidate is likely to be correlated with 
unobserved characteristics of the individuals, and thus endogeneity risks may 
arise. While these doubts seem valid, the above results mitigate these risks. In 
fact, dual candidates who win twice, and who might be leaders, have fewer 
tendencies to vote with party lines than other MPs and not the other way 
around. The risk of endogeneity would be more significant and consequently 
more serious if dual mandate MPs who win twice, and who are likely to be 
members of particular leadership factions, would have a higher tendency to 
vote with party lines. In such a scenario it could be the case that there are 
some unobserved characteristics which favoured their selection as running 
candidates.
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To expand these analyses and investigate endogeneity in detail, future 
work could address what affects the probability that a candidate is chose to 
run in one or more district.
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6.4 Conclusions
To what degree does the incentive structure created by MMM electoral 
rules affect legislators’ voting behaviour? To what extent does dual 
candidacy, which characterises mixed electoral systems, affect the voting 
behaviour of elected MPs? They key finding is the incentive structure faced 
by Italian Legislators is not exclusively affected by their electoral mandate. 
Instead, it also depends on the prospects of competing in both SMD and PR 
tiers as well as election outcomes.
The overview of the relevant literature highlights how conventional 
wisdom and several studies assert that pure PR systems of representation with 
close lists are more successful in disciplining their members. In these systems 
MPs greatly rely on their party for accessing resources such as ballot entry, 
financial resources, or career advancement. Legislators elected in SMD need 
not to entirely rely on their party for resources, as they must appeal to local 
constituents in order to win seats. However when moving mixed system the 
picture is blurred and the literature provides inconclusive answers as the 
incentive structure of legislators under such rules.
In the theoretical model I hypothesise that legislators face a trade off 
between expressing a vote that pleases parties and expressing one that pleases 
the electorate (the national versus local interest divide). In my model I argue 
that there are some candidate-specific and some district-specific 
characteristics that influence this trade off.
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The results of this analysis suggest that the model is very useful when 
predicting legislators’ voting behaviour. They enclose a significant 
contribution to the study of legislative behaviour under this form of electoral 
systems. For example, this work demonstrates the importance of disentangling 
MPs into the natural categories they belong to in terms of what seat they 
occupy and how they reach it (a combination of mandate and electoral path). 
The electoral incentives engendered by the new rules make it inadequate to 
simply compare the behaviour of PR legislators versus SMD ones.
Overall, the contribution of this chapter can be synthesised in two main 
elements. The first one stems from the fact that office-seeking Italian 
legislators face a trade off between pleasing their party (for access to seats) 
and pleasing the electoral (for winning seats). When the need for their party’s 
support at future elections is accentuated or is in danger MPs face strong 
incentives to stick with party lines. The mandate per se does not affect such 
need. This need, instead, arises from several intertwined candidate and 
district-specific characteristics, in particular the SMD seat safety and tenure. 
Second, the study unfolds a third influential element. In fact, the 
interdependence of the majoritarian and proportional elements, under the form 
of dual candidacy, does indeed affect patterns of legislative behaviour. The 
case of a legislator who runs in both tiers and wins both is significant. Such 
legislators can rely on both a strong party support (expressed by double 
candidacy) and on strong voters’ support (expressed by double victory). Given
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the support he receives from voters granting him victory, such legislator does 
not feel the pressure to demonstrate his loyalty to his party (see in fact that 
belonging to the category of ‘double candidacy with a single victory’ does not 
seem to affect legislative behaviour).
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7. CONCLUSIONS.
Electoral system reforms are high on the engineering agenda of many 
new and old democracies, Italy among them. Given the great impact of these 
rules on the working of democracy, it is important that their implications are 
analysed, in particular in order to help reformers take future decisions 
concerning the best form to adopt.
The recent proliferation of countries adopting a form or another of 
mixed rules to elect members of their Parliaments was paralleled by an 
equally increasing number of studies dedicated to the study of these systems. 
Italy chose a form of Mixed Member Majoritarian (MMM) electoral system 
for the period running 1994 and the beginning of 2006, when the system was 
changed again. Unlike the plethora of research that developed immediately 
after the Italian reform, the present work does not focus on assessing whether 
its expected and targeted consequences materialised or not. In fact, the 
normative implications of whether the 1994 electoral system is interpreted as 
the product of a rational process of institutional engineering or the result of 
conflicting parties’ strategies are of little interest to this thesis.
As shown in Chapter (2), a great number of analytical work exists that 
addresses the effects of the Italian mixed electoral system on topics like ‘party 
fragmentation and the decrease in the number of parties’ as well as ‘the issue 
of bipolarity’. Instead, the characterising feature of this work is that it gathers
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under one roof the analysis of the choice and behaviour of the major political 
actors (parties, voters and legislators) subject to the constraints imposed by 
the new rules of the game. In fact, through the study of the pre-electoral, the 
electoral and the legislative stages, I examine the new incentive structure that 
the combination of the proportional representation and majority rule provide 
to parties, voters and legislators at three different electoral levels.
The choice of this framework is dictated by the fact that the 
interdependence of the proportional and plurality tiers in the Italian mixed 
system (between 1994-2001) is epitomised at all stages of the representative 
system. This is coupled with the notion that a multiparty representative 
system is identified by a social choice mechanism intended to aggregate 
individual preferences into social choices in a number of consecutive stages 
(Austen-Smith and Banks, 1988, 2005). Consequently, I study the pre- 
electoral stage where intra-coalition bargaining over the allocation of single 
member districts defines an incentive structure, whereby the interests of 
parties and those of their coalition do not match entirely. Then, I examine the 
electoral stage characterised by the dual ballot available to voters and 
whereby voters, as a consequence, may split their vote. Finally, I study the 
legislative stage investigating the role that the political ‘mandate’ can play in 
affecting MP’s legislative behaviour.
In this thesis I demonstrate how the interaction between the majoritarian 
and proportional tiers of mixed electoral systems creates incentive structures
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that are different from those that we would observe if the two components 
operated independently. In particular, this work represents a contribution to 
the study of contamination and interaction. If we understand ‘contamination’ 
as the phenomenon whereby mixed electoral systems do not simultaneously 
exhibit the same characteristics of both majoritarian and proportional systems, 
because the interaction of those two tiers creates a new hybrid system with its 
own identity and features, then the last chapter is essentially a contribution to 
contamination theory. In essence this research is in line with those studies that 
define mixed electoral systems as a ‘new species of electoral institutions’. The 
purpose is to assess political actors’ behaviour subject to mixed rules. 
Consequently, finding evidence of contamination in some parts of this thesis 
is just a by product, and not a goal per se.
While from a theoretical standpoint both ticket splitting behaviour and 
legislative behaviour under mixed rules are abundantly investigated 
throughout academic studies, the same cannot be said about the existing 
empirical contributions for all of the three topics of this study. Consequently, 
aside from theoretically enhancing the already existing research, this thesis is 
essentially an empirical contribution to those themes addressed by theory but 
not yet sufficiently corroborated by empirics. Nonetheless, the theoretical 
contribution of this thesis in shedding the light to the causal mechanisms that 
govern pre-electoral coalition bargaining should not be underestimated.
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Starting from the pre-electoral stage, this study provides a unique piece 
of research as it addresses the link between a party’s resources and its 
bargaining power in obtaining SMDs. As previously discussed, Reed’s work 
suggests that “Duverger's law is not only working in Italy but it is working 
rapidly and powerfully” (2001: 313) manifesting itself through the two- 
candidate competition at the district level. His conclusions highlight the 
importance of moving the analysis’ focus in Italy from the study of party 
competition to that of coalition competition at the district level. Chapter (4) of 
this thesis, for its part, goes one step further, addressing the analysis of intra­
coalition competition at the district level.
The theoretical chapter highlights the weakness prevailing throughout 
the general political science literature concerning the theme of pre-electoral 
alliances. What we know is that the introduction of mixed electoral rules, in 
general, and the adoption of an abundant majoritarian element in the elections 
of the Italian Lower House, in particular, imposed on parties the need to come 
together under unprecedented pre-electoral alliances. However, the exact 
mechanisms explaining the intra-party bargaining taking place and linking the 
sources of such power to the number of SMDs received have rarely been 
spelled out. Furthermore, not only is the existing academic work mainly about 
post-electoral forms of coalitions; but it also essentially addresses those (post- 
electoral) coalitions formed ‘to establish a government’, leaving those formed 
‘to divide a pie’ under-investigated. As a result, very little is known regarding
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what may affect intra-coalition bargaining when the parties involved try to 
reach agreements in ‘divide the pie’ situations.
This thesis, therefore, provides a theoretical account of ‘who gets what 
and where’ when it comes to distributing the cake of 475 electoral districts 
among allies, using a resource-based account. This thesis does not only 
enhance the theoretical literature in this area, but it also provides an important 
and valuable empirical contribution. Relying on data from the 2001 Italian 
elections, this thesis demonstrates that while the classical resource of power 
(also known as ‘size’) is fundamental in explaining bargaining outcomes, a 
party’s blackmailing potential reflected in its policy position, constitutes 
another important and under-investigated resource.
Overall, in terms of what affects intra-coalition bargaining power 
especially over the allocation of ‘safe’ districts, the results of this thesis 
provide unique and unprecedented material. To begin with, the descriptive 
statistics I present in Chapter (3) encourage us to be cautious when theorizing 
about the claimed ‘high bargaining power’ of small parties. On the other 
hand, the statistical analysis presented in the subsequent chapter highlights the 
role of parties’ resources in explaining bargaining. In particular, the results 
provide evidence corroborating the hypothesis according to which a party’s 
resources, in terms of size, incumbency and location influence their 
bargaining power over the quantitative and qualitative allocation of districts.
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Unlike pre-electoral coalition bargaining, the phenomenon of split-ticket 
voting in mixed electoral systems has been a largely investigated issue, both 
in terms of theory and empirics. While extensive, both theoretical and 
empirical contributions have been greatly ambivalent. On the one hand, 
several rival explanations co-exist to account for voters’ motives in splitting 
their ticket. The theoretical literature that has been reviewed uncovers the lack 
of consensus among scholars as to what may affect split-ticket behaviour. The 
cardinal difference among the existing studies lays in what these studies 
contend to be the influential variables behind split voting decisions. Such 
work usually revolves around distinct ideological, personal characteristic or 
strategic motivations to account for this phenomenon. On the other hand, the 
studies rely on different types of data to study split-ticket behaviour. While , 
most of the existing research usually relies on survey data, the new wave of 
academic work on split-ticket behaviour, relies on Bayesian simulations to 
derive split-ticket estimates. This lack of theoretical agreement on variables 
and data is amplified by the recent proliferation of comprehensive empirical 
studies aimed at providing empirical leverage on this disputed question. This 
ambiguity prevalently comes from the difficulty of obtaining reliable and 
accurate split-ticket estimates in multiparty systems.
By and large, these studies are impaired by either their poor and limited 
data or by their narrow minded single variable focus. In this thesis I attempt to 
overcome both sets of flaws. In fact, I confirm many of the existing results by
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implementing a more sophisticated approach to the estimation of split-ticket, 
while at the same time adopting a more comprehensive approach. My results 
confirm, for the centre-right coalition, the conclusions drawn from Benoit et 
al. (2006) in their study regarding the important role played by the distance 
between PR and SMD candidates in affecting split-ticket voting. My 
statistical analysis, however, goes beyond the mere analysis of candidates’ 
policy positions and highlights the importance of taking into account different 
districts variables such as the nature of the electorate in each district. The 
results of the analysis for the 2001 Italian elections suggest the prevalence of 
ideological and strategic motivations for split-ticket voting over explanations 
based on candidates’ specific characteristic.
When it comes to the centre-left, econometric estimates do not deliver 
results as neat and as consistent with the theory. Iin Chapter (5) there are 
serious indications that the Italian centre-left party scenario in 2001 stands as 
an obstacle in the face of the creation of accurate variables.
Finally, in terms of the theme of legislative behaviour, this thesis’ 
valuable contribution consists in spelling out in detail the mechanisms linking 
the mandate and electoral path of a legislator with her voting behaviour. As it 
is the case with the literature on split-ticket behaviour, my analysis 
demonstrates that there is no clear agreement as these studies reach quite 
diverging conclusions on the role that mandate plays in explaining legislative 
voting behaviour. Several empirical studies have recently emerged to give
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empirical leverage on this theoretically disputed question. However, the main 
weakness of these studies is the operationalisation of some variables and, 
consequently, their measurement strategy. In my model, I hypothesise that 
legislators face a trade-off between expressing a vote that pleases parties and 
between expressing one that pleases the electorate (the national versus local 
interest divide). Then, I argue that there are some candidate-specific and some 
district-specific characteristics that influence this trade-off. I subsequently 
make a case that electoral incentives engendered by the new rule make it 
inadequate to simply compare the behaviour of PR legislators versus SMD 
ones. Consequently, I disentangle MPs into the natural categories they belong 
to in terms of what seat they occupy and how they reached it (a combination 
of mandate and electoral path).
The key finding is that the incentive structure faced by Italian legislators 
is not exclusively affected by their electoral mandate. Instead, it also depends 
on the prospects of competing and winning in both SMD and PR tiers. The 
results that derive from my measurement strategy are consistent throughout 
the different models that I run and as such add robustness to previous work.
There are a number of other important points that need to be mentioned 
concerning the empirical nature of this thesis and of its implications. First, 
when constructing an explanatory model I seek to identify a set of factors that 
account for the occurrence of a particular phenomenon. Consequently, it is 
important to bear in mind that all models are departures from the reality
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(Fiorina, 1975: 153 and Downs, 1957: 34). Indeed one of the main advantages 
of modelling is that by cutting away a large number of factors it allows for 
“precision and clarity of thought” (Fiorina, 1975: 138). However, as much as 
these advantages are worth seeking for, “one must take care not to trade away 
the problem in order to get enough simplicity to analyze it” (Fiorina, 1975: 
153). Therefore, it is important to insist on the fact that the assumptions 
underlying a model are not in outright contradiction to reality, but they are 
only simplifying it to varying degrees. Consequently, in this thesis I 
endeavour to adopt such simplifying assumptions that nevertheless are guided 
by a regard for the robustness of the model.
Second, in section 2.1.2 of this thesis I illustrate the incentives of 
political actors under distinct proportional and majoritarian systems related to 
the three electoral stages addressed by this thesis. In other words, I describe 
how pure electoral systems affect party competition and their electoral 
strategies, how they affect voting behaviour and how they affect legislators’ 
propensity to vote against their party. However, because talks about reforms 
in Italy nowadays do not involve discussions about pure majoritarian or
no
proportional forms, it becomes salient to spend some words about the
70relevance of this study when discussing variant forms of mixed systems.
78 For example one of the latest reform proposals known as the Vassallum (after the name of 
its drafter) proposes an electoral system, which, to simply put it, is a mixture of the German 
and Spanish systems, and as such it includes both majoritarian and proportional traits.
79 The current Italian electoral system, the one adopted after the mixed one, is a purely 
proportional based on closed party lists and with a majority bonus (Premio di Maggioranza).
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Essentially, scholars identify ‘the independence or the dependence of 
the two tiers’ in terms of seats and votes among the most important 
distinguishing features across different mixed member systems (Shugart and 
Wattenberg, 2001; Massicotte and Blais, 1999; and Golder, 2005). For 
example, some previously established classifications distinguish between 
Mixed Member Majoritarian (MMM) electoral systems, and Mixed Member 
Proportional (MMP) electoral systems. Essentially, the first type is 
characterised by two parallel tiers, while in the second there exists a 
compensatory link between the two, and the votes won in one tier are 
subtracted from those won in the other tier (Shugart and Wattenberg, 2001: 
13). Italy between 1994 and 2006 adopted a Mixed Member Majoritarian
system with partial compensation. While the system was characterised by no
0/1
‘seat’ linkage, the scorporo represents a form of ‘vote’ linkage. Variations 
on the form of vote or seat linkages could, thus, have serious implications on 
the incentive structure of one of the actors discussed in this thesis, that of 
voters.
In fact, the occurrence of pre-electoral coalitions (and consequently the 
incentive structure of parties) depends greatly on the number of actors 
involved and the district magnitude. Similarly, the incentive structure of 
legislators pertaining to voting with or against their parties greatly depends on 
their mandate and electoral paths. Voters’ incentives to split their ticket,
80 The ''scorporo ’ or ‘unbundling’ was discussed back on page 48.
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however, might be directly influenced by the linkage, or absence of it, 
between proportional and majority tiers. The effects of the linkage, of course, 
should also depend on how the linkage is actually carried out. Germany, for 
example, has a Mixed Member Proportional system with seat linkage between 
its tiers. In this system a party’s overall seats entitlement is proportional to the 
number of the votes received by applying the PR formula nationally to the 
total number of parliamentary seats. Each party is then entitled to the number 
of seats it won through the SMDs. Subsequently, the party complements the 
remaining seats with the number of candidates from its lists required to reach 
its overall entitlement.
It can be argued, that this institutional variation among mixed electoral 
systems could affect the incentives of voters in casting their votes. This is 
because in systems similar to the German one the SMD vote has no real 
impact on the final number of seats a party receives. Consequently, while in 
an MMM system, like the Italian one, there is reason to expect that split-ticket 
decisions are influenced by strategic motivations (which was corroborated in 
this analysis), the same cannot be theorised about some MMP systems similar 
to the German type. These considerations must be taken in consideration 
when trying to apply this work to other mixed electoral systems. 
Nevertheless, in order to formulate a more detailed theoretical account to 
explain how the incentive structure of political actors changes across different 
mixed systems, a comparative study is deemed necessary.
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Despite the aforementioned issues, which apply to all empirical work, it 
is important to underline the current relevance and salience of this work. With 
electoral reform talks being more important than ever in today’s Italy, 
advancing our understanding of electoral rules is a crucial matter. When it 
comes to Italy and Italian reformers it is unsafe to rule out a priori that the 
next electoral system will be free from mixed traits. Therefore, while policy 
makers and institutional drafters usually look at direct consequences of 
electoral reforms, this study highlights the importance of tackling other, less 
direct but nonetheless, important consequences of rule changes especially 
those that affect the incentive structures of political actors.
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